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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  	  It	  has	  become	  an	  unfortunate	  cliché,	  but	  in	  the	  post	  September	  11th	  world	  Islam	  holds	  especial	  importance	  in	  the	  continuing	  and	  ubiquitous	  struggle	  to	  understand	  emerging	  social	  and	  political	  movements.	  	  It	  has	  been	  given	  unique	  treatment	  in	  policy	  circles,	  political	  rhetoric,	  and	  academia	  alike.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  Western	  discussion	  of	  Islam,	  especially	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  has	  centered	  on	  the	  compatibility,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  between	  Islam	  and	  democracy.	  	  Specifically,	  scholars	  and	  politicians	  have	  focused	  on	  Islam’s	  engagement	  with	  women’s	  rights,	  religious	  and	  ethnic	  equality,	  and	  its	  conceptualization	  of	  democracy	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  	   The	  ability	  for	  democratic	  governance	  systems	  and	  Islam	  to	  hold	  a	  mutually	  harmonious	  relationship	  is	  vital	  to	  the	  future	  of	  international	  politics,	  and	  thus	  the	  analyses	  previously	  preformed	  on	  the	  subject	  matter	  are	  essential	  and	  important.	  	  After	  all,	  the	  potential	  success	  of	  new	  governments	  formed	  in	  Tunisia,	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq	  and	  	  Egypt	  all	  depend	  in	  part	  on	  how	  Muslims	  choose	  to	  interact	  with	  democracy.	  	  This	  thesis	  argues,	  however,	  that	  these	  examinations	  have	  missed	  a	  crucial	  sectarian	  nuance	  significant	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  democracy	  and	  Islam.	  	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  relations	  dominate	  much	  of	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  and	  while	  they	  are	  consanguineous	  members	  of	  the	  same	  branch	  of	  Islam,	  significant	  theological	  differences	  separate	  the	  two.	  	  A	  complete	  treatment	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  Islam	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  behave	  democratically	  would	  therefore	  include	  findings	  on	  if	  the	  dissimilarities	  between	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  Islam	  have	  any	  hold	  on	  this	  relationship,	  and	  thus	  this	  is	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exactly	  what	  this	  thesis	  sets	  out	  to	  answer.	  	  	  Understanding	  the	  complexity	  inherent	  to	  Islam	  is	  a	  fundamental	  first	  step	  in	  comprehending	  the	  implications	  that	  the	  religion	  carries	  for	  democratic	  prospects.	  	  	  	   This	  thesis	  conducts	  a	  multilevel	  analysis	  of	  the	  theological	  differences	  between	  Sunnism	  and	  Shiism	  that	  are	  of	  particular	  relevance	  to	  democracy	  and	  democratization.	  	  	  It	  examines	  specific	  disparate	  theological	  tenets	  held	  by	  each	  branch,	  and	  how	  these	  beliefs	  may,	  in	  a	  theoretical	  context,	  contribute	  or	  hinder	  democratization	  efforts.	  	  It	  also	  examines	  the	  historical	  construction	  and	  foundation	  of	  these	  differences	  and	  how	  they	  contribute	  to	  contemporary	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  towards	  various	  governance	  structures	  and	  democratic	  or	  authoritarian	  values.	  	  Finally,	  it	  briefly	  examines	  how	  these	  theological	  differences	  play	  out	  in	  specific	  cases	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  Iraq	  through	  political	  parties	  and	  leaders.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   These	  findings	  occupy	  a	  unique	  space	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  has	  not	  previously	  been	  explored.	  	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  specific	  dissimilarities	  between	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  Islam	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  have	  significant	  implications	  toward	  the	  relationships	  between	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  and	  democracy,	  but	  that	  not	  all	  of	  these	  implications	  are	  realized	  contemporarily,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Lebanon.	  	  It	  is	  also	  finds	  that	  neither	  sect	  is	  inherently	  more	  democratic	  or	  antidemocratic	  than	  the	  other,	  but	  that	  each	  have	  specific	  beliefs	  that	  vary	  in	  their	  propensity	  to	  democratic	  values	  and	  democracy	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  It	  shows,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  differences	  between	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  Islam	  do	  matter	  in	  terms	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of	  democratic	  inclinations,	  and	  that	  future	  discussions	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  Islam	  and	  democracy	  would	  do	  well	  to	  reflect	  this.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  second	  chapter	  is	  a	  review	  of	  the	  scholarly	  literature	  surrounding	  the	  dynamic	  between	  various	  religions	  and	  democracy,	  both	  in	  specific	  cases	  and	  in	  general.	  	  	  	  It	  also	  examines	  the	  factors	  that	  drive	  religiosity,	  such	  as	  existential	  security,	  charismatic	  leadership,	  and	  state	  mandated	  religions.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  literature	  review	  is	  to	  provide	  an	  analytical	  foundation	  from	  which	  to	  use	  for	  the	  following	  chapters.	  	  It	  does	  so	  by	  examining	  the	  various	  theological	  and	  empirical	  bases	  that	  scholars	  use	  to	  analyze	  different	  religions,	  methods	  that	  are	  utilized	  further	  on	  in	  the	  thesis.	  	  The	  third	  chapter	  studies	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Sunni-­‐Shia	  split	  for	  democracy.	  	  The	  history	  is	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  why	  Sunnism	  and	  Shiism	  exist	  as	  they	  do	  today,	  and	  also	  demonstrates	  why,	  for	  example,	  Shia	  value	  an	  authoritarian	  leadership	  structure	  while	  Sunnis	  prioritize	  community	  consensus.	  The	  history	  contextualizes	  the	  contemporary	  dynamics	  between	  the	  two	  sects	  and	  democracy	  and	  also	  analyzes	  the	  concept	  of	  ijma,	  or	  consensus	  building,	  which	  is	  of	  particular	  relevance	  to	  Sunni	  democratization	  efforts.	  	  	  The	  next	  chapter	  examines	  specific	  contemporary	  theological	  divides	  between	  Sunnis	  and	  Shia	  and	  connects	  these	  dissimilarities	  to	  democratic	  propensity	  or	  disinclination.	  	  	  To	  cite	  some	  examples,	  it	  traces	  the	  contemporary	  disuse	  of	  ijma	  in	  the	  Sunni	  tradition,	  the	  tenet	  of	  ijtihad	  (judgment)	  that	  allows	  for	  modern	  reinterpretation	  of	  Islamic	  law	  by	  Shia	  leaders,	  with	  potential	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Chapter	  2:	  Literature	  Review	  	  
	  
	   In	  both	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  terms,	  how	  do	  the	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  branches	  of	  Islam	  differ	  in	  their	  approach	  and	  propensity	  towards	  democracy	  and	  democratization?	  The	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  politics	  is	  precise	  and	  exhaustive	  in	  many	  areas.	  	  For	  example,	  much	  has	  been	  written	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  connections	  between	  Catholicism	  and	  democracy	  as	  well	  as	  Confucianism	  and	  democracy,	  while	  the	  relationship	  between	  Islam	  and	  democracy	  has	  also	  enjoyed	  extensive	  scholarly	  attention,	  especially	  in	  the	  post	  September	  11th	  world.	  	  Yet	  while	  the	  different	  branches	  within	  the	  Christian	  tradition	  have	  been	  separately	  examined	  as	  to	  their	  propensity	  to	  democracy	  and	  democratization,	  Islam	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  given	  the	  same	  nuanced	  approach.	  	  To	  best	  answer	  the	  question	  above,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  first	  examine	  the	  works	  dealing	  with	  different	  religions	  and	  their	  applied	  and	  theoretical	  relationships	  with	  democracy	  and	  democratization	  as	  a	  means	  to	  understand	  the	  historically	  best	  methods	  to	  examine	  religion	  and	  democracy.	  	   This	  chapter	  first	  examines	  the	  literature	  on	  what	  drives	  religious	  participation,	  a	  matter	  relevant	  to	  this	  paper’s	  thesis	  in	  that	  levels	  of	  religiosity	  and	  religious	  participation	  are	  often	  linked	  with	  a	  variety	  views	  on	  different	  moral	  and	  political	  issues.	  	  It	  then	  discusses	  how	  the	  literature	  shows	  that	  it	  is	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  provide	  a	  generalized	  view	  of	  how	  states	  act	  with	  religion,	  thus	  necessitating	  that	  any	  paper	  on	  the	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  relations	  with	  democracy	  must	  be	  done	  on	  a	  specific	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  before	  developing	  any	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overarching	  theme.	  I	  next	  examine	  how	  Confucianism,	  Catholicism,	  and	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  tradition	  in	  America	  all	  act	  with	  democracy	  structurally,	  theoretically	  and	  empirically.	  	  The	  existing	  literature	  on	  this	  is	  important	  because	  it	  provides	  a	  solid	  analytical	  foundation	  in	  which	  to	  examine	  the	  thesis	  topic	  in	  specific	  terms.	  	  I	  then	  move	  on	  to	  the	  interactions	  between	  democracy	  and	  Islam	  as	  a	  whole,	  an	  important	  matter	  in	  that	  this	  will	  allow	  for	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  what	  structural	  and	  theoretical	  components	  of	  Islam	  may	  allow	  for	  an	  increased	  or	  decreased	  compatibility	  with	  democracy,	  which	  can	  then	  later	  be	  examined	  for	  their	  importance	  within	  each	  specific	  branch.	  	  	  	  
Religious	  Participation	  	  Religious	  participation	  varies	  throughout	  the	  world	  across	  cultural,	  religious	  and	  socioeconomic	  groups.	  Norris	  and	  Inglehart	  identify	  various	  quantifiable	  traits	  that	  lead	  to	  societal	  modernization	  and	  the	  increase	  of	  secularization	  (Norris	  and	  Inglehart,	  53).	  	  Equality	  in	  socioeconomic	  standing	  and	  advancements	  in	  human	  development	  lead	  to	  marked	  differences	  in	  what	  the	  authors	  call	  “existential	  security”,	  or	  the	  reduction	  of	  threats	  to	  survival	  and	  the	  increase	  of	  a	  person’s	  capability	  to	  make	  his	  or	  her	  life	  more	  profitable.	  	  Security	  is	  largely	  based	  off	  of	  human	  development	  rather	  than	  economic	  development.	  	  To	  extrapolate	  in	  general	  terms,	  religiosity	  on	  an	  individual	  basis	  decreases	  as	  human	  development	  qualities	  such	  as	  literacy,	  education,	  proper	  nutrition	  and	  health	  care	  quality	  increases,	  but	  does	  not	  necessarily	  decrease	  if	  private	  wealth	  alone	  increases	  (ibid,	  54).	  	  “Private	  affluence	  can	  coexist	  with	  public	  squalor,	  and	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wealth	  alone	  is	  insufficient	  to	  guarantee	  widespread	  security”	  (ibid,	  54).	  	  Within	  first	  world	  nations,	  for	  example,	  some	  ethnic	  minorities	  and	  other	  sectors	  such	  as	  the	  elderly	  remain	  at	  risk	  of	  lessened	  existential	  security.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  authors	  agree	  that	  there	  are	  other	  contingent	  factors	  that	  affect	  regional	  religiosity,	  particularly	  charismatic	  spiritual	  leadership,	  or	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  state	  to	  stamp	  out	  religions,	  such	  as	  in	  China,	  or	  to	  mandate	  a	  certain	  religion,	  such	  as	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia	  (ibid,	  54).	  	  Still,	  in	  the	  long-­‐term,	  the	  authors	  argue	  that	  human	  development	  levels	  are	  the	  defining	  factor	  driving	  religious	  participation	  in	  nations,	  and	  that	  religion	  as	  an	  important	  piece	  of	  daily	  life	  is	  reduced	  most	  significantly	  as	  nations	  “emerge	  from	  low-­‐income	  agrarian	  economies	  into	  moderate-­‐income	  industrial	  societies	  with	  basic	  welfare	  safety	  nets”	  that	  provide	  a	  margin	  of	  security	  larger	  than	  the	  agrarian	  societies	  (ibid,	  54).	  	  To	  support	  their	  argument,	  the	  authors	  measured	  evidence	  of	  religious	  behavior	  across	  agrarian,	  industrial	  and	  postindustrial	  societies	  in	  eight	  measures	  of	  religiosity	  (fig	  1.1)	  (ibid,	  57).	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  1.1	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Source:	  World	  Values	  Survey,	  pooled	  1981-­2001	  
	  The	  study	  draws	  on	  23	  postindustrial	  nations,	  overwhelmingly	  western	  and	  Catholic	  and	  Protestant	  in	  their	  historically	  predominant	  religions,	  such	  as	  Austria,	  Finland	  and	  the	  United	  States;	  33	  industrial	  nations	  ranging	  from	  Catholic	  countries	  such	  as	  Argentina	  and	  Hungary	  to	  Orthodox	  and	  Muslim	  nations,	  such	  as	  Belarus	  and	  Turkey;	  and	  23	  agrarian	  countries	  with	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  historically	  predominant	  religions	  such	  as	  Albania,	  China,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Peru	  (ibid,	  46).	  	  	  This	  security	  axiom,	  then,	  demonstrates	  that	  decreased	  threats	  from	  an	  assortment	  of	  risks	  and	  dangers,	  such	  as	  natural	  disasters,	  poverty,	  humanitarian	  crises	  and	  human	  rights	  violations,	  all	  contribute	  to	  human	  security,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  this	  security	  leads	  to	  increased	  religiosity	  (ibid,	  14).	  	  The	  less	  secure	  a	  population	  feels,	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  is	  to	  turn	  to	  religion.	  	  The	  authors	  state	  that	  the	  security	  axiom	  shows	  that	  because	  societies	  differ	  in	  human	  security,	  this	  directly	  influences	  religious	  values,	  important	  indicators	  of	  which	  are	  the	  importance	  of	  religion	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  God(s)	  in	  a	  society	  (ibid,	  5).	  	  	  The	  cultural	  traditions	  axiom,	  meanwhile,	  is	  a	  secondary	  argument	  posited	  by	  the	  authors.	  	  It	  states	  that	  the	  cultural	  and	  social	  fabrics	  that	  make	  up	  societies	  are	  guided	  and	  linked	  with	  historical	  religious	  traditions	  that	  are	  imbedded	  even	  in	  citizens	  that	  have	  not	  attended	  church	  or	  stepped	  foot	  in	  a	  mosque.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  religious	  values	  can	  be	  seen	  even	  in	  societies	  that	  are	  not	  predominantly	  religious.	  	  For	  example,	  “although	  only	  about	  5%	  of	  the	  Swedish	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public	  attends	  church	  weekly,	  the	  Swedish	  public	  as	  a	  whole	  manifests	  a	  distinctive	  Protestant	  value	  system	  that	  they	  hold	  in	  common	  with	  the	  citizens	  of	  other	  historically	  Protestant	  societies	  such	  as	  Norway,	  Denmark,	  Iceland,	  Finland,	  Germany,	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  “(ibid,	  17).	  	  Religious	  participation	  can	  vary	  by	  country,	  but	  religious	  influence	  can	  also	  vary	  and	  it	  should	  not	  be	  assumed	  that	  largely	  secular	  societies	  experience	  little	  religious	  legacy	  and	  impact	  on	  daily	  and	  cultural	  life	  (ibid,	  17).	  	  	  While	  human	  security	  impacts	  religious	  values,	  the	  cultural	  axiom	  states,	  religious	  culture	  affects	  moral	  beliefs	  within	  each	  society,	  such	  as	  attitudes	  towards	  gender	  equality	  and	  divorce	  (ibid,	  15).	  	  	   The	  authors	  conclude	  that	  the	  religious	  traditions	  of	  Protestants,	  Muslims,	  Buddhists,	  Hindus,	  and	  Catholics,	  among	  others,	  shape	  the	  values	  and	  beliefs	  of	  people	  living	  in	  societies	  where	  there	  has	  been	  a	  predominant	  religion	  long	  rooted	  in	  the	  cultural	  traditions	  and	  histories	  that	  it	  is	  practiced	  in	  (ibid,	  219).	  	  It	  thus	  becomes	  hard	  to	  generalize	  about	  how	  religion	  impacts	  a	  country	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  church	  attendance	  or	  belief	  in	  a	  higher	  power,	  as	  even	  atheists	  and	  adherents	  to	  a	  minority	  religion	  are	  impacted	  by	  the	  impact	  of	  religious	  traditions	  and	  values	  on	  culture.	  	  The	  point	  to	  be	  made	  here	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  analyze	  religious	  participation	  alone	  in	  any	  country	  or	  society,	  but	  also	  how	  religions	  have	  impacted	  cultural	  beliefs	  in	  more	  subtle	  ways.	  	  It	  is	  not	  only	  religious	  practices	  that	  must	  be	  compared,	  but	  also	  religious	  values	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  more	  complete	  cross-­‐national	  picture	  of	  religious	  influence	  and	  religiosity	  (ibid,	  219).	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   Due	  to	  the	  osmosis	  effect	  of	  religion	  influencing	  cultural	  norms,	  historically	  Protestant	  cultures	  (for	  example)	  will	  show,	  and	  continue	  to	  show,	  values	  distinct	  from	  historically	  Catholic	  societies.	  	  These	  values	  leave	  a	  lasting	  impact	  on	  “religious	  beliefs	  and	  other	  social	  norms,	  ranging	  from	  approval	  of	  divorce,	  to	  gender	  roles,	  tolerance	  of	  homosexuality,	  and	  work	  orientations”	  (ibid,	  220).	  	  Yet	  while	  religious	  cultures	  are	  useful	  in	  predicting	  certain	  beliefs	  centered	  on	  moral	  issues	  and	  governmental	  choices,	  such	  as	  how	  Islamic	  societies	  “remain	  deeply	  traditional”	  with	  regard	  to	  women’s	  equality,	  the	  religious	  cultures	  hypothesis	  is	  alone	  not	  enough	  to	  explain	  all	  cultural	  beliefs	  and	  values	  (ibid,	  222).	  	  	  “Support	  for	  gender	  equality	  and	  tolerance	  of	  divorce,	  homosexuality,	  and	  so	  forth	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  Western	  Christian	  tradition”	  or	  even	  distinctly	  Western;	  they	  are	  instead	  strongly	  associated	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  economic	  development	  and	  education	  (ibid,	  222).	  	  	  	  
Religion	  and	  the	  State	  	  Religion	  within	  the	  political	  sphere	  takes	  many	  forms	  due	  to	  varying	  political	  structures,	  religious	  and	  cultural	  beliefs	  and	  is	  therefore	  impossible	  to	  generalize	  cross-­‐nationally.	  	  Within	  state	  legislative	  structures,	  vast	  arrays	  of	  laws	  are	  present	  in	  each	  state	  but	  cannot	  fully	  speak	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  religious	  participation	  in	  government.	  	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  for	  example,	  the	  only	  time	  religion	  is	  mentioned	  (where)	  is	  banning	  religious	  qualifications	  for	  holding	  office,	  yet	  “the	  US	  population	  is	  among	  the	  most	  religious	  of	  Western	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democracies	  and	  it	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  without	  the	  zealousness	  of	  federal	  courts,	  religious	  legislation	  would	  exist	  in	  the	  USA”	  (Fox,	  135).	  	   In	  France,	  meanwhile,	  Fox	  classifies	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  state	  and	  religions	  as	  “hostile”.	  	  Religious	  organizations	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  register	  and	  the	  state	  is	  allowed	  to	  dissolve	  religious	  groups	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons	  (Fox,	  136).	  	  Within	  the	  government,	  officials	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  wear	  Muslim	  headscarves	  or	  large	  Christian	  crosses.	  	  	   On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  Iran	  overwhelmingly	  has	  tied	  religion	  with	  the	  state,	  albeit	  solely	  Islam.	  	  Iran	  is	  constitutionally	  established	  as	  an	  Islamic	  republic,	  family	  law	  is	  based	  on	  a	  fairly	  strict	  interpretation	  of	  Islamic	  law,	  and	  all	  candidates	  for	  public	  office	  first	  face	  approval	  from	  Iran’s	  supreme	  religious	  body,	  the	  Guardian	  Council.	  Religious	  minorities,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  treated	  with	  general	  suspicion	  by	  the	  state	  and	  cannot	  proselytize.	  	  Conversion	  from	  religion	  is	  punishable	  by	  death,	  and	  the	  printing	  of	  bibles	  is	  severely	  restricted	  (Fox,	  232).	  	   Modernity	  has	  caused	  religion	  to	  evolve,	  and	  do	  so	  quickly.	  	  Among	  secular	  nations,	  religion	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  response	  or	  protest	  to	  nontraditional	  ideals	  such	  as	  the	  rise	  of	  Hollywood	  and	  Western	  entertainment	  (Fox,	  22).	  	  Mark	  Juergensmeyer	  argues,	  “the	  resurgence	  of	  religion	  in	  the	  third	  world	  is	  due	  to	  a	  failure	  of	  modern	  secular	  ideologies	  like	  liberalism,	  communism,	  socialism,	  and	  fascism”	  (Fox,	  22).	  	  The	  failure	  of	  secular	  ideologies,	  closely	  associated	  and	  often	  intertwined	  with	  various	  governmental	  regimes,	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leaves	  a	  political	  vacuum	  that	  encourages	  increased	  participation	  by	  cultural	  groups	  that	  are	  looking	  for	  alternative	  styles	  of	  rule	  (Fox,	  22).	  	  	  	   To	  defend	  against	  modernity,	  fundamentalist	  religions	  generally	  take	  one	  of	  two	  options	  (Fox,	  23).	  	  The	  first	  is	  to	  reject	  modern	  values	  and	  practices	  and	  create	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  closed	  community	  with	  rules	  that	  govern	  all	  aspects	  of	  life,	  both	  public	  and	  private	  (Fox,	  23).	  	  The	  second	  option	  looks	  towards	  defeating	  the	  regime,	  either	  through	  political	  tactics	  or	  violent	  strategies	  (Fox,	  23).	  	  In	  either	  form,	  religious	  movements	  use	  “modern	  tools	  and	  strategies	  including	  modern	  communications,	  propaganda,	  mobilization,	  and	  organizational	  techniques	  as	  well	  as	  modern	  political	  institutions”	  (Fox,	  24).	  	  Fox	  cites	  various	  Islamic	  parties,	  such	  as	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  and	  Hezbollah	  that	  have	  historically	  used	  both	  defensive	  options,	  either	  separately	  or	  in	  conjunction	  with	  each	  other.	  	  Fox’s	  theories	  occupy	  a	  different	  segment	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  religiosity	  from	  Norris	  and	  Inglehart	  in	  that	  Fox	  analyzes	  political	  mobilization	  and	  reactionary	  mechanisms	  in	  groups	  with	  increased	  religiosity,	  while	  Norris	  and	  Inglehart	  are	  specifically	  looking	  at	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  lead	  to	  increased	  religiosity	  within	  individuals.	  	  	  	   It	  is	  thus	  difficult	  to	  provide	  an	  overarching	  view	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  religion	  and	  politics	  connect	  with	  each	  other.	  	  What	  is	  easier	  to	  show	  is	  how	  specific	  religions	  engage	  in	  specific	  politics	  and,	  important	  to	  this	  paper,	  with	  democratic	  regimes.	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Democracy	  and	  Religion	  in	  America	  	  	   Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville	  wrote	  “while	  law	  permits	  the	  Americans	  to	  do	  what	  they	  please,	  religion	  prevents	  them	  from	  conceiving,	  and	  forbids	  them	  to	  commit,	  what	  is	  rash	  or	  unjust”	  (Reichly,	  806).	  	  	  In	  this	  vein,	  Reichly,	  identifies	  two	  predominant	  theories	  surrounding	  religion	  and	  democracy	  in	  America.	  	  The	  first	  school	  of	  thought,	  commensurate	  with	  Tocqueville’s	  beliefs,	  postulates	  that	  the	  moral	  and	  ethical	  principles	  established	  by	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  convictions	  in	  America	  stand	  as	  an	  important	  means	  of	  support	  for	  democracy	  in	  America	  and	  for	  general	  democratic	  values	  (Reichly,	  801).	  	  Supporters	  of	  this	  belief	  cite	  the	  Founding	  Fathers’	  strong	  belief	  in	  the	  value	  of	  religion,	  such	  that	  they	  created	  the	  First	  Amendment	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  religion,	  as	  well	  as	  religious	  drives	  for	  the	  abolition	  of	  slavery	  and	  for	  women’s	  suffrage,	  both	  of	  which	  helped	  perfect	  the	  American	  experience	  of	  democracy	  (Reichly,	  801).	  	  The	  so-­‐called	  Protestant	  ethic,	  such	  as	  equality,	  mutuality,	  and	  self-­‐reliance,	  meanwhile,	  “provided	  the	  moral	  bedrock	  on	  which	  republican	  institutions	  were	  built”	  (Reichly,	  801).	  	  	  	   The	  second	  approach	  is	  wary	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  religion	  on	  democracies.	  	  Religions	  are	  inherently	  unaccommodating,	  democratic	  theorists	  say,	  as	  they	  all	  claim	  to	  know	  the	  ultimate	  truth	  about	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  universe	  and	  some	  higher	  power,	  and	  thus	  are	  generally	  not	  tolerant	  of	  other	  beliefs,	  evidenced	  by	  the	  civil	  violence	  in	  Lebanon,	  India	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  (Reichly,	  801).	  	  It	  is	  for	  these	  reasons,	  critics	  of	  religion	  say,	  that	  the	  Founding	  Fathers	  also	  created	  the	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establishment	  clause	  to	  counter	  the	  free	  exercise	  clause,	  barring	  the	  federal	  government	  from	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  national	  religion	  (Reichly,	  801).	  	  	  The	  natural	  question	  that	  then	  arises	  is	  if	  religion	  is	  truly	  necessary	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  American	  democracy.	  	  As	  noted,	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  United	  States	  were	  convinced	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  religion	  as	  a	  moral	  base,	  some	  going	  as	  far	  as	  supporting	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  official	  religion	  at	  the	  state	  level	  (Reichly,	  802).	  	  In	  his	  farewell	  address,	  George	  Washington	  stated,	  “reason	  and	  experience	  both	  forbid	  us	  to	  expect	  that	  national	  morality	  can	  prevail	  in	  exclusion	  of	  religious	  principles”	  (Reichly,	  803).	  In	  modern	  day	  times,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  Washington’s	  instincts	  were	  correct;	  in	  democracies	  such	  as	  Britain,	  Japan,	  Norway	  and	  France,	  low	  religious	  participation	  levels	  co-­‐existed	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  political	  cynicism	  and	  indifference,	  although	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  prove	  causation	  (Reichly,	  803).	  	  And	  while	  in	  the	  United	  States	  more	  than	  90%	  of	  Americans	  identify	  within	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  tradition,	  Reichly	  believes	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  religion	  is	  being	  quickly	  diminished	  thanks	  to	  modern	  shapers	  of	  opinion,	  such	  as	  the	  national	  media	  and	  the	  entertainment	  industry	  (Reichly,	  803).	  	  	  	  While	  religious	  influence	  in	  America	  was	  on	  the	  decline	  in	  the	  1970’s,	  so	  were	  the	  tenets	  of	  personal	  responsibility	  and	  bases	  of	  mutuality	  that	  make	  democracy	  in	  America	  possible	  (Reichly,	  804).	  	  “Violent	  crime,	  marital	  instability,	  abuse	  and	  abandonment	  of	  children,	  open	  traffic	  in	  hardcore	  pornography,	  births	  out	  of	  wedlock,	  and	  drug	  addiction,	  began	  rapidly	  to	  rise”	  (Reichly,	  804).	  	  These	  developments	  could	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  damaging	  to	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democracy,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  decrease	  of	  religiosity	  and	  the	  increase	  of	  undemocratic	  morals	  is	  “at	  least	  suggestive	  of	  a	  causal	  relationship,	  though	  other	  factors	  have	  also	  undoubtedly	  been	  involved”	  (Reichly,	  804).	  	  	  If	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  religion	  in	  America	  is	  important	  to	  morals	  that	  are	  supportive	  of	  democratic	  politics,	  is	  it	  also	  possible	  that	  there	  are	  secular	  alternatives	  that	  would	  support	  democracy	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  religion	  has?	  	  Reichly	  finds	  no	  viable	  alternatives,	  believing	  philosophical	  views	  put	  forth	  by	  early	  political	  scientists	  such	  as	  Locke	  and	  Rousseau	  regarding	  the	  possibility	  of	  general	  good	  will	  towards	  others,	  to	  be	  idealized	  and	  overly	  optimistic	  (Reichly,	  805).	  He	  instead	  advocates	  for	  a	  delicate	  balance	  to	  be	  struck	  between	  the	  free	  exercise	  of	  religion	  in	  America	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  religion	  as	  a	  campaign	  device.	  	  Religion	  and	  democracy,	  Reichly	  believes,	  are	  at	  once	  complementary	  and	  in	  tension	  with	  each	  other;	  democracy	  is	  reliant	  on	  religion	  for	  values	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  find	  sourced	  outside	  of	  religion	  and	  religion	  is	  reliant	  on	  democracy	  for	  its	  nurturing	  in	  a	  free	  atmosphere	  (Reichly,	  806).	  	  Yet	  while	  some	  religions	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  intrinsic	  to	  democratic	  values,	  others	  are	  seen	  as	  having	  considerable	  aporia	  in	  conjunction	  with	  liberal	  traditions.	  
	  
Confucianism	  and	  Democracy	  Samuel	  Huntington	  believes	  that	  people	  hoping	  for	  democracy	  in	  Confucian	  societies	  might	  as	  well	  stop	  wasting	  their	  time:	  “Almost	  no	  scholarly	  disagreement	  exists	  regarding	  the	  proposition	  that	  traditional	  Confucianism	  was	  either	  undemocratic	  or	  antidemocratic…	  Classic	  Chinese	  Confucianism	  and	  its	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derivatives	  in	  Korea,	  Vietnam,	  Singapore,	  Taiwan,	  and	  (in	  a	  diluted	  fashion)	  Japan	  emphasized	  the	  group	  over	  the	  individual,	  authority	  over	  liberty,	  and	  responsibilities	  over	  rights”	  (Huntington,	  24).	  	  	  Theoretically,	  Fukuyama	  finds	  that	  Huntington	  grossly	  exaggerates	  the	  undemocratic	  principles	  of	  Confucianism	  and	  instead	  believes	  that	  there	  is	  much	  within	  the	  Confucian	  tradition	  that	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  democratic	  in	  nature.	  	  First,	  the	  examination	  system	  within	  Confucianism	  is	  meritocratic	  and	  implemented	  in	  modern-­‐day	  Confucian	  societies	  as	  an	  egalitarian	  gateway	  to	  higher	  education	  and	  more	  equal	  income	  distribution	  (Fukuyama,	  24).	  	  Confucianism	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  education,	  an	  important	  underpinning	  of	  democracy	  in	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  increase	  concern	  about	  noneconomic	  matters	  such	  as	  equality	  and	  political	  participation	  (Fukuyama,	  25).	  	  In	  addition,	  Confucianism	  has	  historically	  coexisted	  with	  other	  religions	  better	  than	  many	  other	  belief	  systems,	  a	  important	  point	  in	  that	  liberal	  democratic	  values	  advocate	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  all	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  systems	  	  (Fukuyama,	  25).	  	  	  Other	  literature	  disagrees	  with	  Fukuyama’s	  theoretical	  analysis	  of	  Confucianism	  as	  not	  antidemocratic.	  	  Steven	  Hood	  argues	  that	  Confucianism	  is	  inherently	  anti-­‐rights	  in	  its	  political	  and	  social	  orientation	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  (Hood,	  854).	  	  Confucianism	  emphasizes	  heavily	  the	  importance	  of	  ancestral	  tradition	  and	  the	  superiority	  of	  ancestors	  over	  those	  living.	  	  Hood	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  a	  source	  of	  the	  belief	  that	  authority	  is	  infallible	  and	  a	  divergence	  from	  the	  philosophical	  concepts	  of	  natural	  rights	  (Hood,	  855).	  	  There	  is	  no	  historical	  Confucian	  conceptualization	  of	  human	  beings	  as	  individuals	  who	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can	  generate	  freedom	  and	  happiness	  for	  themselves.	  	  Instead,	  authority	  over	  individuals	  is	  stressed	  and	  is	  a	  “denial	  of	  conditions	  necessary	  to	  realize	  and	  enjoy	  rights”	  (Hood,	  855).	  	  As	  for	  other	  scholars	  finding	  elements	  of	  democratic	  value	  within	  the	  Confucian	  canon,	  Hood	  believes	  such	  evidence	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  selective	  reading	  of	  Confucian	  thought	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  space	  for	  individuals	  separate	  from	  the	  state	  (Hood,	  855).	  	  	  	   Theoretical	  considerations	  aside,	  the	  true	  problem	  with	  Huntington’s	  argument	  ,Fukuyama	  believes,	  is	  that	  it	  views	  Confucianism	  as	  an	  easily	  politicized	  religion	  such	  as	  Islam,	  which	  often	  binds	  together	  the	  two	  separate	  spheres	  of	  politics	  and	  social	  life	  in	  the	  legitimization	  of	  	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state	  over	  the	  life	  it	  governs	  (Fukuyama,	  26).	  	  Political	  Confucianism,	  which	  advocated	  for	  a	  hierarchical	  system	  leading	  up	  to	  an	  emperor,	  has	  not	  existed	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Qing	  dynasty	  in	  1911.	  	  Fukuyama	  believes	  the	  “Confucian	  personal	  ethic”	  is	  the	  actual	  legacy	  of	  Confucianism.	  	  This	  personal	  ethic	  advocates	  for	  respect	  for	  the	  family,	  hard	  work	  and	  education.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  Confucianism	  was	  never	  political	  in	  nature,	  but	  that	  it	  instead	  was	  a	  type	  of	  intense	  “familism”	  that	  viewed	  the	  state	  apparatus	  as	  a	  larger	  part	  of	  the	  familial	  system	  (Fukuyama,	  25).	  	  Therefore,	  while	  Confucianism	  maintains	  a	  personal	  ethic	  that	  is	  socially	  engaging,	  its	  breadth	  does	  not	  extend	  into	  the	  political	  sphere	  as	  Islam’s	  doctrine	  does.	  	  	  The	  actual	  issue	  with	  democracy	  in	  Confucian	  Asia	  as	  Fukuyama	  sees	  it	  is	  the	  unattractiveness	  of	  Western	  democracy	  to	  the	  communalism	  of	  Asia,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  continued	  economic	  successes	  in	  Asia:	  “To	  many	  Asians,	  the	  social	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problems	  currently	  plaguing	  the	  United	  States	  are	  problems	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  per	  se.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  this	  perception	  continues,	  the	  future	  of	  democracy	  in	  Asia	  will	  depend	  less	  on	  the	  theoretical	  compatibility	  or	  incompatibility	  of	  Confucianism	  with	  democratic	  principles	  than	  on	  whether	  people	  in	  Asia	  feel	  that	  they	  want	  their	  society	  to	  resemble	  that	  of	  the	  United	  States”	  (Fukuyama,	  32).	  	  Further,	  Fukuyama	  cites	  links	  between	  economic	  development	  in	  Confucian	  societies	  and	  the	  arrival	  of	  democratization	  and	  prodemocracy	  movements	  (Fukuyama,	  21).	  	  	  What	  matters	  more	  than	  what	  Huntington	  views	  as	  the	  negative	  implications	  of	  the	  Confucian	  tradition	  is	  the	  modernization	  theory,	  Fukuyama	  states.	  	  	  Modernization	  theory	  finds	  that	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  correlation	  between	  economic	  development	  and	  the	  increase	  of	  democracy	  and	  democratization,	  and	  Asia	  over	  the	  past	  50	  years	  has	  helped	  prove	  this	  theory	  correct,	  given	  developments	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea	  in	  which	  the	  two	  rapidly	  modernizing	  countries	  embraced	  democratic	  governance,	  Fukuyama	  argues.	  	  Fukuyama	  also	  posits	  that	  in	  Confucian	  societies	  the	  correlation	  between	  modernization	  and	  democracy	  cannot	  simply	  be	  explained	  in	  solely	  economic	  terms	  (Fukuyama,	  22).	  	  Instead,	  there	  are	  distinctly	  noneconomic	  desires	  for	  recognition	  voiced	  among	  those	  looking	  for	  more	  democratic	  regimes	  (Fukuyama,	  22).	  	  	  While	  the	  modernization	  hypothesis	  may	  continue	  to	  be	  borne	  out,	  if	  East	  Asia	  continues	  to	  prosper	  while	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  Western	  democracies	  continue	  to	  experience	  economic	  and	  social	  problems,	  the	  Western	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democratic	  model	  will	  remain	  fairly	  unattractive,	  regardless	  of	  Fukuyama’s	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  no	  fundamental	  Confucian	  cultural	  obstacle	  in	  regard	  to	  democracy	  (Fukuyama,	  32).	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  seems	  that	  it	  would	  be	  better	  for	  Fukuyama	  to	  argue	  that	  Confucianism	  is,	  at	  best,	  a	  nonissue	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  its	  relationship	  with	  democratization	  since	  the	  author	  argues	  that	  what	  matters	  most	  for	  Asian	  democracy	  is	  either	  economic	  development	  or	  the	  demonstrably	  improved	  effects	  of	  democracy	  in	  the	  West.	  	  	  Hood	  counters	  that	  hierarchy	  and	  political	  authority	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Confucianism	  can	  be	  found	  even	  in	  functioning	  democracies	  such	  as	  Japan	  and	  Taiwan.	  	  Parties	  such	  as	  Japan’s	  LDP	  seek	  to	  foster	  Confucian	  values	  of	  harmony	  and	  cooperation	  through	  united	  fronts	  and	  the	  packaging	  of	  policies.	  	  “Government	  leaders	  are	  respected	  for	  having	  greater	  information	  and	  insight	  into	  local	  and	  national	  conditions”	  and	  are	  expected	  to	  always	  act	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  commensurate	  with	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  their	  subjects	  (Hood,	  856).	  	  Whether	  political	  authority	  was	  elected	  by	  free	  elections	  or	  not,	  Confucianism	  demands	  that	  the	  hierarchy	  in	  place	  be	  respected.	  	  Again,	  Hood	  emphasizes	  that	  theoretical	  considerations	  aside,	  Western-­‐style	  democracy	  will	  remain	  unattractive	  to	  Eastern	  Asia	  as	  long	  as	  the	  West	  is	  plagued	  by	  high	  unemployment	  and	  crime	  (Hood,	  856).	  	  
Catholicism	  and	  Democracy	  Paul	  Sigmund	  identifies	  four	  basic	  responses	  in	  scholarly	  literature	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  Catholic	  Church’s	  leadership	  and	  democracy.	  	  The	  first	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states	  that	  Catholicism	  is	  generally	  ambivalent	  to	  regime	  forms	  as	  long	  as	  the	  government	  provides	  for	  the	  general	  good	  of	  the	  people	  .	  	  The	  second,	  more	  critical	  view	  argues	  that	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  is	  unconcerned	  with	  government	  types,	  even	  if	  the	  regime	  is	  unjust	  and	  tyrannical,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  Church	  is	  left	  unhindered	  to	  proselytize	  and	  operate	  as	  it	  sees	  fit.	  	  The	  third	  maintains	  that	  as	  the	  Church	  is	  inherently	  quasi-­‐monarchical	  and	  hierarchical	  in	  its	  functioning,	  it	  is	  more	  prone	  to	  sympathize	  and	  identify	  with	  governments	  that	  have	  regime	  types	  similar	  in	  operation	  to	  the	  Church.	  The	  final	  response	  holds	  that	  the	  moral	  values	  esteemed	  by	  the	  Church	  correspond	  heavily	  with	  democratic	  values	  and	  that	  Catholicism	  has	  gradually	  moved	  from	  the	  first	  position	  to	  the	  fourth	  in	  that	  it	  has	  moved	  from	  ambivalence	  to	  the	  support	  of	  democratic	  regimes	  on	  moral	  grounds	  (Sigmund,	  530).	  	   Sigmund	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  first	  democratic	  wave	  in	  the	  late	  1700-­‐1800s	  in	  Europe	  that	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  was	  forced	  to	  make	  its	  first	  doctrinal	  assertion	  regarding	  politics	  (Sigmund,	  531).	  	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  later,	  the	  Church	  in	  this	  period	  was,	  in	  essence,	  negative	  towards	  democracy	  and	  democratization	  (Sigmund,	  532).	  	  Yet	  there	  are	  identifiably	  democratic	  theological	  inclinations	  in	  Catholicism	  as	  far	  back	  as	  medieval	  times:	  “In	  the	  church-­‐state	  conflicts	  between	  the	  spiritual	  and	  temporal	  powers,	  each	  side	  appealed	  to	  the	  role	  of	  people	  to	  weaken	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  other	  side,	  and	  in	  the	  constitutional	  crises	  of	  the	  church	  associated	  with	  the	  Conciliar	  Movement,	  conciliar	  writers	  used”	  democratic	  arguments,	  such	  as	  the	  tradition	  of	  electing	  both	  bishops	  and	  the	  pope,	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  pope.	  	  The	  Conciliar	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Movement	  itself	  lasted	  for	  nearly	  three	  hundred	  years,	  through	  the	  16th	  century,	  and	  advocated	  for	  the	  final	  authority	  in	  theoretic	  and	  spiritual	  matters	  to	  be	  constitutionally	  vested	  in	  an	  ecumenical	  (general)	  council	  rather	  than	  the	  pope	  (Sigmund,	  533-­‐534).	  	  	  	   Democratic	  possibilities	  aside,	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  the	  Church	  was	  in	  a	  well-­‐entrenched	  position	  alongside	  traditional	  monarchies	  as	  a	  source	  of	  the	  state’s	  power.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  its	  influence,	  the	  Church	  aligned	  with	  nondemocratic	  regimes	  as	  a	  means	  to	  maintain	  its	  influence.	  	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  French	  revolution	  that	  the	  Church	  found	  its	  privileges	  removed,	  although	  by	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  it	  had	  again	  found	  itself	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  monarchists	  in	  France	  with	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	  Bourbons	  (Sigmund,	  535).	  	  France	  demonstrated	  the	  need	  for	  not	  only	  a	  “free	  exercise	  clause”	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  democracy,	  but	  also	  a	  “no-­‐establishment”	  principle,	  as	  “disestablishment	  becomes	  politically	  necessary	  for	  democracy	  wherever	  an	  established	  religion	  claims	  monopoly	  over	  the	  state	  territory,	  impedes	  the	  free	  exercise	  of	  religion,	  and	  undermines	  the	  equal	  rights	  of	  all	  citizens”	  (Casanova,	  
The	  Problem,	  68).	  	  It	  was	  especially	  vital	  to	  counter	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  France	  because,	  at	  that	  time,	  it	  did	  not	  acknowledge	  the	  principle	  of	  freedom	  of	  religion	  (Casanova,	  68).	  	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  much	  later	  that	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  interpreted	  its	  doctrine	  to	  allow	  others	  to	  worship	  God	  as	  they	  wished	  (Sigmund,	  536).	  	   Catholic	  popes	  first	  reacted	  strongly	  against	  democracy	  and	  popular	  sovereignty.	  	  Pius	  IX	  (1846-­‐1878),	  for	  example,	  called	  “liberty	  of	  conscience	  as	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an	  insanity	  and	  freedom	  of	  speech	  as	  injurious	  babbling”	  (Sigmund,	  536).	  	  The	  Catholic	  leadership,	  especially	  the	  Papacy,	  would	  continue	  to	  run	  foul	  of	  democracy	  until	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  when	  a	  large	  “Catholic-­‐based	  party	  committed	  to	  democracy”	  developed	  in	  France	  (Sigmund,	  538).	  	  While	  during	  World	  War	  II	  the	  Church	  seemed	  eager	  to	  align	  with	  Hitler	  and	  fascist	  dictators	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  consolidate	  power,	  Catholic	  political	  theorists	  after	  World	  War	  II	  began	  to	  promote	  democracy	  as	  the	  most	  acceptable	  form	  of	  government	  because	  it	  promoted	  the	  common	  good,	  and	  kept	  with	  the	  Christian	  belief	  system,	  namely,	  the	  ethical	  treatment	  of	  all	  humans	  (Sigmund,	  540).	  	  Much	  of	  the	  remaining	  bloc	  of	  Catholic	  conservatives	  dissolved	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  changed	  stance	  of	  the	  Vatican’s	  position	  after	  the	  election	  of	  John	  Kennedy	  and	  the	  increased	  democratization	  of	  Latin	  America	  and	  Europe	  (Sigmund,	  544).	  	  At	  the	  time,	  Latin	  America	  was	  replete	  with	  military	  rulers	  who	  had	  seized	  power	  and	  committed	  human	  rights	  offenses,	  and	  the	  Church	  found	  itself	  fighting	  a	  losing	  battle	  to	  maintain	  the	  traditional	  order	  while	  the	  region	  was	  moving	  irreparably	  towards	  democratic	  rule	  (Sigmund,	  542).	  	  In	  stating	  its	  reasons	  for	  shifting	  its	  position	  towards	  being	  a	  defender	  of	  human	  rights,	  the	  Vatican,	  referencing	  the	  scripture,	  argued	  the	  “dignity	  of	  the	  human	  person”	  was	  commensurate	  with	  Christian	  values,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  began	  to	  decentralize	  the	  Church,	  defining	  it	  more	  democratically	  as	  “the	  people	  of	  God”	  (Sigmund,	  545).	  	   Casanova	  argues	  that	  the	  Catholic	  Church’s	  identification	  with	  democracy	  perhaps	  wasn’t	  as	  much	  about	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  finally	  identifying	  itself	  with	  democracy	  as	  much	  as	  it	  was	  that	  democracy	  helped	  liberalize	  an	  unwilling	  
	   27	  
Church.	  	  Catholic	  political	  mobilization	  emerged	  at	  first	  as	  a	  means	  to	  help	  subvert	  liberalism	  and	  democracy	  in	  Europe	  in	  the	  pre	  and	  post	  World	  War	  II	  eras;	  if	  one	  were	  to	  focus	  “on	  Catholic	  ideology	  and	  doctrine	  [that	  argued	  for	  the	  maintenance	  and	  continuation	  of	  traditional	  hierarchy	  and	  governance	  systems],	  one	  was	  bound	  to	  conclude	  that	  Catholicism	  and	  democracy	  were	  indeed	  antithetical	  and	  irreconcilable”,	  yet	  electoral	  politics	  helped	  moderate	  fundamentalist	  political	  Catholicism	  [in	  Europe]	  by	  forcing	  Catholics	  to	  embrace	  democratic	  politics	  (Casanova,	  69-­‐70).	  	  Catholic	  parties	  “integrated	  masses	  of	  newly	  enfranchised	  voters	  into	  existing	  liberal	  parliamentary	  regimes,	  and	  both	  were	  deradicalised	  in	  the	  process,	  becoming	  part	  of	  the	  very	  institutions	  they	  initially	  rejected”	  (Kalyvas,	  264).	  	   Mikenberg	  finds	  that	  it	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  countries	  with	  fascist	  regimes	  in	  the	  interwar	  period	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  were	  generally	  all	  Catholic	  while	  countries	  without	  dictatorships	  were	  all	  Protestant.	  	  The	  cause	  of	  this,	  he	  argues,	  is	  doctrinal.	  The	  Catholic	  Church	  held	  onto	  its	  historical	  theocratic	  aspirations,	  while	  the	  Protestant	  Reformers	  spent	  most	  of	  their	  history	  battling	  against	  the	  Catholic	  vision.	  	  The	  Catholic	  Church	  “has	  been	  the	  historical	  antagonist	  to	  liberal	  democracy	  for	  much	  of	  Western	  modernity”,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  Second	  Vatican	  Council	  in	  the	  1960’s	  that	  the	  two	  finally	  reached	  a	  reconciliation	  (Mikenberg,	  895).	  	  Mikenberg	  points	  out	  that,	  regardless	  of	  motives	  or	  cause,	  the	  case	  of	  Catholicism	  shows	  that	  religious	  traditions	  are	  not	  fixed	  in	  their	  views	  towards	  democracy	  (Mikenberg,	  904).	  	  As	  a	  result,	  further	  research	  on	  democracy	  and	  democratization,	  he	  argues,	  “needs	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to	  take	  into	  account	  under	  which	  conditions	  such	  an	  antagonistic	  relationship	  between	  a	  particular	  religion	  and	  democratic	  principles	  and	  practice	  can	  be	  transformed	  into	  reconciliation”	  (Mikenberg,	  904).	  	  	  
	  
Islam	  and	  Democracy	  The	  global	  discourse	  on	  Islam	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  similar	  to	  the	  old	  discourse	  on	  Catholicism,	  in	  that	  Islam	  is	  often	  said	  to	  be	  fundamentalist	  and	  incompatible	  with	  democracy	  (Casanova,	  Catholic	  and	  Muslim	  Politics,	  89).	  	  Casanova	  finds	  reasons	  to	  be	  hopeful	  that	  the	  Muslim	  world	  and	  democracy	  can	  coexist.	  	  While	  the	  West	  dismisses	  Islam	  as	  an	  “essentially	  fundamentalist,	  antimodern,	  and	  antidemocratic	  religion”,	  Casanova	  argues	  that	  “The	  juxtaposition	  of	  Catholicism	  and	  Islam	  shows	  that	  the	  problem	  lies	  in	  simplistic	  depictions	  of	  a	  uniform	  “fundamentalist”	  Islam	  that	  fail	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  extraordinary	  diversity	  one	  finds	  among	  Muslim	  societies	  in	  the	  past	  and	  in	  the	  present”,	  and	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  every	  incrimination	  against	  Islam	  is	  nearly	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  what	  was	  directed	  against	  Catholicism	  in	  the	  past	  (ibid,	  100).	  	  Yet	  Catholic	  Christianity	  is	  now	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  Western	  democracy,	  and	  Islam	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  follow	  the	  same	  path	  in	  the	  east.	  	  The	  traits	  that	  many	  associate	  with	  political	  Islam,	  such	  as	  terrorist	  attacks	  and	  revolutionary	  violence,	  can	  also	  be	  easily	  found	  in	  the	  Catholic	  tradition	  and	  the	  near	  past	  of	  many	  Western	  countries	  (ibid,	  100).	  	  Casanova	  argues	  that	  the	  modern	  authoritarian	  states	  commonly	  associated	  with	  Islam	  exist	  thanks	  to	  the	  support	  of	  Western	  nations	  and	  do	  not	  allow	  for	  the	  necessary	  public	  reflection	  on	  the	  compatibility	  of	  Islam	  and	  democracy	  in	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the	  countries	  that	  need	  it	  most	  (ibid,	  102).	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  Islam,	  some	  scholars	  argue,	  may	  make	  Muslims	  more	  sensitive	  to	  democratic	  pluralism	  (ibid,	  100).	  	  	  The	  downside	  of	  a	  fragmented	  Islam	  is	  that	  it	  lacks	  a	  unified	  transnational	  community.	  	  There	  is	  a	  widespread	  globalization	  of	  Islam:	  “The	  proliferation	  of	  transnational	  Muslim	  networks	  of	  all	  kinds,	  transnational	  migration	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  Muslim	  diasporas	  throughout	  the	  world”	  are	  all	  evidence	  of	  this	  (ibid,	  93).	  	  The	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Caliphate	  has	  created	  political	  discord	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  unifying	  power	  means	  that	  it	  will	  be	  much	  more	  difficult	  for	  Islam	  to	  accept	  democracy	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  than	  it	  was	  for	  Catholicism	  (ibid,	  93).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Catholic	  tradition	  has	  a	  predominant	  school	  of	  theological	  reflection	  and	  a	  single	  line	  of	  authority	  that	  Islam	  lacks.	  	  	  Yuchtman-­‐Ya’ar	  and	  Alkalay	  find,	  through	  a	  multi-­‐level	  analysis	  on	  data	  gathered	  by	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey,	  mixed	  results	  on	  the	  Muslim	  public’s	  response	  to	  democracy.	  	  While	  Western	  and	  Muslim	  publics	  both	  favor	  democracy	  over	  other	  forms	  of	  government	  by	  similar	  margins,	  and	  are	  content	  with	  democracy’s	  performance	  in	  their	  own	  countries,	  noteworthy	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  appear	  elsewhere	  (Alkalay,	  125).	  	  For	  example,	  “more	  than	  four-­‐fifths	  of	  those	  surveyed	  across	  all	  11	  Muslim	  majority	  countries	  in	  the	  sample	  either	  agreed	  (27	  percent)	  or	  strongly	  agreed	  (54	  percent)	  that	  unbelievers	  are	  unfit	  for	  public	  office”	  while	  in	  the	  19	  Western	  countries	  polled	  around	  a	  quarter	  of	  those	  surveyed	  (27	  percent)	  agreed	  with	  the	  statement	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(Alkalay,	  125).	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  democracy	  is	  fine	  for	  many	  Muslims	  as	  long	  as	  it	  excludes	  nonbelievers	  from	  government,	  a	  fact	  rather	  antithetical	  to	  the	  basis	  of	  democracy	  (Alkalay,	  125).	  	  	  Yet	  the	  authors	  also	  argue	  that	  individual	  characteristics	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  democratic	  orientation.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  more	  schooling	  a	  person	  has	  had,	  the	  more	  prone	  he	  or	  she	  is	  to	  be	  favorable	  towards	  democracy.	  	  (Alkalay,	  126).	  	  Higher	  income	  levels,	  younger	  age,	  and	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  religiosity	  all	  appear	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  how	  someone	  views	  democracy	  (Alkalay,	  126).	  	  The	  authors	  find	  that	  the	  gap	  in	  differences	  between	  Western	  and	  Muslim	  attitudes	  towards	  democracy	  in	  general	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  differences	  of	  distributions	  of	  individual	  characteristics.	  	  Regardless,	  it	  is	  harder	  in	  Muslim	  societies	  to	  find	  support	  for	  specific	  democratic	  characteristics,	  such	  as	  women’s	  equality	  and	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  suggesting	  that	  Islam	  in	  general	  is	  hospitable	  to	  democracy	  in	  general,	  but	  inhospitable	  to	  liberal	  democracy	  (Alkalay,	  129).	  	  Even	  at	  levels	  of	  human	  development	  that	  match,	  “non-­‐Muslim	  societies	  are	  likely	  to	  host	  higher	  levels	  of	  support	  for	  liberal-­‐democratic	  attitudes	  than	  can	  be	  found	  in	  similarly	  circumstanced	  Muslim-­‐majority	  societies”	  (Alkalay,	  130).	  	  77.3	  percent	  of	  Muslim-­‐majority	  respondents,	  for	  example,	  agreed	  that	  politicians	  who	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  God	  were	  unfit	  to	  hold	  office,	  while	  only	  40.6	  percent	  of	  respondents	  in	  non-­‐Muslim	  societies	  felt	  the	  same	  way	  (Alkalay,	  130).	  	  	  In	  order	  for	  Islam	  to	  become	  accepting	  of	  liberal	  democratic	  principles,	  the	  authors	  write,	  “democratic	  ideas	  will	  first	  need	  to	  receive	  legitimation	  on	  the	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basis	  of	  Koranic	  texts	  and	  Islamic	  traditions”	  (Alkalay,	  132).	  	  A	  significant	  body	  of	  scholarly	  work	  has	  done	  just	  that.	  	  Esposito	  identifies	  a	  few	  concepts	  in	  Islam	  that	  present	  themselves	  as	  solid	  basis	  for	  democracy	  and	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  
Tawhid,	  for	  example,	  is	  the	  belief,	  simply	  put,	  that	  there	  is	  “no	  God	  but	  God”,	  and	  the	  God	  is	  the	  sovereign	  power	  (Esposito,	  23).	  	  At	  first	  glance	  this	  may	  appear	  to	  repudiate	  the	  concept	  of	  popular	  sovereignty,	  as	  both	  Islamic	  and	  non-­‐Muslim	  scholars	  have	  argues.	  	  But	  the	  democratic	  political	  system	  is	  easily	  framed	  within	  the	  concept	  of	  tawhid,	  as	  explained	  by	  a	  Sunni	  Muslim	  thinker:	  “The	  entire	  Muslim	  population	  runs	  the	  state	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Book	  of	  God	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  His	  Prophet…	  the	  executive	  under	  this	  system	  of	  government	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  general	  will	  of	  the	  Muslims	  who	  have	  also	  the	  right	  to	  dispose	  it”	  (Esposito,	  24).	  	  	  This	  interpretation	  of	  tawhid	  has	  been	  used	  structurally	  in	  Iran.	  	  	  The	  “Deputy	  General	  of	  the	  Imam”,	  the	  position	  held	  by	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  after	  the	  1979	  Iranian	  revolution,	  is	  accountable	  to	  a	  consultative	  council	  and	  must	  have	  the	  support	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  members.	  Because	  the	  concept	  of	  tawhid	  makes	  any	  human	  hierarchy	  impossible	  since	  underneath	  God	  all	  humans	  are	  equal,	  dictatorial	  systems	  have	  historically	  been	  dismissed	  as	  non-­‐Islamic,	  and	  the	  label	  “king”	  has	  negative	  connotations	  (Eposito,	  25).	  	  	  Another	  concept	  important	  to	  contemporary	  Muslim	  understanding	  of	  democracy	  is	  that	  of	  the	  khilafah	  (Esposito,	  25).	  	  At	  the	  inception	  of	  Islam,	  “the	  title	  of	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community	  following	  the	  death	  of	  the	  prophet	  Muhammad	  was	  “caliph”,	  or	  khilafah”,	  the	  term	  literally	  meaning	  successor	  to	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the	  prophet	  (Esposito,	  25).	  	  By	  the	  beginning	  of	  World	  War	  I,	  the	  title	  of	  “caliph”	  carried	  connotations	  not	  only	  of	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  state	  but	  also	  of	  the	  Islamic	  tradition.	  	  Yet	  there	  is	  now	  a	  profoundly	  different	  understanding	  of	  the	  term.	  The	  opinion	  of	  one	  Muslim	  scholar,	  for	  example,	  is	  that	  “the	  authority	  of	  the	  caliphate	  is	  bestowed	  on	  the	  entire	  group	  of	  people,	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole,	  which	  is	  ready	  to	  fulfill	  the	  conditions	  of	  representation	  after	  subscribing	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  [tawhid]”	  (Esposito,	  26).	  	  The	  framework	  provided	  by	  the	  concepts	  of	  tawhid	  and	  khilafah,	  Esposito	  argues,	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  equality	  of	  human	  beings	  and	  are	  important	  perspectives	  in	  the	  context	  of	  democracy	  (Esposito,	  27).	  	  Like	  Esposito,	  Goddard	  examines	  the	  implications	  of	  how	  Islam,	  “as	  a	  set	  of	  belief	  and	  practice”,	  views	  democracy	  (Goddard,	  3).	  	  As	  Sigmund	  did	  with	  Catholicism,	  Goddard	  identifies	  four	  points	  of	  view	  towards	  Islam’s	  philosophical	  compatibility	  with	  democracy.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  democracy	  is	  anathema	  to	  Islam	  (Goddard,4).	  	  	  The	  two	  are	  in	  such	  strong	  opposition	  to	  each	  other,	  those	  of	  this	  viewpoint	  argue,	  because	  the	  inherent	  relationship	  between	  Islam	  and	  the	  West	  is	  one	  of	  antagonism,	  and	  thus	  Islam	  can	  never	  accept	  democracy	  because	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  to	  accept	  the	  West	  as	  useful	  to	  humanity.	  	  Goddard	  cites	  the	  Egyptian	  Syyid	  Qutb	  (1906-­‐66)	  as	  representative	  of	  the	  view	  that	  democracy	  itself	  is	  in	  direct	  philosophical	  opposition	  to	  Islam	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  hakimiyyat	  allah,	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  God;	  human	  society	  should	  not	  govern	  itself,	  as	  it	  must	  be	  governed	  by	  God	  and	  no	  one	  else	  (Goddard,	  4-­‐5).	  	  Qutb	  views	  authentic	  Islam	  as	  a	  theocracy	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  God	  rules	  all.	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Goddard	  argues	  against	  this	  viewpoint,	  since	  the	  phrase	  hakimiyyat	  allah	  “does	  not	  occur	  in	  the	  Qur’an,	  the	  Muslim	  scripture,	  nor	  in	  the	  Hadith…	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  modern	  phrase	  which	  is	  essentially	  a	  reaction	  to	  secularism	  as	  an	  ideology”	  (Goddard,	  5).	  	  In	  some	  ways	  it	  is	  disappointing	  that	  Goddard	  would	  choose	  this	  singular	  and	  easily	  dismissed	  example	  in	  order	  to	  illustrate	  the	  view	  that	  democracy	  is	  anathema	  to	  Islam;	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  there	  are	  concepts	  within	  Islamic	  texts,	  such	  as	  tawhid,	  that	  perhaps	  argue	  better	  against	  the	  compatibility	  of	  Islam	  and	  democracy.	  	  	  The	  second	  perspective	  finds	  that	  Islam	  and	  democracy	  are	  incompatible	  as	  they	  contradict	  each	  other.	  	  It	  is	  not	  a	  total	  dismissal,	  Goddard	  argues,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  “necessarily	  correspond	  precisely	  to	  democracy	  as	  understood	  in	  Western	  political	  philosophy	  but	  rather	  comes	  to	  be	  understood”	  as	  a	  theo-­‐democracy,	  a	  democracy	  guided	  and	  ruled	  by	  God	  (Goddard,	  6).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  the	  twisting	  of	  democracy,	  or	  Islam,	  or	  both,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  more	  compatible	  but	  not	  authentic	  to	  their	  original	  intent.	  	  Goddards	  cites	  Abu’l-­‐A	  ‘la	  Mawdudi	  (1903-­‐79),	  the	  founder	  of	  Jama’at-­‐i-­‐Islami,	  who	  took	  the	  concept	  of	  
shura,	  or	  consultation,	  and	  interpreted	  it	  in	  an	  expansive	  view	  to	  mean	  a	  council	  of	  advisers	  (Goddard,	  6).	  	  This	  body	  would	  prevent	  arbitrary	  actions	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  rulers	  and	  could	  potentially	  be	  elected	  in	  Mawdudi’s	  interpretation.	  	  	  The	  next	  view	  is	  more	  positive	  towards	  to	  democracy	  and	  argues	  “Islam	  as	  traditionally	  understood	  is	  quite	  compatible	  with	  democracy	  as	  it	  is	  understood	  in	  the	  twentieth-­‐century	  world”	  (Goddard,	  7).	  	  Goddard	  cites	  Mahmud	  al-­‐‘Aqqad	  (1889-­‐1964),	  an	  Egyptian	  intellectual,	  as	  a	  major	  purveyor	  of	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this	  attitude.	  	  Al-­‐‘Aqqad	  found	  two	  concepts	  to	  support	  his	  argument,	  the	  first	  being	  the	  concept	  of	  ijma,	  or	  consensus,	  which	  is	  widely	  recognized	  by	  the	  Muslim	  community	  as	  a	  part	  of	  Islamic	  law.	  	  Ijma	  dictates	  that	  if	  the	  Islamic	  finds	  consensus	  on	  a	  particular	  point	  of	  law,	  it	  must	  become	  legally	  binding	  for	  all	  Muslims	  (Goddard,	  7).	  	  Ijma	  thus	  lays	  the	  foundation	  and	  justification	  for	  representative	  democracy	  as	  the	  Muslim	  community	  would	  be	  able	  to	  choose	  their	  leader	  by	  consensus.	  	  The	  second	  concept,	  discussed	  in	  depth	  later	  in	  this	  paper,	  is	  that	  of	  bay’a	  (pledge	  of	  allegiance),	  which	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Sunni	  Muslim	  community	  to	  obtain	  from	  his	  subjects	  before	  he	  is	  legitimate.	  	  Al-­‐‘Aqqad	  found	  this	  as	  a	  precedent	  for	  an	  electoral	  democracy,	  although	  Goddard	  argues	  its	  original	  intent	  was	  to	  further	  support	  for	  an	  already	  established	  leader	  (Goddard,	  7).	  	  	  The	  final	  point	  of	  view	  is	  also	  the	  most	  optimistic	  and	  suggests	  that	  Islam	  and	  democracy	  are	  essential	  for	  each	  other.	  	  Goddard	  provides	  Bassam	  Tibi,	  a	  Visiting	  Fellow	  at	  Harvard,	  as	  a	  purveyor	  of	  this	  viewpoint.	  	  Tibi	  argues,	  rather	  weakly,	  that	  Islam	  is	  vital	  to	  ensuring	  world	  peace,	  and	  that	  “there	  can	  be	  no	  stable	  regional	  political	  order	  in	  Islamic	  civilization	  without	  some	  measure	  of	  democratization”	  (Goddard,	  7-­‐8).	  Fereydoun	  Hoveyda	  chooses	  to	  trace	  the	  path	  of	  the	  Muslim	  world	  through	  history	  and	  the	  purported	  incompatibility	  between	  Islam	  and	  democracy.	  	  By	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century,	  the	  West	  had	  slipped	  any	  remaining	  bonds	  of	  backwardness	  and	  committed	  itself	  to	  considerable	  progress	  in	  science	  and	  technology,	  while	  furthering	  the	  political	  importance	  of	  democratic	  and	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liberal	  institutions	  (Hoveyda,	  229).	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  fundamentalist	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Koran	  began	  to	  be	  the	  norm	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  and	  hidebound	  Muslim	  philosophers	  dominated	  the	  religious	  and	  political	  landscape.	  	  The	  result	  was	  the	  Muslim	  world	  removing	  itself	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  and	  declining	  until	  it	  was	  finally	  colonized	  by	  European	  powers	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  	  Hoveyda	  argues	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  Muslim	  and	  Western	  world	  deepened	  as	  Muslims	  clung	  to	  their	  traditional	  ways	  and	  tried	  to	  “find	  solace	  and	  answers	  in	  the	  past”	  in	  response	  to	  the	  invasion	  of	  their	  countries	  (Hoveyda,	  230).	  	  	  	   The	  gap	  grew	  again	  after	  Word	  War	  I	  in	  the	  face	  of	  women	  in	  the	  West	  fighting	  for	  equal	  rights,	  and	  the	  adoption	  in	  1948	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  	  In	  many	  ways	  the	  values	  embodied	  by	  the	  Declaration,	  such	  as	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  individual,	  were	  antithetical	  to	  the	  historical	  traditions	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  which	  valued	  a	  patriarchical	  structure	  within	  its	  social	  order.	  	  The	  authority	  of	  various	  Muslim	  religious	  leaders	  became	  threatened	  by	  this	  rapid	  modernization	  imposed	  by	  the	  West,	  and	  the	  logical	  response	  for	  many	  Muslims	  was	  an	  organized	  reaction	  against	  Western	  values	  (Hoveyda,	  231).	  Hoveyda	  cites	  all	  this	  to	  underscore	  his	  main	  point	  that	  there	  is	  “no	  basic	  incompatibility	  between	  Islam	  and	  democracy”	  (Hoveyda,	  231).	  	  Instead,	  he	  argues,	  the	  antagonism	  between	  the	  two	  exists	  thanks	  to	  the	  West	  rapidly	  modernizing	  quicker	  than	  the	  Muslim	  world	  and	  the	  reactionary	  clergymen	  that	  “have	  kept	  Muslim	  nations	  outside	  the	  progressive	  trends	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	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world”	  (Hoveyda,	  231).	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  best	  encourage	  the	  growth	  of	  democracy	  in	  Muslim	  countries,	  Western	  nations	  should	  stop	  providing	  financial	  assistance	  to	  corrupt	  dictators	  and	  allow	  for	  Muslim	  reformist	  movements	  to	  help	  modernize	  autocratic	  regimes	  and	  	  (Hoveyda,	  232).	  	  	  The	  literature	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  various	  religions	  and	  democracy	  provides	  a	  useful	  base	  in	  which	  to	  examine	  the	  empirical,	  historical	  and	  theoretical	  implications	  of	  Islam	  and	  democracy.	  	  It	  also	  illustrates	  that	  there	  is	  no	  one	  best	  way	  in	  which	  to	  analyze	  a	  religion	  and	  its	  components,	  especially	  when	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  define	  its	  relationship	  to	  a	  system	  of	  governance.	  	  After	  all,	  this	  literature	  review	  includes	  scholars	  who	  examine	  disparate	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  that	  are	  tied	  to	  each	  other	  only	  by	  the	  religion	  that	  includes	  them.	  Yet	  there	  is	  also	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  in	  that	  there	  is	  no	  serious,	  systematic	  examination	  of	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  differences	  in	  the	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  domains.	  	  Given	  the	  large	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  branches,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  assume	  that	  Islam	  and	  democracy	  can,	  or	  should	  be,	  generalized	  accurately	  without	  understanding	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  dissimilarities	  and	  similarities	  between	  the	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  branches.	  	  	  The	  chapters	  that	  follow	  fit	  well	  within	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  literature,	  but	  also	  circumvent	  some	  of	  the	  methods	  used	  for	  analysis.	  	  For	  example,	  while	  authors	  such	  as	  Yuchtman-­‐Ya’ar	  and	  Alkalay	  discussed	  economic	  factors	  at	  length,	  these	  types	  of	  factors	  that	  could	  push	  Sunnis	  or	  Shias	  towards	  democracy	  are	  for	  the	  most	  part	  looked	  over	  except	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  where	  the	  discussion	  centers	  on	  how	  Shia	  groups	  emerged	  out	  of	  economic	  marginalization.	  	  	  Instead,	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Chapter	  3:	  Implications	  of	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Sunni-­Shia	  Split	  	  	  
Why	  History	  is	  Important	  The	  history	  of	  the	  Sunni-­‐Shia	  split	  is	  vital	  to	  understanding	  the	  modern-­‐day	  democratic	  implications	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  sects	  in	  that	  it	  contextualizes	  how	  the	  contemporary	  issues	  of	  these	  disparities	  came	  to	  exist.	  	  The	  foundation	  of	  the	  disparities	  between	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  is	  of	  obvious	  importance	  as	  it	  still	  often	  largely	  governs	  their	  beliefs	  and	  differences	  to	  this	  day.	  	   In	  this	  history	  there	  are	  no	  clear	  arguments	  for	  democracy,	  no	  mass	  elections,	  no	  enlightened	  clamors	  for	  religious	  freedom	  or	  women’s	  rights	  or	  other	  liberal	  democratic	  principles.	  	  Instead,	  there	  are	  implications	  and	  tendencies	  that	  I	  examine	  that	  hint	  at	  democratic	  possibilities.	  	  The	  struggle,	  of	  course,	  is	  to	  identify	  differences	  that	  actually	  matter	  in	  terms	  of	  democratic	  potential	  and	  not	  to	  engage	  in	  concept	  stretching	  or	  overstate	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  historical	  issue.	  	  	  In	  and	  of	  itself	  the	  split	  is	  hard	  to	  define,	  as	  it	  is	  still	  occurring	  to	  this	  day.	  	  There	  are	  no	  clearly	  drawn	  lines	  to	  signify	  when	  the	  schism	  began,	  and	  when	  it	  finally	  solidified,	  or	  if	  it	  even	  has.	  	  The	  periods	  I	  choose	  to	  examine	  are	  hopefully	  the	  most	  relevant	  to	  the	  very	  contemporary	  issue	  of	  whether	  one	  group	  or	  the	  other	  has	  a	  higher	  attraction	  towards	  democracy.	  This	  chapter	  discusses	  Muhammad's	  rise	  to	  power,	  the	  battle	  for	  succession	  that	  followed,	  and	  the	  importance	  that	  each	  group	  gave	  to	  how	  successors	  were	  chosen,	  which	  are	  then	  tied	  in	  with	  each	  aspect’s	  relevance	  to	  democratic	  compatibility.	  	  This	  chapter	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also	  examines	  the	  different	  approaches	  the	  two	  sects	  initially	  took	  towards	  various	  bodies	  of	  Islamic	  writings	  dealing	  with	  matters	  of	  jurisprudence	  and	  theology.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Split	  This	  history	  of	  the	  split	  is	  a	  heavily	  abbreviated	  version,	  condensed	  to	  include	  the	  most	  relevant	  factors	  in	  considering	  democratic	  implications.	  	  1.3	  billion	  Muslims	  live	  in	  today’s	  world,	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  whom	  are	  Sunnis	  (Nasr,	  The	  Shia	  Revival,	  275).	  	  A	  mere	  10-­‐15%	  of	  Muslims,	  or	  130-­‐195	  million	  people,	  identify	  themselves	  as	  Shia.	  	  The	  spit	  between	  Shiism	  and	  Sunnism	  occurred	  near	  the	  onset	  of	  Muslim	  history,	  and	  each	  sect	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  the	  original	  orthodoxy	  (Nasr,	  291).	  Nasr	  argues	  that,	  “Shiism	  and	  Sunnism	  not	  only	  understand	  Islamic	  history,	  theology	  and	  law	  differently,	  but	  each	  breathes	  a	  distinct	  ethos	  of	  faith	  and	  piety	  that	  nurtures	  a	  particular	  temperament	  and	  a	  unique	  approach	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  Muslim”	  (291).	  	  	  That	  this	  schism,	  so	  influential	  to	  each	  sect’s	  understanding	  of	  itself,	  occurred	  in	  the	  time	  shortly	  following	  Muhammad’s	  death	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  understanding	  this	  particular	  segment	  in	  Islamic	  history.	  	  	  To	  understand	  Muhammad	  is	  to	  understand,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  the	  main	  motivations	  behind	  why	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  exist	  as	  they	  do	  today.	  	  Muhammad	  was	  born	  in	  570	  C.E.,	  orphaned	  while	  still	  in	  his	  infancy,	  and	  became	  a	  business	  manager	  for	  his	  eventual	  wife,	  Khadija,	  who	  worked	  in	  the	  caravan	  trade	  in	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Central	  Arabia	  (Esposito,	  6).	  	  They	  had	  three	  sons,	  all	  of	  whom	  died	  in	  infancy,	  and	  four	  daughters,	  the	  most	  notable	  being	  Fatima,	  who	  would	  later	  marry	  Ali,	  the	  fourth	  caliph	  and	  the	  first	  leader	  of	  Shia	  Islam.	  	  Muhammad	  would	  frequently	  retreat	  to	  a	  cave	  by	  himself	  for	  reflection	  and	  solitude,	  and	  it	  was	  in	  this	  cave	  in	  610	  C.E.	  at	  the	  age	  of	  40	  that	  Muhammad	  became	  a	  prophet.	  	  Over	  a	  period	  of	  22	  years,	  Muhammad	  received	  divine	  messages	  and	  transcribed	  them	  into	  what	  would	  become	  the	  Quran,	  or	  “The	  Recitation”	  (Esposito,	  7).	  	  	  Muhammad	  initially	  struggled	  to	  attract	  followers	  in	  a	  heavily	  polytheistic	  population.	  	  Among	  his	  earliest	  converts	  were	  Ali,	  his	  cousin	  and	  son-­‐in-­‐law,	  and	  Abu	  Bakr,	  his	  father-­‐in-­‐law	  (Esposito,	  8).	  Muhammad	  and	  his	  followers	  migrated	  to	  Medina	  in	  622	  in	  order	  to	  escape	  violence	  and	  persecution	  perpetrated	  against	  them	  by	  Meccans,	  primarily	  those	  belonging	  to	  the	  Umayyad	  clan	  (Esposito,	  8).	  	  It	  was	  in	  Medina	  that	  the	  first	  true	  Islamic	  community	  (umma)	  was	  created.	  	  By	  the	  time	  of	  Muhammad’s	  death	  in	  632,	  “all	  Arabia	  was	  united	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  Islam”	  (Esposito,	  11).	  	  	  Muhammad’s	  life	  provided	  strict	  guidance	  for	  his	  followers	  in	  all	  facets	  of	  life.	  	  He	  is	  remembered	  among	  Muslims	  as	  compassionate,	  righteous,	  honest	  and	  trustworthy	  (Esposito,	  11).	  	  What	  Muhammad	  practiced	  became	  the	  norm	  for	  his	  followers,	  who	  sought	  to	  emulate	  his	  Sunna,	  or	  example	  (Esposito,	  11).	  	  Muslims	  began	  to	  write	  down	  stories	  and	  observations	  on	  how	  the	  Prophet	  acted,	  and	  these	  traditions	  are	  now	  known	  as	  Hadith.	  	  The	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  differences	  surrounding	  Hadith	  provides	  an	  interesting	  basis	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from	  which	  to	  view	  each	  sect’s	  potential	  attitude	  towards	  democracy	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  on.	  A	  debate	  over	  who	  would	  succeed	  the	  Prophet	  as	  leader	  quickly	  followed.	  	  For	  most	  Muslims	  in	  632,	  the	  tribal	  traditions	  at	  the	  time	  dictated	  that	  the	  successor	  for	  Muhammad	  should	  be	  chosen	  by	  a	  council	  of	  elders	  (Nasr,	  291).	  	  These	  Muslims	  were	  the	  forebears	  to	  Sunnis,	  and	  found	  justification	  in	  their	  belief	  from	  the	  words	  of	  Muhammad,	  who	  declared,	  “my	  community	  will	  never	  agree	  in	  error”	  (Nasr,	  291).	  	  Sunnis	  believed	  “the	  successor	  to	  the	  Prophet	  would	  need	  no	  exceptional	  spiritual	  qualities	  but	  would	  merely	  have	  to	  be	  an	  exemplary	  Muslim”	  who	  was	  well	  acquainted	  with	  the	  religious	  and	  political	  needs	  of	  his	  community	  (Nasr,	  291).	  	  	  The	  Sunnis	  thus	  chose	  Abu	  Bakr,	  Muhammad’s	  father-­‐in-­‐law	  and	  close	  friend,	  as	  caliph	  (Nasr,	  291).	  	  Abu	  Bakr	  became	  the	  first	  of	  what	  is	  now	  known	  as	  the	  “Rightly	  Guided	  Caliphs”.	  	  The	  following	  three	  caliphs	  were	  Umar	  ibn	  al-­‐Khattab	  (624-­‐644),	  Uthman	  ibn	  Affan	  (644-­‐656)	  and	  Ali	  ibn	  Abi	  Talbi	  (656-­‐661)	  (Esposito,	  36).	  	  Abu	  Bakr	  and	  Umar	  stove	  to	  consolidate	  and	  expand	  Islamic	  rule	  in	  the	  Arabian	  Peninsula,	  and	  Umar	  appointed	  an	  election	  committee	  to	  choose	  his	  successor	  (Esposito,	  37).	  	  This	  council	  chose	  Uthman,	  a	  weak	  leader	  who	  was	  assassinated	  by	  “a	  group	  of	  mutineers	  from	  Egypt”	  (Esposito,	  37).	  	  	  	  	  The	  fourth	  caliph,	  Ali,	  the	  cousin	  and	  son-­‐in-­‐law	  of	  Muhammad,	  drew	  heavy	  support	  from	  partisans	  who	  believed	  that	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Islamic	  community	  should	  be	  derived	  only	  from	  those	  related	  to	  the	  Prophet.	  	  A	  civil	  war	  developed	  during	  a	  challenge	  from	  Uthman’s	  cousin	  Muawiya,	  who	  demanded	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that	  Ali	  avenge	  the	  death	  of	  Uthman.	  	  Ali	  was	  assassinated	  by	  a	  group	  of	  extremists	  upset	  by	  the	  crisis	  enveloping	  the	  Islamic	  community,	  and	  Muawiya	  took	  power,	  beginning	  the	  reign	  of	  the	  Umayyad	  dynasty	  (661-­‐750)	  (Nasr,	  308).	  	  Sunni	  acceptance	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  Muawiya	  is	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  emphasis	  Sunnis	  put	  on	  basic	  order	  over	  all	  else;	  for	  Sunnis,	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  Umayyad	  dynasty	  was	  acceptable	  because	  it	  was	  derived	  from	  the	  support	  of	  the	  community.	  The	  caliph	  was	  not	  the	  religious	  successor	  to	  Muhammad,	  but	  rather	  his	  political	  and	  military	  heir	  (Esposito,	  43).	  	  In	  this	  manner,	  while	  the	  Umayyad	  rulers	  relied	  on	  Islam	  as	  a	  source	  of	  their	  power	  and	  legitimacy,	  they	  deviated	  from	  the	  Islamic	  practice	  of	  selection	  or	  election	  by	  developing	  a	  hereditary	  system	  to	  choose	  leaders.	  (Esposito,	  41).	  	  Sunnis	  accepted	  this	  development	  as	  they	  positioned	  themselves	  as	  the	  caretakers	  of	  the	  Islamic	  leadership	  establishment	  as	  long	  as	  the	  faith	  was	  allowed	  to	  flourish	  unhindered,	  which	  the	  Umayyad	  dynasty	  allowed.	  	  	  Shiism	  grew	  largely	  out	  of	  dissent	  to	  this	  view.	  	  The	  caliphate	  had	  become	  a	  monarchy	  under	  the	  Umayyads,	  with	  separate	  political	  and	  religious	  leadership,	  and	  the	  Shias	  traced	  this	  problem	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  Abu	  Bakr,	  rather	  than	  Ali,	  as	  the	  first	  successor	  to	  Muhammad	  (Nasr,	  324).	  	  The	  dissenting	  Shias	  rejected	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  first	  three	  Rightly	  Guided	  Caliphs,	  “arguing	  that	  God	  would	  not	  entrust	  his	  religion	  to	  ordinary	  mortals	  chosen	  by	  the	  vote	  of	  the	  community	  and	  that	  Muhammad’s	  family-­‐	  popularly	  known	  as	  ahl	  al-­Bayt	  (people	  of	  the	  household)”-­‐	  were	  the	  actual	  successors	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community	  “for	  the	  blood	  of	  the	  Prophet	  ran	  in	  their	  veins”	  and	  were	  imbued	  with	  the	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personal	  and	  spiritual	  qualities	  given	  to	  Muhammad	  by	  God	  (Nasr,	  324).	  	  	  That	  the	  Umayyads	  were	  not	  part	  of	  Muhammad’s	  family	  and	  had	  also	  chosen	  to	  make	  the	  succession	  process	  one	  that	  was	  hereditary	  provided	  further	  evidence	  for	  Shias	  that	  the	  Umayyad	  dynasty	  had	  become	  a	  kingship	  and	  thus	  was	  not	  truly	  Islamic	  (Esposito,	  41).	  	  	   The	  actual	  function	  of	  the	  successor	  created	  additional	  strife	  between	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias.	  	  Sunnis	  argued	  that	  the	  successors	  to	  the	  Prophet	  were	  only	  inheriting	  his	  role	  as	  leader	  of	  the	  Islamic	  community	  and	  did	  not	  have	  to	  have	  the	  same	  special	  relationship	  to	  God.	  	  They	  viewed,	  and	  view,	  Abu	  Bakr	  as	  the	  legitimate	  successor	  to	  Mohammed	  because	  his	  rule	  was	  derived	  from	  the	  consensus	  of	  the	  Islamic	  community.	  	  	  	   Shiism,	  meanwhile,	  does	  not	  put	  the	  same	  emphasis	  on	  the	  capability	  of	  the	  Islamic	  community	  to	  choose	  the	  correct	  leader.	  	  It	  is	  a	  more	  pessimistic	  outlook	  that	  emphasizes	  humans’	  fallibility	  and	  inability	  to	  lead	  themselves,	  unguided,	  towards	  salvation.	  	  In	  Nasr’s	  words,	  “Just	  as	  humans	  could	  not	  find	  salvation	  until	  the	  Prophet	  took	  up	  the	  task	  of	  guiding	  them	  toward	  it,	  so	  after	  him	  people	  need	  the	  help	  of	  exceptionally	  holy	  and	  divinely	  favored	  people	  in	  order	  to	  live	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  inner	  truths	  of	  religion”	  (361).	  	  Since	  the	  Prophet	  held	  special	  divine	  properties	  so	  that	  he	  could	  understand	  the	  message	  of	  God,	  those	  related	  to	  him,	  Shias	  argue,	  hold	  these	  special	  qualities	  as	  well	  (Nasr,	  361).	  	  We	  can	  therefore	  say,	  “the	  differences	  between	  Shias	  and	  Sunnis	  are	  thus	  not	  only	  political	  but	  also	  theological	  and	  even	  anthropological”,	  in	  that	  these	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differences	  govern	  how	  each	  group	  chooses	  its	  leader,	  which	  then	  affects	  many	  aspects	  of	  daily	  life	  for	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  (Nasr,	  361).	  	  	  
Analysis	  of	  History	  The	  very	  etymology	  of	  the	  groups	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  analysis.	  	  Sunni	  is	  the	  familiar	  name	  given	  to	  the	  ahl	  al-­sunnah	  wa’l-­jama’ah	  (people	  of	  tradition	  and	  consensus)	  (Nasr,	  343).	  	  Shia	  is	  the	  familiar	  name	  for	  Shi’atu	  ‘Ali,	  meaning	  “followers	  of	  Ali”.	  	  We’ll	  first	  examine	  how	  the	  history	  of	  these	  followers	  of	  Ali	  impacts	  their	  potential	  to	  find	  democracy	  an	  appealing	  prospect.	  	  	  	  As	  noted,	  Shiism	  deeply	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  divine	  and	  blessed	  leadership	  over	  consensus:	  	  As	   in	   Sunni	   Islam,	   the	   [Shia]	   believe	   that	   only	  God	   is	   sovereign	  and	   his	   legislation	   is	   known	   through	   the	   Shari’a.	   	   Nevertheless,	   in	  comparative	  terms,	  the	  Shia	  belief	  in	  the	  divine	  right	  of	  succession	  and	  the	   inspired	   ability	   of	   the	   true	   Imams	   to	   be	   infallible	   guides	  demonstrates	   that	   the	   Shia	   view	   of	   the	   caliphate	   is	   closer,	   relatively	  speaking,	   to	   an	   idea	  of	   ‘state	   sovereignty,’”	   in	   that	   the	   caliphate	   is	   not	  only	  a	  religious	  leader	  but	  a	  leader	  	  	  of	  the	  entire	  state	  and	  its	  governance	  (Forte,	  24).	  	  Indeed,	  Shia	  adherence	  to	  the	   infallibility	   of	   its	   leadership	   suggests	   a	   viewpoint	   consistently	   at	   odds	  with	  democratic	  principles,	  namely,	  the	  ability	  to	  question	  leadership.	  	  Shia	  insistence	   that	   the	   only	   legitimate	   successors	   to	   Muhammad	   are	   those	  related	   to	   the	   Prophet	   through	   blood	   or	   marriage	   undermines	   the	  democratic	  emphasis	  upon	   leadership	  chosen	   through	  popular	  sovereignty	  and	   instead	   is	   reminiscent	  of	   the	  principle	  of	  divine	   right	   to	   rule	   regularly	  employed	  by	  European	  monarchies.	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Shia	  Imams	  (not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  same	  term	  employed	  for	  leaders	  of	  prayer	  in	  Sunni	  Islam),	  hold	  a	  special	  place	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  Shias.	  	  Because	  they	  are	  related	  to	  the	  Prophet,	  they	  are	  infallible	  and	  divine	  and	  rank	  only	  under	  Muhammad	  in	  terms	  of	  divinity	  and	  power.	  	  Yet	  for	  some	  fringe	  Shias,	  whose	  origins	  lie	  in	  early	  Islam,	  Ali	  and	  the	  Imams	  are	  outright	  “incarnations	  of	  the	  godhead”,	  truly	  divine	  in	  nature	  with	  a	  transitory	  corporeal	  presence	  (Goldziher,	  184).	  	  Ali	  was	  elevated	  to	  the	  level	  of	  God	  by	  these	  groups,	  some	  even	  going	  so	  far	  as	  endorsing	  the	  heretical	  view	  that	  that	  the	  angel	  who	  approached	  Muhammad	  had	  done	  so	  accidentally,	  and	  had	  meant	  to	  deliver	  God’s	  message	  to	  Ali	  instead	  (Goldziher,	  186).	  	  	  I	  cite	  this	  to	  underscore	  the	  extremes	  to	  which	  Shias	  follow	  and	  believe	  in	  Ali	  and	  his	  descendants.	  	  Twelver	  Shia	  Islam,	  for	  example,	  is	  the	  largest	  sect	  within	  Shiism	  and	  follows	  the	  succession	  of	  twelve	  Imams	  after	  the	  death	  of	  Muhammad,	  beginning	  with	  Ali	  (Ithnā	  Asharīyah,	  Britannica).	  	  The	  twelfth	  Imam,	  or	  Mahdi,	  will	  reappear	  when	  the	  time	  is	  correct	  and	  bring	  salvation	  with	  him.	  	  Shia	  theology	  created	  an	  occultation	  of	  the	  Imam,	  who	  they	  believe	  has	  merely	  gone	  into	  hiding.	  	  In	  the	  interim,	  the	  Shia	  community	  is	  to	  “await	  his	  return	  and	  be	  guided	  by	  its	  religious	  experts”,	  the	  mujtahids	  (Esposito,	  45).	  History	  has	  bound	  Shiism	  to	  this	  path,	  and	  it	  is	  evident	  how	  this	  worship	  of	  Ali	  and	  the	  Imams	  in	  general	  is	  antithetical	  to	  democracy,	  in	  that	  it	  is	  prohibitive	  of	  any	  outside	  leadership	  and	  thought.	  	  	  The	  legitimate	  successors	  to	  Muhammad	  are	  the	  only	  Muslims	  who	  can	  interpret	  the	  word	  of	  God,	  a	  fact	  that	  stifles	  independence	  and	  self-­‐determination..	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Islam	  offers	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guidance	  for	  all	  aspects	  of	  life	  and	  that	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  Imams	  into	  the	  lives	  of	  Shias	  is	  thus	  comprehensive	  and	  substantial,	  thus	  magnifying	  the	  potential	  impact	  that	  Imams	  have	  in	  shaping	  Shia	  propensity	  to	  democracy.	  	  To	  look	  at	  Shia	  Islam	  by	  its	  early	  history	  only,	  then,	  is	  to	  look	  at	  authoritarianism.	  	  The	  individual	  is	  discouraged,	  and	  submission	  to	  the	  ultimate	  authority	  of	  the	  Imams	  is	  required.	  	  The	  Shia	  conceptualization	  of	  who	  is	  best	  suited	  to	  interpret	  the	  word	  of	  God	  within	  the	  theological	  framework	  is	  thus	  antithetical	  to	  democratic	  principles.	  	  There	  is	  no	  room	  for	  democracy	  in	  a	  structure	  that	  insists	  upon	  the	  rule	  of	  a	  divine	  group	  of	  people	  who	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  legitimated	  by	  election	  since	  God	  has	  given	  them	  their	  legitimacy	  already.	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  encouraging	  components	  of	  Shiism	  in	  terms	  of	  democratic	  compatibility	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  party	  of	  dissent.	  	  Shias	  occupy	  a	  spot	  as	  a	  persecuted	  minority	  throughout	  much	  of	  history,	  one	  that	  dismissed	  the	  various	  tyrants	  and	  monarchs	  endorsed	  by	  the	  Sunni	  faith.	  	  “The	  true	  Shia	  is	  persecuted	  and	  wretched,	  like	  the	  family	  whose	  rights	  he	  maintains	  and	  for	  whose	  cause	  he	  suffers.	  	  People	  soon	  regarded	  it	  as	  the	  vocation	  of	  the	  Prophet’s	  family	  to	  endure	  hardship	  and	  persecution”	  (Goldziher,	  179).	  	  Ali’s	  son	  Husayn,	  for	  example,	  rebelled	  against	  the	  Umayyads,	  and	  was	  slaughtered	  in	  680.	  	  He	  has	  become	  a	  martyr	  in	  the	  Shia	  faith	  and	  a	  paradigm	  of	  the	  injustice	  and	  suffering	  that	  Shias	  have	  endured	  (Esposito,	  43).	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  historical	  fact	  should	  make	  them	  more	  likely	  to	  respect	  minority	  groups	  and	  permit	  universal	  rights,	  an	  important	  component	  of	  liberal	  democracy.	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The	  period	  of	  the	  Four	  Rightly	  Guided	  Caliphs	  makes	  this	  evident	  in	  illuminating	  the	  stark	  contrast	  between	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  Islam.	  	  Different	  methods	  were	  used	  for	  the	  appointment	  of	  each	  Khalifa,	  yet	  for	  each	  of	  the	  Khalifas	  the	  Muslim	  community	  was	  polled	  to	  develop	  consensus	  and	  ensure	  that	  it	  was	  the	  will	  of	  the	  community	  that	  each	  man	  would	  become	  Khalifa.	  	  The	  typical	  process	  involved	  “the	  selection	  of	  the	  best	  man	  through	  initial	  election,	  nomination	  and	  election	  through	  an	  electoral	  college,	  in	  all	  cases	  followed	  by	  a	  private	  bayah	  [oath	  of	  allegiance],	  subsequently	  the	  appointment	  confirmed	  through	  a	  public	  
bayah.	  	  The	  course	  adopted	  in	  all	  cases	  was	  republican”,	  although	  victory	  of	  a	  candidate	  through	  plurality	  rather	  than	  majority	  was	  the	  norm	  (Iqbal,	  16).	  	  	  It	  is	  easy,	  thus,	  to	  connect	  Sunni	  belief	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Muhammad’s	  death	  with	  potential	  democratic	  compatibility.	  	  As	  noted,	  Sunnis	  believed	  that	  the	  Prophet	  had	  not	  appointed	  a	  successor	  or	  a	  means	  or	  method	  to	  appoint	  a	  successor,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  thus	  a	  responsibility	  of	  the	  community	  to	  find	  a	  leader	  best	  suited	  to	  the	  role	  (Iqbal,	  14).	  	  	  Muhammad	  had	  declared,	  after	  all,	  that	  his	  “community	  will	  never	  agree	  in	  error”	  (Forte,	  42).	  	  While	  the	  end	  goal	  of	  both	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  was	  to	  establish	  a	  community	  of	  faith,	  Sunnis	  were	  unique	  in	  that	  they	  believed	  the	  best	  method	  to	  do	  so	  was	  through	  the	  consensus	  of	  the	  community	  or	  through	  a	  council	  of	  elders,	  a	  system	  Umar	  created	  previous	  to	  his	  death	  (Iqbal,	  14).	  	  	  This	  electoral	  college	  was	  composed	  of	  the	  most	  likely	  candidates	  to	  succeed	  Umar	  and	  its	  members	  selected	  the	  Khalifa	  from	  among	  themselves.	  	  The	  relevance	  of	  this	  particular	  historical	  fact	  to	  democracy	  cannot	  be	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understated.	  	  Consensus	  is	  in	  the	  very	  fiber	  of	  what	  composes	  the	  Sunni	  faith,	  and	  is	  a	  guiding	  principle	  of	  democracy	  as	  well.	  	  That	  in	  600	  C.E.	  Islam	  had	  developed	  a	  semi-­‐democratic	  system	  based	  on	  consensus	  is	  a	  fact	  that	  rarely	  appears	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  democracy,	  and	  that	  this	  method	  of	  choosing	  a	  leader	  is	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  Sunnism	  should	  be	  encouraging	  to	  those	  who	  dream	  of	  an	  Islamic	  state	  compatible	  with	  democracy.	  	  	  Yet	  upon	  the	  assassination	  of	  Uthman,	  Ali	  refused	  to	  accept	  a	  private	  
bayah,	  insisting	  that	  “if	  the	  Muslim	  community	  wanted	  to	  swear	  allegiance	  to	  him	  as	  the	  Khalifa,	  it	  should	  be	  openly	  done	  in	  the	  Masjid-­i-­NabviI”,	  in	  Medina	  (Iqbal,	  17).	  	  Ali	  introduced	  a	  prerogative	  that	  if	  he	  was	  not	  leading	  the	  congregational	  prayers,	  “the	  Imam	  mentioned	  his	  name	  in	  the	  Khutba	  and	  prayed	  for	  him”	  (Iqbal,	  17).	  	  If	  Ali	  had	  not	  been	  assassinated	  in	  661,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  interesting	  to	  view	  the	  method	  he	  employed	  to	  choose	  his	  successors.	  	  	  Shias,	  obviously,	  would	  have	  advocated	  for	  the	  leadership	  of	  someone	  directly	  related	  to	  Ali.	  	  	  Although	  those	  who	  would	  eventually	  combine	  into	  Sunnism	  gradually	  splintered	  into	  different	  factions,	  all	  shared	  a	  common	  attribute	  in	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  Shia	  assertion	  of	  blood	  succession	  only	  (Forte,	  25).	  	  The	  caliph,	  or	  leader,	  of	  the	  Muslim	  community,	  “must	  possess	  knowledge	  of	  the	  law	  to	  the	  level	  of	  a	  jurist,	  he	  must	  be	  of	  good	  character	  sufficient	  to	  be	  a	  witness	  in	  court,	  and	  he	  must	  have	  administrative	  and	  military	  ability”	  (Schacht,	  9).	  	  	  But	  the	  Sunni	  faith	  could	  also	  best	  be	  summed	  up	  in	  the	  aphorism	  of:	  “Sixty	  years	  of	  tyranny	  are	  better	  than	  an	  hour	  of	  civil	  strife”	  and,	  as	  noted,	  this	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was	  often	  the	  case	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Sunnism	  (Schacht,	  13).	  	  Sunnis	  eschewed	  the	  controversial	  choice	  of	  Ali	  as	  the	  first	  successor	  to	  Muhammad	  in	  favor	  of	  stability,	  arguing	  that	  it	  was	  Abu	  Bakr	  was	  better	  suited	  to	  the	  task	  of	  leading.	  	  It	  was	  the	  avowal	  of	  the	  principle	  that	  the	  best	  leader	  was	  not	  necessarily	  someone	  who	  was	  divinely	  favored	  by	  God,	  but	  someone	  who	  could	  compel	  obedience	  from	  the	  community.	  	  We	  noted	  how	  Sunnis	  coalesced	  around	  the	  rejection	  of	  blood	  succession,	  but	  just	  as	  important	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  Sunni	  Islam	  was	  the	  opposition	  of	  “a	  party	  at	  the	  other	  extreme,	  the	  Kharijites,	  who	  said	  that	  the	  caliph	  served	  at	  the	  pleasure	  of	  the	  community,	  that	  the	  community	  could	  dispose	  of	  him	  at	  any	  time,	  and	  that	  a	  leader	  who	  was	  a	  sinner	  lost	  his	  legitimacy”	  (Forte,	  25).	  	  	  The	  Kharijites	  argued	  that	  any	  Muslim	  was	  capable	  to	  lead	  provided	  that	  he	  was	  free	  from	  sin	  and	  had	  community	  support	  (Esposito,	  42).	  	  The	  Kharijites	  followed	  a	  strict	  moral	  code	  and	  demanded	  purity,	  as	  a	  Kharijite	  scholar	  said,	  “In	  the	  same	  way,	  the	  state	  of	  purity	  is	  invalidated	  by	  what	  issues	  from	  the	  mouth	  by	  way	  of	  falsehood	  and	  slander	  that	  may	  be	  to	  hurt	  of	  one’s	  fellow.	  	  It	  is	  invalidated	  by	  spreading	  scandal	  that	  plants	  hatred	  and	  enmity	  among	  people.	  	  Anyone	  who	  has	  without	  just	  cause	  abused,	  cursed,	  or	  spoken	  evil	  of	  people	  or	  animals	  has	  ceased	  being	  in	  a	  state	  of	  purity…”	  (al-­‐Mahruqi,	  20).	  	  	  Sunnis	  argued	  differently,	  believing	  that	  moral	  failings	  were	  an	  acceptable	  sacrifice	  to	  be	  made	  in	  return	  for	  a	  leader	  who	  brought	  stability	  (Schacht,	  15).	  	  	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  emphasis	  of	  political	  doctrine	  that	  “there	  is	  no	  obedience	  in	  sin”,	  much	  of	  the	  Sunni	  emphasis	  on	  the	  rejection	  of	  Kharijite	  principles	  was	  a	  result	  of	  the	  violent	  revolt	  that	  the	  two	  groups	  led,	  and	  the	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ability	  of	  strict	  obedience	  to	  leaders	  to	  combat	  this	  dissent	  (Lambton,	  18).	  	  The	  Sunni	  rejection	  of	  Kharijite	  ideals	  was	  also	  a	  rejection	  of	  fundamental	  democratic	  principles,	  such	  as	  the	  right	  of	  the	  political	  community	  to	  dispose	  of	  a	  leader	  through	  peaceful	  means,	  and	  damages	  any	  potential	  argument	  to	  be	  made	  regarding	  historic	  Sunni	  compatibility	  with	  democracy.	  	  Even	  the	  most	  extreme	  form	  of	  removing	  a	  leader,	  the	  right	  of	  revolution,	  composes	  much	  of	  basis	  for	  the	  America	  Declaration	  of	  Independence,	  and	  was	  included	  in	  the	  constitutions	  of	  various	  states,	  including	  that	  of	  Massachusetts.1	  	  	  	   Further,	  while	  election	  may	  have	  been	  the	  favored	  method	  for	  choosing	  the	  Four	  Rightly	  Guided	  Caliphs,	  it	  was	  not	  the	  most	  legally	  dominant	  form	  after	  Ali’s	  death	  (Forte,	  26).	  	  Electors	  could	  be	  entirely	  removed	  from	  the	  succession	  process	  by	  the	  caliph	  if	  he	  named	  his	  successor	  in	  his	  will.	  	  	  It	  is	  easily	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  early	  Sunnis	  were	  more	  democratic	  than	  those	  that	  followed	  them.	  	  It	  was,	  after	  all,	  not	  until	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Umayyad	  Empire	  that	  Sunnis	  departed	  from	  the	  Islamic	  practice	  of	  electing	  (or	  selecting	  through	  consensus)	  the	  successor	  of	  Muhammad.	  	  	  This	  contradiction	  within	  the	  Sunni	  faith	  highlights	  the	  absolute	  necessity	  of	  contextual	  understanding	  and	  analyzing	  contemporary	  developments.	  	  It	  would	  be	  hard	  for	  a	  bystander	  to	  convincingly	  argue,	  even	  five	  centuries	  after	  the	  death	  of	  Muhammad,	  the	  exact	  path	  Sunnism	  would	  take	  in	  the	  millennia	  to	  follow	  simply	  from	  knowing	  the	  history	  of	  the	  split.	  	  There	  is	  nothing	  particularly	  promising	  about	  how	  the	  Sunnis	  historically	  developed	  and	  chose	  their	  leaders.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Massachusetts	  1780	  Constitution,	  Bill	  of	  Rights,	  Art.	  7. 	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Much	  of	  this	  development,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  was	  a	  result	  of	  fights	  over	  the	  consolidation	  of	  power;	  in	  this	  sense	  they	  were	  often	  both	  politically	  and	  religiously	  motivated.	  	  The	  implication	  here	  is	  that	  Sunnis	  were	  willing	  to	  adjust	  their	  beliefs	  in	  order	  to	  find	  a	  larger	  following	  of	  believers;	  one	  such	  example	  would	  be	  the	  sect’s	  acceptance	  of	  the	  consensus	  of	  the	  community	  while	  disavowing	  the	  Kharajis.	  	  	  Aporia	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  predominant	  theme	  for	  the	  history	  of	  Sunni	  Islam.	  	  	  	  
Ijma	   A	  complete	  history	  of	  the	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  split	  not	  only	  includes	  the	  methods	  in	  which	  the	  sects	  chose	  their	  leaders,	  but	  also	  the	  specific	  theological	  principles	  that	  were	  developed	  by	  the	  two	  branches.	  	  Following	  the	  death	  of	  Ali	  and	  the	  succession	  of	  the	  Umayyad	  Empire,	  local	  jurists	  initially	  used	  ra’y	  (personal	  interpretation)	  to	  interpret	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  Sunna	  to	  situations	  demanding	  jurisprudence	  (Forte,	  42).	  	  “Ra’y,	  however,	  led	  to	  diverse	  and	  conflicting	  results,	  and	  it	  was	  quickly	  supplanted	  by	  the	  technique	  of	  qiyas	  and	  
ijma”	  (Forte,	  42).	  	  These	  techniques	  became	  important	  to	  the	  Sunnis,	  who	  accepted	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  Umayyad	  Empire.	  	  Qiyas	  (analogical	  deduction)	  allowed	  for	  a	  more	  flexible	  method	  of	  coping	  with	  legal	  issues	  that	  arose	  through	  the	  use	  of	  previous	  rulings;	  interestingly,	  it	  is	  a	  form	  of	  reasoning	  used	  by	  legal	  systems	  the	  world	  around	  (Forte,	  41).	  	  The	  second	  technique,	  ijma,	  was	  a	  system	  of	  consensus	  building	  occupying	  a	  special	  spot	  within	  the	  Sunni	  tradition	  and	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  double-­‐
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edged	  sword.	  	  Sunnis	  view	  ijma	  as	  the	  third	  source	  of	  Islamic	  law	  and	  it	  is	  practiced	  primarily	  in	  a	  scholarly	  setting	  (Forte,	  41).	  	  Sunnism,	  after	  all,	  is	  the	  party	  of	  consensus.	  Liberal	  democracy	  not	  only	  allows	  for	  consensus	  building,	  but	  for	  the	  continual	  examination	  and	  reexamination	  of	  principals	  and	  beliefs	  and	  theories.	  	  Voices,	  even	  those	  holding	  a	  minority	  opinion,	  are	  allowed	  an	  opportunity	  to	  be	  heard.	  	  “Yet	  at	  the	  moment	  that	  consensus	  was	  reached	  within	  Islamic	  laws	  further	  legal	  speculation	  was	  no	  longer	  permitted”	  (Forte,	  41).	  	  The	  result	  was	  that	  it	  was	  a	  mere	  few	  hundred	  years	  after	  the	  death	  of	  Muhammad	  that	  the	  development	  of	  Islamic	  law	  had	  been	  significantly	  halted,	  a	  topic	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  for	  its	  modern	  implications	  in	  Chapter	  4	  (Forte,	  41).	  	  	  Indeed,	  to	  this	  day	  “modern	  Muslim	  reformers	  find	  ijma	  one	  of	  their	  greatest	  obstacles”	  (H.	  Gibb,	  77).	  	  Consensus-­‐building	  quickly	  became	  a	  one-­‐time	  opportunity	  for	  Sunnis	  directly	  after	  the	  death	  of	  Muhammad;	  in	  an	  odd	  form	  of	  consensus	  leading	  to	  tyranny,	  consensus	  would	  be	  formed	  and	  never	  relinquished.	  	  In	  modern-­‐day	  terms,	  it	  would	  be	  as	  if	  Americans	  voted	  on	  a	  proposition	  to	  ban	  revisiting	  any	  previous	  laws	  enacted.	  	  We	  can	  connect	  therefore	  connect	  ijma,	  with	  a	  deep	  historical	  basis	  in	  the	  Sunni	  system	  of	  jurisprudence	  after	  the	  death	  of	  Muhammad,	  with	  heavily	  antidemocratic	  implications.	  	  	  Ijma	  today	  is	  linked	  with	  democratic	  possibilities,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  but	  viewing	  it	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  history	  alone	  leaves	  little	  promise	  for	  democracy	  and	  democratization.	  This	  concept	  of	  ijma	  is	  of	  vital	  importance	  to	  this	  chapter,	  as	  it	  highlights	  the	  essential	  difference	  between	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  Islam	  in	  a	  historical	  context:	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“the	  former	  is	  based	  on	  the	  ijma,	  and	  the	  latter	  on	  the	  authoritarian	  principal”	  (Goldziher,	  191).	  	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  Shiism	  is	  based	  on	  part	  by	  the	  rejection	  of	  Sunni	  ideals	  and	  beliefs,	  and	  Shias	  find	  that,	  through	  the	  history	  we	  have	  touched	  upon,	  ijma	  “does	  not	  always	  match	  with	  truth	  and	  righteousness”	  (Goldziher,	  191).	  	  Ijma,	  for	  example,	  could	  lead	  to	  the	  sanctioning	  of	  violence	  and	  injustice	  just	  as	  easily	  as	  compassion	  and	  peace.	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  ijma	  does	  not	  serve	  the	  same	  importance	  as	  it	  does	  in	  Sunni	  Islam.	  	  	  History	  shows	  us	  this	  through	  the	  violence	  needed	  to	  establish	  the	  caliphate	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Sunni	  view	  (Goldziher,	  191).	  	  In	  Shia	  Islam,	  ijma	  has	  some	  theoretical	  applicability,	  but	  for	  Shias,	  ijma	  cannot	  possibly	  be	  utilized	  without	  the	  guidance	  from	  the	  Imam.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  Shia	  distrust	  towards	  ijma	  is	  simply	  a	  reflection	  of	  an	  ugly,	  often	  unacknowledged	  aspect	  and	  danger	  of	  democracy,	  however,	  rather	  than	  ijma	  being	  inherently	  undemocratic.	  	  Consensus,	  as	  the	  Sunnis	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  struggle	  after	  Muhammad’s	  death,	  is	  not	  always	  an	  appealing	  prospect.	  	  Thomas	  Jefferson	  noted	  of	  this	  danger	  in	  warning	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  tyranny	  of	  the	  majority	  over	  the	  minority,	  a	  struggle	  that	  continues	  to	  this	  day	  for	  certain	  minority	  groups	  (such	  as	  homosexuals)	  in	  America	  and	  other	  democratic	  nations.	  	  
	  	  
Conclusion	  	   In	  these	  deeply	  theoretical	  grounds,	  it	  is	  exceedingly	  hard	  to	  resist	  arguing	  that	  there	  are	  very	  few	  historical	  facts	  that	  could	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  both	  democratic	  and	  antidemocratic,	  especially	  with	  the	  knowledge	  that	  these	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principles	  of	  the	  past	  can	  be	  manipulated	  at	  will	  according	  to	  how	  a	  person	  with	  a	  position	  of	  power	  within	  the	  Islamic	  community	  chooses	  to	  form	  a	  governance	  structure.	  	  Ijma,	  for	  example,	  was	  accepted	  by	  Sunnis,	  who	  valued	  consensus,	  but	  the	  principle	  itself	  could	  be	  interpreted	  and	  implemented	  in	  different	  ways;	  a	  democratic-­‐leaning	  leader	  might	  use	  it	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  elections,	  while	  a	  more	  authoritarian	  type	  leader	  could	  argue	  that	  ijma	  was	  reserved	  for	  only	  a	  select	  group	  of	  scholars	  and	  not	  the	  broader	  community.	  	  	  However,	  some	  facts	  do	  have	  significant	  implications	  for	  democracy,	  especially	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  chose	  their	  leaders	  in	  the	  succession	  struggle	  after	  the	  death	  of	  Muhammad.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  best	  summation	  of	  how	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Sunni-­‐Shia	  split	  has	  impacted	  their	  propensity	  towards	  democracy	  is	  as	  Goldziher	  noted:	  Sunni	  Islam	  is	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  ijma,	  and	  Shiism	  based	  on	  principles	  of	  authoritarianism.	  	  Using	  this	  fact	  alone,	  of	  course,	  would	  not	  allow	  for	  an	  accurate	  and	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  democratic	  potential	  within	  the	  two	  sects.	  	  As	  noted,	  however,	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Sunni-­‐Shia	  split	  provides	  a	  useful	  and	  necessary	  context	  for	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  sects	  and	  allows	  for	  a	  better	  analysis	  of	  the	  contemporary	  implications	  of	  democracy	  for	  the	  two.	  	  Our	  next	  chapter	  will	  analyze	  how	  some	  of	  these	  historical	  differences,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  developments,	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  and	  interpreted	  in	  the	  contemporary	  governance	  structures	  of	  both	  sects.	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Chapter	  4:	  Contemporary	  Theological	  Differences	  	  
 
The largely theological differences between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims 
have been transformed into full-fledged political conflict, with broad 
ramifications for law and order, social cohesion, and government 
authority (Stern, Foreign Affairs).   
 
Islamic theology matters in that it makes an appreciable impact not only 
in the theoretical domain but also in the real world.  It provides the basis for 
much of how both Sunnis and Shias act politically and socially, and so before 
examining specific Islamic parties and governments, it is necessary to inspect 
the basis on which some of these political structures and beliefs reside.  We 
have already observed how the Sunni-Shia split historically determined the 
disparate theological and personal values inherent to the two sects.  We will 
now examine how these differences have solidified and shifted in modern 
times, and study the extent to which their inclinations are democratic.   
It should be noted, however, that the similarities between the two sects 
outweigh the differences.  Sunnism and Shiism, after all, are two branches of 
the same tree, “united in the Quran and the Prophet, the foundation of all 
Islam” (Nasr, Ideals and Realities, 172). Day-to-day religious practices 
between the two are nearly the same, and the fundamental principles of Islam 
embodied in each faith are the same, placing Sunnis and Shias within the same 
orthodoxy of Islam (ibid, 172).  The areas discussed in this chapter are 
therefore relatively narrow when compared to the large corpus of beliefs and 
norms that Sunni and Shia Islam share. Where the two branches differ, 
	   56	  
however, they often differ strongly and in intertwined areas.  This chapter 
examines such disparities in dimensions such as law, in governance, and in 
religious intermediaries, all with some clear-cut implications for democratic 
compatibility.  It first discusses the different manners in which the two sects 
interpret the Shari’ah, how each view the individual, and finally how they 
implement and interact with governance structures.    
 
Approaches to the Shari’ah 
Islam is a religion that dominates not only the religious beliefs of Muslims- it 
occupies the political and social spheres as well.  At the center of this 
characteristic is the Shari’ah.   The Shari’ah in some ways can be seen as the 
opposite of the Western conception of law, in that it is law religiously 
understood not only as a Divine Law that governs universal moral practices 
and principles but also “how a man should conduct his life and deal with his 
neighbor and with God; how he should eat, procreate and sleep; how he should 
pray and perform other acts of worship” (Nasr, Ideals and Realities, 88).  It is 
comprehensive in its approach and thus offers guidance on all aspects of 
human life.  In this manner law is part of the revelation in Islam, not a foreign 
element that was not sanctified by the ultimate authority, that of God (Nasr, 
Ideals and Realities, 87).  A Muslim is expected, and is indeed not a Muslim, 
until he or she accepts the Shari’ah (ibid., 85).   
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 Many, although not all, of the specific teachings taken from the 
Shari’ah differ little among the Sunni and Shi’ite schools (ibid. 85).  The 
Shari’ah is derived from the Qur’an, pre-Arabian customs, the Hadith 
(attributions of Mohammad’s sayings and actions) and the process of ijma, 
among other factors (Forte, 16-19).  Politically speaking, however, God is the 
only legislator, and man does not have the ability to legislate and create laws 
outside of the Shari’ah; the void left, therefore, is exclusively how God’s laws 
are executed (Nasr, Ideals and Realities, 100).  Much, of course, has been 
discussed on the Shari’ah as a whole and its relationship with democracy, and 
the literature as a whole has rightfully treated the Shari’ah as universally 
respected and followed throughout all of Islam, although it does not provide 
the basis for law in all Muslim countries.  Any potential insights to be gained 
from differences between Sunni and Shia Islam are thus confined to how the 
two branches contemporarily choose rulers for their communities, and how this 
relates to the Shari’ah and its interpretation.  Governance structures within the 
sects are crucial and obviously highly relevant when considering how Sunni 
and Shia Islam are dissimilar and alike in their attitudes to democracy and 
democratization.   
 We	  have	  traced	  the	  historical	  roots	  of	  ijma,	  or	  consensus	  building,	  and	  viewed	  how	  this	  system	  was	  virtually	  exhausted	  by	  Sunnis	  a	  few	  hundred	  years	  after	  the	  death	  of	  Muhammad.	  	  For	  Sunnis,	  legal	  scholarship	  is	  tied	  down	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  taqlid,	  following	  the	  examples	  of	  pious	  men	  (Forte,	  17,	  68).	  	  The	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intellectual	  development	  of	  Sunni	  thought	  largely	  was	  stopped,	  as	  previously	  noted,	  by	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  misuse	  of	  ijma	  and	  the	  embracing	  of	  taqlid	  (Forte,	  68).	  	  	  	   Ijtihad	  (judgment)	  has	  been	  used	  historically	  and	  contemporarily	  to	  execute	  the	  Shari’ah	  “in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  clear	  precedent”	  (Dutton,	  33).	  	  It	  is	  a	  “dynamic,	  forward-­‐looking	  component	  of	  the	  law”	  that	  allows	  for	  a	  modern	  understanding	  of	  the	  Shari’ah	  (Abd-­‐Allah,	  245).	  	  Sunni	  jurists	  practiced	  ijtihad	  in	  order	  to	  further	  the	  intellectual	  development	  of	  the	  Shari’ah	  (Forte,	  17).	  Conservative	  Sunnis	  rejected	  its	  principles,	  insisting	  that	  society	  must	  instead	  “conform	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  divine	  law	  objectively	  determined”	  (Forte,	  68).	  	  	  Contemporarily,	  ijtihad	  has	  been	  the	  source	  of	  controversy	  for	  many	  within	  the	  Sunni	  community.	  	  “Many	  defenders	  of	  the	  Shari’ah	  are	  repelled	  when	  modern	  legislators	  attempt	  to	  justify	  new	  reforms	  by	  a	  tortuous	  reference	  to	  the	  Shari’ah.	  	  They	  prefer	  that	  the	  sacred	  law	  of	  Islam	  remained	  unsullied	  by	  modern	  reinterpretations”	  (Forte,	  69).	  	  Yet	  just	  as	  passages	  in	  the	  Bible	  call	  for	  the	  stoning	  of	  adulterous	  women2,	  much	  of	  the	  Shari’ah	  is	  simply	  outdated.	  	  Movements	  in	  favor	  of	  ijtihad	  within	  Sunni-­‐majority	  countries	  have	  been	  rejected.	  	  In	  one	  case,	  Indonesians	  delegates	  (to	  what	  kind	  of	  gathering?)	  “called	  for	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  a	  paper	  which	  urged	  a	  new	  evolution	  of	  thought”	  and	  that	  also	  suggested	  ignoring	  Quranic	  texts	  that	  had	  proven	  to	  be	  outdated	  (Forte,	  69).	  	  Similarly,	  a	  movement	  to	  bring	  back	  ijtihad	  was	  also	  refused	  in	  the	  country.	  Twelver	  Shia	  governance	  is	  dominated	  by	  mujtahids	  (more	  on	  this	  system	  of	  governance	  later),	  those	  who	  have	  “attained	  a	  high	  stage	  of	  proficiency	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See	  John	  8:1-­‐11	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science	  of	  the	  law	  and	  possess	  the	  other	  traditional	  requirements”	  (Nasr,	  Ideals	  
and	  Realities,	  98).	  	  Ever	  Shia	  must	  follow	  a	  mujtahid,	  who	  uses	  ijtihad	  to	  interpret	  the	  law	  on	  a	  generational	  basis,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  how	  it	  best	  applies	  to	  the	  current	  environment.	  	  Shias,	  as	  noted	  previously,	  await	  the	  return	  of	  the	  twelfth	  Imam,	  and	  during	  his	  absence	  the	  mujtahids	  provide	  the	  needed	  guidance	  (Esposito,	  45).	  	  	   Sunnis,	  meanwhile,	  only	  respect	  early	  mujtahids	  as	  the	  source	  and	  basis	  for	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Shari’ah	  (Zysow,	  44).	  	  	  As	  with	  ijma,	  the	  gate	  is	  closed	  in	  many	  respects	  for	  ijtihad	  and	  Sunnis,	  in	  that	  mujtahids	  of	  “the	  highest	  ranks	  were	  not	  to	  be	  found	  after	  early	  centuries	  of	  Islam”	  (Zysow,	  44-­‐45).	  	  The	  four	  extant	  Sunni	  schools	  of	  jurisprudence	  are	  divided	  by	  which	  mujtahid	  each	  school	  of	  legal	  thought	  follows.	  	  The	  schools,	  named	  after	  the	  mujtahids	  they	  follow	  (all	  of	  whom	  lived	  from	  700	  C.E.	  to	  860	  C.E.),	  are	  the	  Hafanis,	  Malikis,	  Chafi’is,	  and	  Hanbalis,	  and	  they	  all	  view	  each	  other	  as	  mutually	  orthodox	  (Zysow,	  46).	  We	  can	  thus	  trace	  a	  fundamental	  and	  multidimensional	  difference	  between	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  Islam.	  	  Sunnis	  reject	  both	  ijtihad	  and	  the	  mujtahid,	  while	  Shias	  still	  use	  the	  process	  today.	  	  	  An	  increased	  likelihood	  to	  turn	  to	  ijtihad	  can	  be	  both	  promising	  and	  worrisome	  when	  considering	  Shia	  Islam.	  	  Ijtihad	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  device	  to	  “sweep	  away	  those	  awkward	  provisions	  of	  Shari’ah	  that	  protected	  rulers,	  non-­‐Muslims	  and	  ordinary	  people,	  that	  required	  strict	  procedures	  of	  proof,	  and	  that	  leaned	  presumptions	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  accused”	  (Forte,	  242).	  	  It	  can,	  therefore,	  be	  used	  by	  fundamentalists	  and	  radicals	  to	  interpret	  the	  Shari’ah	  as	  they	  please,	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and	  to	  bolster	  support	  for	  provisions	  that	  may,	  for	  example,	  condone	  acts	  of	  violence	  against	  minorities,	  or	  sectarian	  attacks.	  On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  coin	  are	  positive	  implications	  for	  democratization	  movements	  and	  for	  support	  for	  liberal	  democratic	  principles.	  	  The	  Shia	  process	  of	  continuously	  updating	  and	  interpreting	  the	  Shari’ah	  means	  that	  Shias	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  more	  cognizant	  of	  modernization	  movements	  and	  potential	  democratization	  movements.	  The	  struggle,	  of	  course,	  is	  in	  ensuring	  that	  Shia	  leadership	  is	  attentive	  to	  democratization	  desires	  within	  its	  community.	  	  Additionally,	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  literature	  review,	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  a	  given	  that	  Muslims	  view	  democracy	  in	  a	  positive	  light.	  	  Ijtihad	  thus	  may	  not	  produce	  democratic	  results	  if	  either	  the	  leadership	  is	  not	  sensitive	  to	  a	  democratically-­‐inclined	  community	  or	  is	  attune	  to	  its	  community	  but	  the	  community	  has	  not	  expressed	  desires	  for	  a	  more	  democratic	  system	  of	  governance.	  	  Again	  we	  see	  the	  Shia	  reliance	  raising	  their	  spiritual	  leaders	  to	  a	  level	  that	  is	  not	  seen	  in	  the	  Sunni	  faith.	  	  That	  Shias	  inherently	  believe	  that	  they	  are	  not	  all	  capable	  of	  interpreting	  the	  Qur’an	  and	  the	  Shari’ah	  is	  disturbing	  in	  its	  democratic	  implications,	  as	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  extrapolate	  this	  into	  a	  Shia	  belief	  that	  not	  all	  people	  are	  capable	  of	  ruling	  and	  thus	  are	  not	  all	  equal.	  	  	  
 The Sunni rejection of ijtihad also has antidemocratic implications in 
that, as we saw in the case of Indonesia, it is a thought process commonly 
associated with resistance to change.  At the heart of democracy, of course, is 
the constant processing and appraisal of various choices and actions that the 
political community decides upon.  It is the “systematic and analytical 
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development” of policies and legal concepts that both democracy and ijtihad 
embrace, based on rational debate and thought, and so in turn the Sunni 
rejection of ijtihad, putting in its place taqlid, is not conducive to 
democratization.  Indeed, in some ways the Sunni Islamic law is in a state of 
“stagnation…. Principally due to the notion… that the right to the exercise of 
private judgment ceased with the early legists, that its exercise in modern times 
was sinful” (Mullah and Hidadjatullah, xxviii).  Instead, judgment has been left 
to men who lived shortly after the time of Muhammad and who cannot realize 
the demands of the current age (ibid).  
 It would be an encouraging sign, then, to see a renewed Sunni interest 
in ijtihad, in that it could be a sign of a possible movement to democratization 
or at least the justification of some liberal democratic principles.  In the same 
manner as Shiism, however, the use of ijtihad is dependant upon the direction 
that the political community wishes to take it.  Sunni reformers have often 
turned to ijtihad as a method for modernization. The Egyptian Muhammad 
Abduh (d. 1905), for example, saw ijtihad as instrumental in overturning the 
centuries of stagnation that Sunni Islam was experiencing, regarding the “aura 
of sanctity that had come to surround the law of the legal schools” as an 
obstacle to the goal of modernization (Zysow, 49).  Although the numerous 
attempts to revive ijtihad by Sunni Muslims have largely failed, any future 
efforts to increase its influence in the Sunni tradition should be viewed as 
encouraging in relation to democratic prospects.   
	   62	  
The Individual and Self-Sovereignty  
In a democracy, sovereignty is invested in the people, whether the governance 
structure is republican in nature or a direct democracy (that is to say, a 
government in which the people are intimately involved with the decision 
making processes involved in governance through ballots or other means).  
Sovereignty is not relinquished in a republic, but rather delegated to 
representatives, and thus it is vital to examine self-sovereignty in the Sunnism 
and Shiism in order to understand how the two sects interact with democratic 
principles. 
Ash’arite theology points directly to the traditionalism and disavowal of 
self-sovereignty that Sunnis embody.  Ash’arite theology is recognized as “the 
most widely accepted school of Sunni theology” and in many ways denies the 
idea of self-sovereignty (Stelzer, 166).  In the Ash’arite approach, the values 
present in humans are a result of divine will. Moral values cannot be 
interpreted through one’s self.  As we saw historically, Sunni thought often 
values stability and unity over all else, indeed, it is “conceivable that the 
Ash’arites stress ‘tradition’… not only because they that this is per se to be 
preferred over reason, but because reference to tradition and revelation is of 
theological relevance, that is, of relevance for faith and its unity”, for unity of 
its believers in Sunni Islam (Stelzer, 167).  In this ethical and theological 
approach, humans are seen as subjugated to Islamic law, bound by divine will.  
It is the rejection of the ideal of individual, emphasizing instead “;to say what 
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He says’, ‘to command what He commands’, because, in the end, the correct 
interpretation of a divine word is known only by the divine speaker Himself” 
(Stelzer, 166).  Sunnism is based partly on the firm belief that while 
responsible for their actions, humans “cannot create their own acts without 
divine intervention” and that there are consequently no other forms of 
sovereignty but God himself (Lucas, 80).   
Although it does not compose the entirety of Sunni thought, Ash’arite 
theology offers a glimpse into the Sunni treatment of self-sovereignty, or lack 
thereof.  In this form of Sunni thought, the individual is eschewed, with 
antidemocratic implications.  Without overly conflating the two concepts, 
various philosophers, such as Rousseau, in setting the foundation for 
democratic governance, would argue that individual agency and morals are 
derived from within.  Democracy is thus the result of the will of individuals, 
with self-sovereignty, to enter into a social contract.  Ash’arite emphasis upon 
the idea that the individual is incapable of self-guidance and morality with the 
word of God is thus the rejection of the emphasis that democracy puts on self-
agency and morality.  Again we see the special importance that Sunnis put 
upon tradition, which in the case of the Ash’arite tradition trumps reason.  It 
stresses obedience to the ultimate sovereign, that of God (Stelzer, 167).   
A portion of Shia theology, meanwhile, can be seen as in strong 
opposition to Sunni theology. Shiism holds five central beliefs: the justice of 
God, the unity of God, prophecy, the Day of Judgment, and the imamate 
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(Sachedina, 75).  As we have seen, Shias differ with Sunnis most strongly over 
the development of the imamate, but they also differ with Sunnis on details 
regarding other beliefs, such as self-sovereignty (Sachedina, 75). “The belief in 
the justice of God, for example, is similar to that of the Sunni Mu’Tazilis, 
rationalist theologians who were active” until the tenth century, when they 
were surpassed by the traditionalist Ash’arites (Sachedina, 75).  For example, 
Shia Islam emphasizes the use of reason over tradition in that God’s 
endowment to humanity is that of the ability to reason, and that both good and 
evil are constructs able to be defined and analyzed through the use of rational 
thought. (Sachedina, 75).   
By extension, this rational theology is corroborated through Shia 
jurisprudence, “the comprehensiveness of Islamic revelation, interpreted, and 
applied by use of reason” (Sachedina, 75).  Along these lines, Shia theology 
provides the basis for ijtihad and is an excellent example of how Islam is a 
faith that extends into matters of jurisprudence and governance as well as 
personal religious habits.   
In this manner we can view some portions of Shia theology as 
antithetical to Sunni theology, especially when compared to the Ash’arite 
theology.  While Sunni theology places importance on tradition and following 
the examples of others, Shia Islam stresses the need for a rational, evolutionary 
based approach to interpreting the divine word.  In terms of democratic 
propensity, Shia rationalism is encouraging in that it is not steeped in 
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traditionalism, and thus is relatively forward thinking.  This suggests a 
promising proclivity towards alternative governance structures not widely 
used, as well as the ability to become more accepting of specific liberal 
democratic principles such as women’s rights, universal suffrage, and the 
rights of minority groups and religions.   
Again, however, the governance structure of Shiism stymies much of 
the democratic potential of its emphasis on reason and rationality.  Not just 
anyone, after all, can “undertake the interpretation of the scriptural sources 
rationally”, and in this way Shiism shies away from placing importance on the 
individual and self-sovereignty (Sachedina, 76).  As previously discussed, this 
lack of individualism can have antidemocratic implications, as it sets the 
foundation for Shias feeling as though they do not need to have individual 
agency and interpretation within their faith, an extension that can be possibly 
made to the attitudes Shias have towards governmental structures.   
 
Governance 
We have examined the historical roots of the Sunni and Shia faiths in terms of 
its governance, and noted the Shia reliance on intermediaries between the 
individual and God. Indeed,	  we	  can	  attribute	  the	  number	  of	  highly	  influential	  grand	  ayatollahs	  existing	  today	  within	  Shia	  Islam	  to	  the	  requirement	  that	  Shias	  must	  adhere	  to	  the	  teachings	  of	  a	  living	  mujtahid	  (Zysow,	  46).	  	  Much	  of	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  said	  about	  Shia	  governance	  has	  already	  been	  said	  in	  the	  previous	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sections	  on	  the	  Shari’ah	  and	  the	  history	  of	  Shiism	  and,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  avoid	  repetition,	  we	  will	  examine	  the	  actions	  of	  specific	  living	  ayatollahs	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  As	  noted	  previously,	  the	  Shia	  reliance	  upon	  mujtahids	  can	  have	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  connotations,	  especially	  when	  considering	  the	  concept	  of	  
ijtihad.	  	  Inherently,	  however,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  view	  Shia	  Islam	  as	  a	  system	  based	  on	  authoritarianism.	  	  There	  is	  little	  room	  for	  individualism	  and	  self-­‐sovereignty	  in	  a	  structure	  reliant	  upon	  unquestionable	  leadership.	  	  Sunni	  governance,	  meanwhile,	  differs	  from	  that	  of	  Shia	  Islam.	  There is no 
“charismatically endowed hierarchy” in Sunni Islam as there is in Shiism (and 
there is not, of course, an overarching church such as the one that Roman 
Catholics belong to) (Goldberg, 11).  Sunnis reject the mujtahid and instead 
adapt their ideology “to state structures, centralized authorities, and ruling 
regimes” while Shias have an increased likelihood to  “adopt rebellious 
ideologies rejecting state structures”, in that their stringent requirements for 
leadership make them less apt to accept typical systems of governance (Khuri, 
293).  The four Sunni schools, however, contain the ulama, specialists in 
religious law and judicial matters, each who officiate based on which school of 
interpretation they belong to (Khuri, 294).   
Sunni ulama, much like the clergy of the Christian faith, officiate over 
religious ceremonies and provide spiritual and life guidance when asked.  
Other religious officials hold positions in Shari’ah courts, offer advice on legal 
matters, and execute legal transactions (Khuri, 294).  The four schools differ, 
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of course, but what is particularly relevant to this thesis is that Sunnis are able 
to essentially choose which school suits their particular political and social 
needs with relative ease? (Khuri, 295).  While traditionally families, countries 
and ethnicities follow only one school of religious law (for example, Egypt, 
Syria and Lebanon follow the Shafi’i), a “Sunni Muslim who has daughters 
only and wishes them to inherit all his property opts for the Ja’fari law which 
provides for this” (Khuri, 294).  States have followed this pattern historically 
as well.  In one such case, the Ottoman Empire, home to many non-Muslims, 
chose to follow the Hanafi interpretation of the Shari’ah, as it is “the most 
permissive of all with regards to the rights of non-Muslims in an Islamic state” 
(Khuri, 294).	  	   In	  many	  ways	  this	  process	  is	  a	  workaround	  to	  the	  Sunni	  problem	  of	  stagnation	  in	  the	  development	  of	  its	  interpretation	  of	  divine	  law.	  	  The	  ability	  to	  pick	  and	  choose	  the	  most	  politically	  convenient	  and	  acceptable	  interpretations	  of	  Islam	  allows	  for	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  flexibility,	  just	  as	  Shia	  Islam	  has	  with	  
ijtihad.	  	  	  It	  is	  a	  dual	  flexibility	  as	  well-­‐	  the	  individual	  is	  capable	  of	  choosing	  his	  social	  path	  through	  which	  school	  he	  picks,	  and	  the	  state	  is	  able	  to	  choose	  the	  laws	  and	  regulations	  it	  imposes	  on	  its	  citizens.	  	  	  While	  the	  rejection	  of	  ijtihad	  bodes	  ill	  for	  democratization,	  this	  process	  offers	  hope.	  	  Such	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  when	  it	  tried	  to	  extend	  more	  rights	  to	  its	  non-­‐Muslim	  citizens,	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  increased	  liberal	  democratic	  principles	  though	  the	  careful	  choice	  of	  the	  right	  Sunni	  school.	  	  Much	  as	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  Islam	  are	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branches	  of	  the	  same	  tree,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  areas	  in	  which	  the	  Sunni	  schools	  differ	  are	  smaller	  than	  those	  that	  they	  agree	  in.	  	  	   Khuri	  also	  notes	  that	  the	  religious	  authority	  structure,	  that	  of	  those	  within	  the	  Shari’ah	  courts	  and	  the	  ulama,	  among	  others,	  is	  often	  reliant	  on	  the	  power	  structure	  held	  by	  the	  state.	  	  “The	  opinions	  of	  high	  religious	  authorities	  are	  solicited,	  but	  the	  final	  decision	  rests	  in	  the	  hands	  of”	  the	  government,	  meaning	  that	  political	  policies	  are	  set	  by	  the	  government	  rather	  than	  religious	  leaders,	  which	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  potentially	  a	  positive	  fact,	  depending	  on	  the	  state	  governance	  structure,	  given	  the	  Sunni	  emphasis	  on	  tradition	  (Khuri,	  299).	  	  It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  note	  how	  Sunnis	  rely	  much	  less	  on	  a	  hierarchical	  religious	  structure	  than	  do	  Shias,	  and	  it	  is	  fascinating	  to	  view	  how	  the	  historical	  connotations	  of	  the	  Sunni	  support	  of	  the	  Umayyad	  Caliphate	  played	  out	  as	  expected	  into	  modern	  times	  through	  the	  Sunni	  advocacy	  of	  tolerating	  non-­‐Islamic	  power	  structures,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  provide	  stability	  for	  Islam	  .	  	  Again,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  be	  encouraged	  by	  the	  rather	  democratic	  value	  Sunnis	  place	  on	  the	  individual	  ‘s	  ability	  to	  interpret	  God’s	  word	  rather	  than	  depending	  on	  mujtahids,	  although	  in	  many	  ways	  it	  seems	  very	  contradictory	  with	  Ash’arite	  thought.	  	  
Conclusion	  In	  many	  ways	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Sunni/Shia	  split	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  contemporarily	  realized.	  	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  outlined	  the	  Shia	  emphasis	  on	  intermediaries	  through	  the	  relatives	  of	  Muhammad	  and	  Ali,	  and	  the	  importance	  given	  by	  Sunnis	  to	  stability	  and	  tradition.	  Much	  remains	  the	  same	  to	  this	  day,	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with	  the	  Shia	  reliance	  upon	  the	  mujtahid	  as	  leaders	  and	  interpreters	  of	  the	  faith,	  and	  the	  Sunni	  reluctance	  to	  accept	  ijtihad	  as	  a	  means	  to	  modernize	  by	  analyzing	  the	  Shari’ah	  in	  a	  modern-­‐day	  context.	  	  Again,	  we	  can	  view	  much	  of	  this	  as	  both	  democratic	  and	  antidemocratic;	  it	  is	  encouraging	  to	  view	  Shia	  acceptance	  of	  
ijtihad,	  but	  discouraging	  to	  see	  their	  continued	  reliance	  upon	  authoritarian	  figures.	  	  Conversely,	  it	  is	  encouraging	  to	  see	  Sunni	  emphasis	  on	  the	  individual	  and	  its	  distance	  from	  a	  hierarchical	  system,	  but	  discouraging	  to	  see	  that	  the	  sect	  is	  resistant	  to	  ijtihad	  and	  other	  modernization	  means,	  as	  evidenced	  in	  the	  Ash’arite	  denial	  of	  self-­‐sovereignty	  and	  advocacy	  of	  traditionalism;	  democracy	  cannot	  be	  realized	  if	  the	  faith	  is	  set	  in	  remaining	  in	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  	  	  	  Finally,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  various	  components	  of	  the	  Shari’ah,	  and	  the	  methods	  through	  which	  it	  is	  executed	  by	  each	  sect,	  is	  absolutely	  binding	  and	  had	  been	  respected	  by	  Muslim-­‐majority	  states.	  	  It	  is	  thus	  not	  necessarily	  a	  principle	  source	  for	  national	  legislation	  in	  states.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  our	  next	  chapter,	  then,	  is	  to	  examine	  how	  various	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  political	  parties	  and	  governments	  carry	  out	  Islamic	  law,	  jurisprudence	  and	  governance,	  if	  these	  differences	  become	  fully	  realized	  within	  state	  apparatuses,	  and	  what	  this	  means	  for	  democracy	  in	  the	  modern	  Muslim	  world.	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Chapter	  5:	  Theology	  in	  Action	  Do	  theoretical	  and	  theological	  differences	  build	  formidable	  barriers	  or	  create	  streamlined	  paths	  in	  the	  search	  for	  an	  Islamic	  democracy	  or	  a	  democratic	  Islam?	  	  Do	  they	  matter	  at	  all,	  or	  are	  they	  insignificant	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  towering	  influence	  of	  state	  structures,	  governments,	  and	  the	  decisions	  of	  leaders	  who,	  regardless	  of	  Islamic	  affiliation,	  make	  choices	  based	  on	  retaining	  power,	  or	  on	  facets	  of	  political	  realism,	  or	  simply	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  what	  they	  view	  as	  best	  for	  their	  people?	  	  This	  chapter	  takes	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  two	  countries-­‐	  Lebanon	  and	  Iraq-­‐	  with	  strong	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  political	  parties	  and	  populations	  that	  are	  generally	  not	  politically	  marginalized.	  It	  examines	  political	  and	  religious	  leaders	  from	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  religious	  aisle,	  so	  to	  speak,	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  are	  conclusions	  we	  can	  draw	  from	  these	  two	  countries	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  democracy	  and	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  Islam	  in	  political	  practice.	  	  The	  contextual	  framework	  has	  already	  been	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  and	  it	  thus	  now	  important	  to	  see	  which	  differences,	  if	  any,	  are	  realized	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  	  	  	   The	  debate,	  then,	  can	  be	  essentially	  boiled	  down	  to	  one	  of	  political	  constructivism	  versus	  realism.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  are	  these	  two	  approaches	  to	  politics	  contingent	  upon	  the	  social	  and	  historical	  constructs	  and	  differences	  between	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias,	  or	  are	  they	  instead	  governed	  by	  basic	  human	  nature	  and	  desires,	  or	  both?	  To	  best	  answer	  this	  question,	  this	  chapter	  has	  done	  its	  best	  to	  cite	  examples	  that	  can	  be	  tied	  back	  to	  the	  two	  previous	  chapters,	  examining	  Shia	  leaders	  and	  Sunni	  movements	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  Iraq.	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Lebanon	  Lebanon	  is	  composed	  of	  six	  major	  religious	  sects:	  Druze	  Muslims,	  Shia	  Muslims,	  Sunni	  Muslims,	  Orthodox	  Christians,	  Catholic	  Christians,	  and	  Maronite	  Christians	  (Faour,	  631).	  	  28	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  is	  Sunni,	  another	  28	  percent	  is	  Shia,	  and	  22	  percent	  Maronite	  Christian.	  	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  maintain	  religious	  equanimity,	  the	  prime	  minister	  of	  Lebanon	  is	  a	  Sunni,	  the	  speaker	  of	  the	  Parliament	  is	  a	  Shia,	  and	  the	  president	  a	  Maronite.	  	  The	  government	  is	  a	  parliamentary	  republic	  and	  holds	  elections	  generally	  regarded	  as	  free	  and	  fair	  (U.S.	  Dept.	  of	  State).	  Due	  to	  its	  liberal	  leanings	  and	  democratic	  system,	  Lebanon	  was	  once	  regarded,	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  still	  is,	  as	  the	  Switzerland	  as	  the	  Middle	  East,	  with	  Beirut	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  Paris	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  (Esposito,	  186).	  	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  traced	  the	  historical	  roots	  of	  the	  Shia	  sentiment	  of	  social	  marginalization	  and	  as	  its	  status	  as	  a	  predominantly	  minority	  group	  throughout	  the	  world.	  	  In	  Lebanon,	  Shias	  searching	  for	  opportunities	  in	  employment,	  education	  and	  shelter	  solidified	  around	  a	  populist	  movement	  led	  by	  the	  Lebanese	  Shia	  cleric	  Imam	  Musa	  al-­‐Sadr	  (Milton-­‐Edwards,	  55).	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  this	  movement	  became	  popular	  due	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  government	  to	  aptly	  provide	  opportunities	  for	  its	  citizens:	  	   [The]	   root	   of	   the	   ‘Islamic	   phenomenon’	   [is]	   the	   well	   known	  economic	   and	   demographic	   problems	   and	   the	   policy	   dilemmas	  they	   pose	   for	   government…	  There	   is	   a	  withdrawal	   of	   the	   state…	  unable	   to	   cope	   with	   the	   mounting	   burdens.	   	   This	   is	   where	   the	  Islamic	  economic	  and	  social	  sectors	  are	  moving	  in	  “	  (Zubaida,	  xvi).	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Al-­‐Sadr,	  born	  in	  Iran	  but	  with	  Lebanese	  roots,	  recognized	  the	  potential	  of	  Islam	  to	  address	  the	  social	  and	  political	  issues	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world.	  	  Trained	  in	  religious	  seminaries,	  he	  relocated	  to	  southern	  Lebanon	  in	  1960	  and	  rose	  through	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  religious	  clergy	  (Milton-­‐Edwards,	  55-­‐56).	  	  It	  was	  time	  in	  which	  Shias,	  while	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  religious	  groups	  in	  Lebanon,	  felt	  that	  the	  consociational	  democracy	  offered	  little	  to	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  addressing	  grievances	  and	  enjoying	  the	  privileges	  of	  a	  democratic	  system	  (ibid,	  56).	  	  Indeed,	  this	  majority	  “formed	  the	  most	  impoverished	  elements	  of	  Lebanese	  society”	  (ibid,	  56).	  	  	  	   Recognizing	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Shia	  community	  to	  mobilize	  quickly	  around	  its	  interests	  and	  its	  nascent	  attraction	  to	  populist	  social	  actions	  and	  movements,	  al-­‐Sadr	  strove	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  engender	  a	  Shia	  revival.	  	  His	  doctrine	  centered	  on	  addressing	  the	  inequalities	  in	  Lebanese	  society	  and	  of	  putting	  the	  “have”	  and	  “have-­‐nots”	  on	  equal	  footing	  through	  various	  mechanism.	  	  The	  first	  of	  this	  was	  a	  “social-­‐based	  support	  system”	  called	  harakat	  al-­mahrumin	  (the	  Movement	  of	  the	  Deprived)	  (ibid,	  56).	  	  The	  movement,	  created	  in	  1974,	  demonstrated	  and	  protested	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  Shia	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  government.	  	  	  	   The	  movement	  also	  worked	  on	  providing	  social	  programs	  to	  the	  Shia	  community,	  all	  done	  with	  the	  eventual	  goal	  that	  the	  Shi’a	  community	  would	  be	  better	  able	  to	  “demand	  its	  share	  of	  services	  and	  power	  from	  the	  state”	  (ibid,	  56).	  	  These	  programs	  included	  literacy	  campaigns,	  schools,	  health	  services,	  vocational	  training	  and	  orphanages	  (ibid,	  56).	  	  When	  the	  Lebanese	  civil	  war	  broke	  out	  in	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1975,	  al-­‐Sadr	  continued	  to	  emphasize	  his	  social	  programs	  and	  to	  maintain	  good	  relationships	  with	  the	  religious	  groups	  involved	  in	  internecine	  violence.	  	  	  	  Al-­‐Sadr	  was	  “disappeared”	  in	  1978	  during	  a	  trip	  to	  Libya,	  but	  the	  foundation	  created	  in	  his	  name	  has	  continued	  his	  work	  towards	  a	   society	   free	   of	   ignorance,	   poverty	   and	   disease,	   with	   equal	  opportunities	   regardless	   of	   differences	   of	   faith	   or	   sex,	   and	   an	  environment	  blessed	  by	  a	  growing	  dialogue	  between	  the	  contributions	  of	   the	   capable	   and	   the	   needs	   and	   expectations	   of	   the	   deprived;	   a	  dialogue	  built	  on	  participation	  and	  trust	  in	  one	  and	  in	  others.3	  	   	  The	  Movement	  of	  the	  Deprived,	  therefore,	  is	  an	  encouraging	  sign	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  Shiism	  and	  democracy	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  petition	  its	  government	  through	  largely	  peaceful	  means.	  	  It	  was	  reform	  based	  and	  strived	  to	  hold	  the	  government	  accountable	  through	  ways	  other	  than	  violence.	  	  There	  are	  obvious	  democratic	  implications	  in	  the	  way	  that	  al-­‐Sadr	  approached	  the	  petitioning	  of	  the	  government,	  and	  the	  means	  he	  used	  are	  far	  from	  foreign	  to	  protesters	  in	  democracies	  the	  world	  around.	  	  It	  is	  only	  fair	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  al-­‐Sadr	  encouraged	  his	  followers	  to	  pick	  up	  weapons	  in	  the	  Lebanese	  Civil	  War	  (actions	  which	  were	  not	  necessarily	  antidemocratic;	  it	  was,	  after	  all,	  a	  civil	  war	  in	  which	  violence	  is	  inherent),	  words	  that	  created	  an	  armed	  wing	  of	  the	  Movement	  of	  the	  Deprived	  known	  as	  the	  Amal	  Movement	  (more	  on	  this	  group	  further	  on).	  	  	  The	  question	  that	  remains,	  however,	  is	  if	  al-­‐Sadr’s	  movement	  can	  be	  directly	  tied	  to	  the	  historical	  and	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  of	  Shiism	  that	  were	  previously	  identified	  as	  potential	  means	  for	  democratization.	  	  As	  was	  apparent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  www.sadr-­‐foundation.org	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in	  the	  second	  chapter	  on	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Sunni/Shia	  split,	  Shias	  have	  often	  played	  the	  role	  of	  the	  minority,	  marginalized	  group.	  	  Even	  in	  al-­‐Sadr’s	  Lebanon,	  in	  which	  Shias	  were	  a	  large	  group,	  the	  community	  felt	  ignored	  and	  set	  to	  the	  side	  by	  the	  government.	  	  Meanwhile,	  a	  question	  that	  was	  left	  unaddressed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  was	  how	  Shias	  would	  respond	  to	  their	  general	  status	  as	  the	  minority	  group,	  and	  so	  in	  this	  regard	  it	  is	  encouraging	  to	  see	  democratic	  actions	  taken	  to	  address	  a	  uniquely	  Shia	  sentiment.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  more	  violent	  groups	  such	  as	  Hezbollah	  have	  used	  the	  Shia	  history	  of	  being	  taken	  advantage	  of	  and	  preyed	  on	  by	  oppressors	  in	  their	  political	  rhetoric.	  	  Nasrallah,	  Hezbollah’s	  secretary	  general,	  gave	  a	  speech	  recently	  in	  which	  he	  compared	  contemporary	  Lebanese	  politics	  with	  Hussein’s	  death.	  	  In	  the	  speech,	  the	  Sunnis	  were	  the	  oppressors	  and	  the	  Shia	  the	  oppressed:	  “Oh	  Hussein,	  in	  these	  difficult	  times,	  we	  —	  men	  and	  women	  —	  despite	  all	  the	  challenges,	  dangers,	  threats,	  insults,	  and	  the	  determination	  and	  trickery	  of	  the	  enemy,	  and	  despite	  the	  scarcity	  of	  our	  supporters	  …	  we	  will	  not	  abandon	  you,	  or	  your	  religion,	  or	  your	  flock,	  or	  your	  Karbala,	  or	  your	  objectives,	  even	  if	  we	  are	  killed	  and	  burned,	  and	  our	  wives	  and	  children	  are	  captured	  as	  yours	  were.”	  	  In	  addition,	  it	  was	  discussed	  in	  a	  previous	  chapter	  that	  the	  Shia	  reliance	  on	  hierarchical	  system	  in	  governance	  could	  be	  both	  pro-­‐democratic	  as	  well	  as	  antidemocratic,	  in	  that	  the	  direction	  the	  Shia	  community	  takes	  is	  heavily	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  religious	  leaders	  as	  to	  what	  political	  tactics	  and	  systems	  of	  governance	  they	  see	  as	  fitting.	  	  	  A	  leader	  with	  authoritarian	  sympathies,	  for	  example,	  might	  be	  more	  prone	  to	  support	  authoritarian	  governments	  and	  cite	  Shia	  theology	  that	  supported	  authoritarianism.	  	  In	  some	  ways	  Shias	  endorse	  the	  democratic	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concept	  of	  one	  man,	  one	  vote,	  in	  which	  the	  Imam	  is	  the	  man,	  and	  he	  has	  the	  vote.4	  	  What	  is	  then	  encouraging	  about	  al-­‐Sadr	  is	  that	  he	  used	  his	  religious	  authority	  to	  lead,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  a	  strongly	  prodemocratic	  movement	  with	  goals-­‐	  such	  as	  equality-­‐	  and	  means	  –	  such	  as	  protests	  and	  demonstrations-­‐	  common	  to	  democratic	  organizations	  the	  world	  over.	  	  It	  is	  thus	  demonstrative	  of	  the	  Shia	  ability	  to	  support	  democratic	  governance	  ideals	  even	  with	  an	  authoritarian	  religious	  structure,	  a	  possibility	  that	  at	  first	  glance	  to	  the	  casual	  observer	  may	  seem	  unlikely.	  	  	  Interestingly,	  al-­‐Sadr	  called	  for	  the	  unification	  of	  the	  Shi’a	  community,	  a	  tenet	  this	  paper	  has	  attributed	  predominately	  to	  Sunni	  Islam.	  	  Rather	  than	  the	  Shia	  scholars	  being	  held	  socially	  far	  above	  the	  typical	  Shia,	  al-­‐Sadr	  believed	  “that	  the	  scholar	  must	  not	  only	  preach	  and	  teach,	  but	  also	  reach	  out	  to	  the	  community”	  (Siblani).	  	  He	  argued	  that	  in	  order	  to	  liberate	  the	  masses,	  the	  
mujtahid	  must	  not	  isolate	  himself	  from	  the	  community	  	  (Siblani).	  	  It	  was	  not	  necessary	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  Shia	  doctrine	  previous	  discusses,	  but	  rather	  a	  reinterpretation	  of	  why	  the	  mujtahid	  are	  especially	  important	  to	  the	  Shia	  community	  and	  the	  role	  they	  must	  play.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  find	  quotes	  accurately	  attributed	  to	  al-­‐Sadr	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  his	  conceptualization	  of	  Shia	  ideology,	  but	  it	  is	  encouraging	  in	  terms	  of	  democratic	  potential	  that	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  mujtahids	  in	  a	  new	  liberalized	  light,	  as	  it	  suggests	  that	  other	  Shias	  around	  the	  world	  could	  as	  well.	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Make	  this	  its	  own	  paragraph	  and	  develop	  it	  further	  –	  it’s	  important:	  If	  the	  literature	  on	  al-­‐Sadr	  is	  any	  indication,	  he	  was	  more	  apt	  to	  quote	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  than	  the	  Qur’an.	  	  In	  fact,	  conversely,	  that	  al-­‐Sadr’s	  movement	  was	  so	  overwhelming	  secular	  is	  not	  totally	  a	  good	  argument	  for	  a	  Shia	  propensity	  towards	  democracy,	  in	  that	  al-­‐Sadr	  did	  not	  use	  typical	  Shia	  mechanisms	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  his	  movement	  of	  equality.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  movement	  was	  often	  a	  conceptualization	  of	  democracy	  outside	  of	  the	  Islamic	  framework	  rather	  than	  in	  it.	  	  	   But	  in	  the	  grand	  scheme	  of	  Lebanese	  politics,	  al-­‐Sadr	  played	  only	  a	  part	  and,	  without	  making	  this	  section	  exclusively	  on	  the	  Lebanese	  Civil	  War,	  it	  would	  be	  purposefully	  misleading	  to	  list	  al-­‐Sadr’s	  gentler	  efforts	  as	  emblematic	  of	  Shia	  politics	  in	  Lebanon	  without	  balancing	  them	  against	  the	  actions	  of	  Hezbollah	  and	  the	  Amal	  Movement.	  	  While	  he	  initially	  embraced	  nonviolent,	  al-­‐Sadr	  organized	  Amal	  in	  order	  to	  counter	  the	  other	  militias	  and	  sectarian	  violence	  that	  dominated	  Lebanon	  during	  the	  civil	  war	  (Esposito,	  187).	  	  After	  al-­‐Sadr’s	  disappearance	  in	  Libya	  in	  1978,	  Amal,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  al-­‐Sadr’s	  successor	  Nabih	  Berri,	  increased	  its	  pragmatic	  nationalist	  agenda	  with	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  Shia	  parity	  (Esposito,	  188).	  	  But	  with	  the	  Israeli	  invasion	  of	  Lebanon	  in	  1982,	  the	  moderate	  Shia	  groups	  were	  alienated	  and	  more	  radical,	  Iranian-­‐influenced	  militants	  became	  more	  attractive	  (ibid,	  188).	  	  	  Groups	  like	  Islamic	  Amal	  and	  Hezbollah	  called	  for	  an	  increase	  of	  Islam	  in	  politics	  and	  “engaged	  in	  a	  powerful	  reinterpretation	  of	  Shia	  Islam	  which	  supported	  a	  populist,	  militant,	  political	  activist	  movement	  of	  resistance	  and	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protest”	  (Esposito,	  189).	  	  Hezbollah’s	  political	  beliefs	  could	  aptly	  summed	  up	  simply	  as	  opposite	  to	  al-­‐Sadr’s:	  while	  al-­‐Sadr	  stood	  for	  “a	  more	  pluralistic,	  multiconfessional	  state	  and	  lay-­‐dominated	  organization	  and	  has	  carefully	  eschewed	  a	  primarily	  Islamic	  path	  for	  Lebanon,	  Hezbollah….	  Has	  more	  rigorously	  espoused	  an	  Islamic	  identity,	  theology,	  clerical	  leadership,	  and	  goal”	  (Esposito,	  190).	  	  The	  Hezbollah	  motto	  “the	  Party	  of	  God	  will	  surely	  be	  victors”,	  a	  
Qur’anic	  verse,	  speaks	  to	  its	  belief	  that	  their	  battle	  was	  one	  of	  God’s	  people	  against	  Israel,	  the	  West,	  and	  al-­‐Sadr’s	  Amal	  (Esposito,	  190).	  	  Hezbollah	  glorified	  the	  actions	  of	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  in	  Iran,	  and	  fought	  its	  way	  to	  power	  through	  violence,	  military	  operations,	  kidnappings,	  hijackings,	  as	  well	  as	  social	  programs	  (Esposito,	  190).	  	  	  Hezbollah	  embraced	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  abandonment	  of	  Islamic	  faith	  was	  the	  root	  of	  Muslim	  poverty	  (Milton-­‐Edwards,	  55).	  	  Islamic	  revivalism	  thus	  became	  paramount	  to	  Hezbollah’s	  politics,	  and	  was	  linked	  to	  Hezbollah’s	  populist	  message	  (ibid).	  	  However,	  Hezbollah’s	  conceptualization	  of	  revivalism	  was	  “less	  to	  do	  with	  the	  spiritual	  or	  cultural	  lineage	  of	  Islam”	  and	  more	  to	  do	  with	  providing	  outlets	  in	  which	  Muslims	  could	  make	  their	  voices	  heard	  (ibid).	  	  Hezbollah’s	  leadership	  is	  predominantly	  clerical	  in	  nature	  and	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  during	  the	  Lebanese	  civil	  war	  by	  Ayatollah	  Fadlallah,	  the	  groups	  spiritual	  figurehead.	  	  While	  in	  1975	  Hezbollah	  held	  considerable	  influence	  due	  to	  its	  “mastery	  of	  violence”,	  it	  also	  endorsed	  social	  measures.	  	  Fadlallah	  insisted,	  “The	  occupaton	  has	  to	  end	  and	  it	  can	  only	  do	  so	  by	  resistance…	  yet	  we	  have	  to	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support	  the	  community	  through	  health,	  educational	  [sic]	  and	  a	  social	  point	  of	  view,	  to	  prisoners	  and	  orphans	  etc”	  (Milton-­‐Edwards,	  87).	  	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  speculate	  how	  Lebanese	  politics	  would	  exist	  without	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  civil	  war,	  but	  what	  is	  certain	  is	  that	  there	  was	  an	  ideological	  shift	  to	  more	  militant	  and	  authoritarian	  politics,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  Amal	  out	  of	  a	  group	  that	  was	  originally	  founded	  on	  secular	  and	  democratic	  principles.The	  contradiction	  between	  the	  Movement	  of	  the	  Deprived	  and	  Hezbollah	  speaks	  to	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  Shiism,	  and	  indeed	  religion	  as	  a	  whole,	  to	  being	  manipulated	  by	  those	  in	  power	  according	  to	  their	  wishes.	  	  What	  is	  absent	  from	  all	  these	  examples	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  theology	  this	  paper	  had	  identified	  as	  potential	  Shia	  justifications	  for	  democracy	  and	  democratization,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  that	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  either	  Al-­‐Sadr	  or	  Nasrallah	  chose	  to	  use	  theological	  concepts	  previously	  identified	  as	  potential	  means	  to	  democratize,	  such	  as	  ijtihad.	  	  	  Neither	  Al-­‐Sadr’s	  first	  group	  nor	  Hezballah	  are	  necessarily	  bound	  immovably	  to	  Shia	  theology.	  	  Instead,	  “they	  are	  run	  by	  Lebanese	  in	  leadership,	  ideology,	  politics	  and	  direction”,	  and	  their	  beliefs	  mirror	  and	  are	  sensitive	  to	  those	  of	  their	  constituencies	  (Espositio,	  190).	  	  All	  this	  suggests	  that,	  more	  than	  Islam	  itself,	  it	  is	  the	  wants,	  needs,	  and	  political	  beliefs	  of	  the	  community	  that	  determine	  a	  Shia	  leader’s	  path	  in	  Lebanon.	  	  This,	  perhaps,	  could	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  positive	  sign	  for	  the	  prospects	  of	  democracy	  in	  that	  if	  the	  Shia	  community	  embraces	  democracy,	  its	  leadership	  will	  as	  well	  but,	  of	  course,	  it	  is	  an	  entirely	  different	  story	  to	  make	  democracy	  attractive	  to	  a	  group	  of	  people	  who	  are	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generally	  distrustful	  of	  Western	  democracies	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Finally,	  on	  a	  similar	  note,	  the	  same	  problem	  of	  the	  Shia	  emphasis	  on	  authoritarian	  leadership,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  remains	  embodied	  in	  Hezbollah	  today	  with	  its	  heavy	  emphasis	  on	  clerical	  leadership.	  	  	  Whereas	  the	  Shia	  community	  supported	  parties	  of	  its	  own,	  Lebanese	  Sunnis	  typically	  identify	  with	  the	  Sunni	  Islamic	  community	  throughout	  the	  world	  (Salem,	  448).	  	  As	  a	  result,	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  civil	  war,	  the	  Sunni	  community	  has	  generally	  associated	  with	  parties	  with	  an	  Arab	  nationalist	  orientation	  (Khazem,	  607).	  	  	  As	  with	  Hezbollah,	  Sunni-­‐based	  militias	  existed	  during	  the	  war,	  such	  as	  Harakat	  al-­‐Tawhid	  (Unity	  Movement).	  	  We	  have	  seen	  historically	  the	  Sunni	  emphasis	  on	  its	  community	  and	  the	  need	  to	  build	  consensus	  and	  unity	  within	  the	  community	  over	  other	  traits.	  Especially	  in	  time	  of	  the	  1970’s	  in	  Lebanon,	  but	  certainly	  continuing	  today	  throughout	  the	  Arab	  world,	  Sunnis	  became	  attracted	  to	  Islamic	  militancy	  and	  rhetoric	  as	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  poverty	  and	  lack	  of	  employment	  and	  community	  due	  to	  increased	  urbanization.	  	  While	  the	  Shias	  had	  a	  heightened	  sense	  of	  injustice	  and	  inequality,	  Sunnis	  felt	  removed	  from	  the	  bonds	  of	  kinship	  and	  neighborhood,	  the	  very	  fabric	  of	  the	  Sunni	  community,	  as	  increased	  urbanization	  meant	  that	  Sunnis	  found	  themselves	  increasingly	  alienated	  and	  isolated	  (Mackey,	  218).	  	  The	  obvious	  answer	  to	  this	  anonymity	  was	  to	  turn	  back	  to	  Islam.	  	  “Cut	  off	  from	  the	  ties	  of	  kinship	  and	  neighbors	  that	  held	  the	  society	  of	  the	  villages	  together,	  rural	  refugees	  counterbalanced	  their	  deep	  sense	  of	  alienation”	  from	  the	  Lebanese	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political	  and	  economic	  system	  with	  the	  certainty	  that	  they	  belonged	  to	  a	  community	  of	  Islam	  (Mackey,	  218).	  	  The	  turn	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  Sunnis	  to	  a	  more	  nationalized	  sense	  of	  community	  through	  the	  common	  bonds	  of	  Sunni	  Islam	  and	  Islam	  in	  general	  should	  thus	  come	  as	  no	  surprise.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  emphasis	  is	  that	  the	  single	  unifying	  factor	  is	  that	  of	  Islam	  and	  sectarianism	  rather	  than	  secular	  principles,	  such	  as	  the	  ones	  embodied	  by	  al-­‐Sadr.	  	  It	  should	  not	  be	  a	  stretch	  to	  postulate	  that	  the	  popularity	  of	  more	  radical	  Islamic	  principles	  within	  the	  Sunni	  community	  was	  because	  of	  the	  deep-­‐seated	  historical	  importance	  of	  togetherness	  within	  Sunnis	  embrace,	  an	  aspect	  that	  this	  paper	  has	  outlined.	  	  In	  2007,	  for	  example,	  militant	  Sunni	  Islam	  appeared	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Fatah	  al	  Islam.	  	  It	  offered	  itself	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  Lebanese	  government,	  the	  Lebanese	  Shia	  and	  Western	  democracy.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  declared	  war	  on	  all	  of	  them	  (Mackey,	  251).	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  secular	  Sunni	  groups	  do	  not	  exist	  as	  well.	  	  Future	  Movement,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  Sunni	  backed	  secular	  party,	  that	  was	  established	  to	  “work	  on	  the	  consolidation	  of	  democracy	  based	  on	  respect	  for	  public	  freedoms	  and	  equality	  in	  rights	  and	  duties	  between	  citizens	  of	  one	  country”,	  among	  other	  liberal	  democratic	  principles	  (Movement	  Establishment).	  	  Both	  Shia	  and	  Sunnis	  have	  parties	  in	  the	  Lebanese	  parliament	  that	  hold	  liberal	  democratic	  values,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  intellectually	  dishonest,	  and	  very	  nearly	  impossible,	  to	  tie	  these	  parties’	  values	  to	  their	  theological	  underpinnings.	  	  	  Theological	  underpinnings,	  like	  ijtihad	  and	  ijma,	  should	  be	  distinguished	  as	  separate	  conceptualizations	  than	  the	  historical	  underpinnings	  that	  have	  
	   81	  
influenced	  how	  the	  two	  sects	  interact	  with	  different	  systems	  of	  government	  and	  leadership.	  	  In	  this	  manner,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  fairly	  convincingly,	  then,	  that	  there	  are	  deeply	  historical	  reasons	  for	  how	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  act	  contemporarily	  in	  Lebanon	  today,	  and	  that	  these	  differences	  do	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  whether	  the	  sects	  act	  democratically	  or	  not.	  	  It	  would	  be	  nice	  to	  possibly	  conclude	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  Lebanon,	  the	  Sunni	  emphasis	  on	  an	  Islamic	  community	  and	  the	  Shia	  emphasis	  as	  the	  minority	  opposition	  and	  secular	  ideals	  means	  that	  Shia	  Islam	  is	  more	  democratic,	  but	  this	  would	  be	  misleading.	  	  One	  only	  needs	  to	  look	  at	  groups	  such	  as	  Hezbollah	  to	  disprove	  that	  statement,	  and	  modern-­‐day	  Sunni	  groups	  such	  as	  Future	  Movement.	  	  It	  can	  be	  argued,	  however,	  that	  if	  Lebanon	  is	  any	  indication,	  the	  mechanisms	  in	  which	  initial	  radicalization	  occurs	  within	  Sunni	  Islam	  and	  Shia	  Islam	  could	  be	  said	  to	  be	  different.	  	  Shia	  radicalize	  through	  their	  leaders,	  while	  Sunnis	  do	  so	  through	  their	  communities.	  	  It	  should	  be	  fairly	  obvious	  why	  radicalization	  is	  antidemocratic:	  it	  is	  the	  rejection	  of	  accepting	  other	  points	  of	  view,	  the	  disavowal	  of	  secularization,	  and	  is	  often	  associated	  with	  militancy	  and	  terrorism.	  	  What	  is	  encouraging,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  theological	  differences	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters	  have	  in	  fact	  played	  out	  contemporarily.	  	  
Iraq	  Iraq	  and	  Lebanon	  are	  similar	  in	  some	  ways-­‐	  both	  have	  Muslim	  populations	  split	  between	  Sunnis	  and	  Shia,	  and	  both	  are	  culturally	  diverse	  (Mackey,	  225).	  	  Like	  in	  Lebanon,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  succinctly	  detail	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  political	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atmosphere	  there,	  and	  it	  thus	  better	  to	  deal	  with	  specific	  political	  figures	  and	  movements	  more	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis.	  	   Iraq	  has	  enormous	  historical	  significance	  to	  Shia	  Islam.	  	  It	  was	  here	  that	  Hussein	  was	  killed	  ,	  which	  developed	  the	  tale	  of	  “a	  righteous	  minority	  against	  a	  powerful	  but	  evil	  government	  authority”,	  a	  sentiment	  that	  we	  now	  see	  frequently	  evoked	  in	  Shia	  protests	  and	  politics	  (Cockburn,	  17).	  	  Shia	  are	  the	  majority	  group	  in	  Iraq,	  although	  they	  did	  not	  gain	  control	  of	  their	  country	  until	  the	  fall	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  his	  Baath	  party.	  	  	  	   This	  thesis	  ignores	  the	  vast	  corruption,	  the	  political	  infighting,	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  outside	  groups	  such	  as	  Iran	  and	  Hezbollah	  that	  are	  all	  part	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  political	  experience,	  but	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  they	  do	  exist,	  and	  that	  they	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  Iraq’s	  politics	  but	  are	  less	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis	  than	  are	  other	  facets	  of	  Iraqi	  politics.	  	  Aside	  from	  all	  these	  distractions,	  Iraq	  still	  provides	  an	  interesting	  case	  to	  analyze.	  	  The	  nascent	  democracy	  in	  Iraq	  is	  not	  of	  the	  homegrown	  variety.	  	  Instead,	  it	  was	  rather	  inelegantly	  forced	  upon	  Iraqis	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  that	  one	  might	  use	  to	  put	  a	  square	  peg	  in	  a	  round	  whole.	  	  Even	  still,	  Iraqis	  are	  more	  welcoming	  of	  democracy	  than	  one	  might	  expect.	  	  Even	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  exploding	  sectarian	  violence	  in	  2004,	  a	  full	  85	  percent	  of	  Iraqis	  either	  strongly	  agreed	  or	  agreed	  with	  the	  statement	  “Democracy	  may	  have	  problems	  but	  it’s	  better	  than	  any	  other	  form	  of	  government”	  (of	  course,	  if	  they	  had	  been	  told	  they	  would	  face	  incredibly	  horrific	  sectarian	  violence	  for	  the	  next	  half-­‐decade,	  they	  may	  not	  have	  been	  as	  welcoming)	  (WVS,	  2004).	  	  When	  asked	  the	  question	  if	  the	  government	  should	  only	  implement	  Shari’ah	  law,	  around	  54	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percent	  of	  Iraqis	  said	  that	  it	  should,	  while	  about	  21	  percent	  neither	  agreed	  or	  disagreed,	  and	  around	  23	  percent	  disagreed	  (WVS,	  2004).	  	  	  	   These	  kinds	  of	  values	  are	  important,	  because	  much	  of	  the	  previous	  theoretical	  analysis	  centered	  on	  specific	  sectarian	  differences	  in	  the	  Shari’ah	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  democracy.	  	  It	  was	  noted	  that	  Shari’ah	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  principal	  source	  for	  legislation	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  state	  apparatuses,	  but	  what	  we	  can	  look	  at	  is	  if	  the	  methods	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  used	  to	  implement	  their	  values	  within	  Iraq	  are	  democratic,	  and	  what	  specifically	  these	  values	  are.	  	  	  More	  specifically,	  it	  would	  not	  necessarily	  make	  a	  government	  undemocratic	  if	  it	  were	  to	  implement	  Shari’ah	  law-­‐	  it	  would	  matter	  which	  parts	  of	  the	  Shari’ah	  one	  chose	  to	  enforce.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  democracy	  can	  potentially	  exist	  without	  every	  liberal	  democratic	  value	  present,	  although	  the	  bare	  minimum	  should	  be	  free	  and	  fair	  elections.	  	  	  	   Muqtada	  Sadr	  quickly	  rose	  to	  prominence	  in	  the	  power	  vacuum	  that	  followed	  the	  fall	  of	  Saddam.	  	  He	  was	  the	  both	  the	  son	  and	  the	  son-­‐in-­‐law	  of	  two	  of	  the	  most	  important	  Shia	  figures	  and	  martyrs	  in	  Iraq	  (Cockburn,	  18).	  	  His	  father,	  Mohammad	  al-­‐Sadr,	  was	  a	  Grand	  Ayatollah	  in	  Iraq	  before	  being	  murdered.	  	  Sadr	  appealed,	  and	  continues	  to	  appeal,	  to	  the	  young	  Shias	  in	  Iraq	  who	  bristled	  at	  the	  conservatism	  of	  the	  elder	  clerical	  leaders	  in	  Iraq.	  	  Like	  al-­‐Sadr	  in	  Lebanon,	  Sadr’s	  movement	  was	  a	  populist	  one,	  bent	  on	  providing	  the	  basic	  necessities	  to	  a	  once	  ignored	  population.	  	  Sadr	  and	  his	  followers	  after	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Iraq	  supplied	  water	  to	  thirsty	  Iraqis,	  money	  to	  pay	  for	  municipal	  workers,	  and	  guards	  to	  protect	  vital	  infrastructure	  (Shadid,	  175).	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   Sadr’s	  story	  in	  the	  chaos	  that	  followed	  the	  initial	  invasion	  is	  a	  long	  and	  often	  violent	  one,	  but	  what	  is	  crucial	  to	  understand	  is	  that	  he	  had,	  and	  has,	  a	  large	  cult-­‐like	  following	  who	  were	  willing	  to	  fight	  for	  Sadr	  in	  his	  Mahdi	  Army	  and	  that	  he	  was	  able	  to	  heavily	  influence	  the	  2005	  Iraqi	  elections	  and	  nearly	  every	  subsequent	  election.	  	  His	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  election	  results	  in	  2005,	  for	  example,	  gained	  him	  “control	  over	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  Shia	  allaince’s	  seats	  in	  the	  parliament,	  [and]	  he	  became	  a	  king-­‐maker-­‐	  choosing	  the	  alliance’s	  candidate	  for	  prime	  minister”	  (Nasr,	  2543).	  	  	  Take,	  for	  another	  example,	  Grand	  Ayatollah	  Ali	  al-­‐Sistani,	  the	  leading	  senior	  cleric	  among	  Iraqi	  Shias	  (Nasr,	  440).	  	  Where	  Sadr,	  brash	  and	  unstable,	  might	  have	  been	  the	  “bad	  cop”	  to	  Americans,	  Sistani,	  calmer	  and	  more	  composed,	  was	  the	  “good	  cop”	  (Nasr,	  2527).	  	  Sistani’s	  edicts	  would	  run	  the	  gamut	  from	  highly	  conservative	  to	  moderate	  to	  even	  possibly	  liberal.	  	  On	  contraception,	  for	  example,	  Sistani	  stated:	  “	  It	  is	  permissible	  for	  a	  woman	  to	  use	  [intraunterine	  devices]	  and	  other	  birth	  control	  devices	  provided	  that	  they	  do	  not	  pose	  serious	  harm	  to	  the	  woman's	  health”	  (sistani.org).	  	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  Sistani	  issued	  a	  fatwa	  against	  homosexuals,	  calling	  for	  them	  to	  be	  killed	  in	  the	  “worst,	  most	  severe	  way”(Buckley).	  	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  fall	  of	  Saddam,	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  democracy,	  that	  the	  extremely	  basic	  human	  right	  to	  life	  was	  desecrated	  for	  homosexuals	  (of	  course,	  Saddam	  was	  not	  well	  known	  for	  his	  respect	  of	  many	  other’s	  lives)	  (Buckley).	  	  The	  plight	  of	  homosexuals	  in	  postwar	  Iraq	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  danger	  democracy	  poses	  without	  protection	  for	  liberal	  democratic	  values,	  and	  it	  is	  further	  indicative	  of	  the	  contradictory	  nature	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that	  the	  Shia	  system	  of	  leadership	  embodies.	  	  	  The	  stance	  of	  Shia	  leaders	  on	  democratic	  values	  is	  amplified	  greatly	  due	  to	  their	  vast	  followings,	  sometimes	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  democracy,	  and	  sometimes	  as	  a	  disservice.	  	  	  The	  example	  of	  al-­‐Sadr	  and	  Sistani	  is	  therefore	  cited	  to	  provide	  evidence	  for	  the	  emphasis	  that	  Shia	  place	  on	  religious	  intermediaries	  and	  a	  heavily	  structured	  hierarchy,	  often	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  democracy.	  Sadr	  also	  illustrates	  another	  point:	  sect-­‐based	  groups	  such	  as	  his	  are	  undemocratic	  in	  some	  ways.	  	  Sadr	  did	  not	  provide	  for	  services	  with	  equality	  in	  mind.	  	  Instead,	  it	  was	  an	  effort	  to	  boost	  the	  Shia	  standing	  on	  the	  political	  playing	  field.	  	  	  But	  Sadr	  and	  Sistani,	  for	  all	  their	  faults,	  are	  examples	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Shia	  leadership	  to	  mostly	  play	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  games,	  in	  this	  case	  democracy.	  	  It	  shows	  the	  capability	  of	  a	  rigorous	  religious	  hierarchy	  to	  adapt	  to	  a	  system	  of	  democracy	  in	  the	  best	  way,	  by	  understanding	  it	  and	  participating	  in	  it.	  	  There	  should	  not	  be	  a	  fear	  of	  religion	  playing	  a	  part	  in	  a	  democracy,	  especially	  in	  the	  Arab	  world,	  where	  the	  alternative	  is	  often	  boycotts	  or	  violence.	  	  It	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  work	  throughout	  the	  world	  as	  well;	  religion	  often	  plays	  a	  part	  in	  the	  American	  experience	  of	  democracy,	  with	  Evangelicals	  throwing	  their	  support	  behind	  a	  singular	  presidential	  candidate	  every	  four	  years.	  	  	  	   The	  values	  Sistani	  holds	  are	  not	  held	  by	  every	  Shia	  cleric	  in	  the	  world,	  or	  even	  in	  Iraq.	  	  Just	  as	  it	  was	  demonstrated	  that	  Sunnis	  could	  shift	  among	  the	  four	  Sunni	  schools	  of	  theology	  based	  on	  their	  own	  values,	  Shia	  can	  choose	  which	  religious	  leader	  best	  appeals	  to	  their	  values.	  	  This	  process	  is	  essentially	  democracy	  by	  proxy,	  or	  a	  sort	  of	  double	  representative	  democracy,	  as	  the	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American	  Senate	  was	  before	  the	  Seventeenth	  Amendment	  was	  passed:	  Shias	  in	  Iraq	  support	  a	  certain	  religious	  leader,	  who	  then	  supports	  a	  certain	  candidate	  or	  candidates.	  	  	  The	  individual	  Iraqi	  Shia	  still	  votes,	  but	  he	  votes	  along	  “ayatollah	  lines”.	  	  The	  crucial	  part	  for	  Shias,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  make	  them	  more	  attracted	  to	  liberal	  democratic	  values	  and	  to	  the	  leaders	  that	  embrace	  them,	  such	  as	  al-­‐Sadr	  in	  Lebanon.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  this	  issue	  is	  entirely	  contingent	  upon	  a	  variety	  of	  factors:	  socioeconomics,	  perception	  of	  Western	  governments,	  and	  status	  as	  a	  minority/majority	  group.	  	  It	  can	  be	  hoped,	  although	  not	  demonstrated,	  that	  the	  Shia	  process	  of	  constantly	  updating	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Sharia’ah	  for	  the	  time	  period	  will	  make	  them	  more	  accepting	  of	  democracy.	  	   While	  the	  second	  chapter	  identified	  the	  Shia	  identity	  of	  being	  persecuted	  as	  a	  potential	  positive	  for	  democracy	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  may	  make	  Shias	  more	  welcoming	  towards	  other	  minority	  groups,	  the	  Shia	  community	  in	  Iraq	  has	  demonstrated	  a	  proclivity	  to	  vindictiveness	  (Hazran,	  521).	  	  	  The	  history	  of	  Iraq,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  a	  constant	  bombardment	  of	  attacks	  against	  Shias,	  have	  reinforced	  the	  sectarian	  identity	  of	  the	  Shia	  (Hazran,	  526).	  	  Shias	  have	  conducted	  ethnic	  cleansing	  campaigns	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  had	  a	  commanding	  influence	  in	  the	  state	  security	  apparatuses	  (Hazran,	  525).	  	  The	  National	  Iraqi	  Alliance,	  a	  “sectarian-­‐oriented	  bloc”,	  won	  the	  2005	  election	  and	  is	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  Shia	  political	  scene	  in	  Iraq	  (Hazran,	  525).	  	  	  The	  group	  has,	  in	  part,	  rejected	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Arab	  nationalist	  movement,	  arguing	  that	  the	  Sunni	  elite	  used	  to	  “justify	  its	  political	  domination	  and	  its	  monopoly	  of	  national	  resources”	  (Hazran,	  537).	  It	  is	  an	  argument	  that	  further	  divides	  the	  two	  groups	  in	  Iraq;	  rather	  than	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identifying	  common	  grounds,	  Shias	  have	  chosen	  to	  focus	  on	  what	  separates	  themselves	  from	  Sunnis.	  	  Indeed,	  “the	  main	  explanation	  for	  the	  curren	  crisis	  plaguing	  both	  [Iraq	  and	  Lebanon]	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  neither	  country	  can	  claim	  a	  unitary	  polity	  or	  a	  cohesive	  national	  community”	  (Hazran,	  522).	  	  	  	   The	  Sunni	  experience	  in	  postwar	  Iraq	  is	  an	  entirely	  different	  one,	  and	  harder	  to	  define	  due	  to	  its	  lack	  of	  prominent	  clergy	  to	  outline	  precise	  values.	  	  Further	  complicating	  matters,	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  two	  million	  refugees	  from	  the	  Iraq	  war	  are	  Sunnis,	  who	  are	  now	  spread	  out	  across	  the	  Arab	  world	  (Amos,	  43).	  	  Sunni	  insurgent	  attacks	  became	  common	  in	  2004,	  but	  after	  al-­‐Qaeda’s	  bombing	  of	  the	  Shiite	  Golden	  Dome	  mosque	  in	  Iraq,	  and	  the	  revenge	  attacks	  that	  followed,	  it	  was	  Sunnis	  who	  paid	  the	  largest	  toll	  of	  the	  war,	  with	  an	  exodus	  of	  many	  of	  Iraq’s	  professional	  class	  (Amos,	  57).	  	  A	  caveat,	  then:	  current-­‐day	  Iraq	  may	  be	  in	  simply	  too	  radical	  of	  a	  situation	  to	  fairly	  examine	  the	  Sunni	  position	  in	  Iraq	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  democracy:	  “Sunnis,	  in	  contact	  with	  relatives	  back	  home,	  deeply	  insecure	  and	  largely	  excluded	  from	  power	  at	  every	  level,	  waited	  for	  the	  Shiite-­‐dominated	  government	  to	  show	  signs	  of	  political	  reconciliation”,	  but	  they	  still	  have	  little	  recourse	  (Amos,	  181).	  	  	   It	  is	  an	  odd	  reversal	  of	  roles	  for	  Sunnis.	  	  Shias	  were	  the	  oppressed	  and	  ignored	  demographic	  under	  Saddam,	  and	  now	  it	  is	  the	  Sunnis	  who	  feel	  persecuted.	  	  	  	  Nouri	  al-­‐Maliki,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Iraq,	  earned	  his	  stripes	  as	  a	  leader	  of	  an	  underground	  Shia	  movement	  under	  Saddam,	  and	  he	  is	  often	  viewed	  as	  strongly	  sectarian	  against	  Sunni	  politicians	  (Amos,	  653).	  	  Iraq	  to	  this	  day	  is	  still	  heavily	  sectarian;	  “Baghdad	  became	  a	  Shiite-­‐dominated	  city	  for	  the	  first	  time	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in	  its	  long	  history.	  	  Communities	  were	  separated	  by	  religious	  identity	  and	  now	  lived	  behind	  protective	  blast	  walls.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  mixed	  neighborhoods	  that	  had	  been	  a	  feature	  of	  old	  Baghdad	  had	  been	  purged”	  (Amos,	  695).	  	  The	  Sunni	  community	  has	  largely	  been	  shattered.	  	  Even	  Jalal	  Talabani,	  the	  President	  of	  Iraq	  and	  a	  Sunni,	  did	  not	  come	  to	  power	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Sunni	  Arab	  community	  as	  discussed	  in	  Lebanon.	  He	  is	  a	  Kurd,	  and	  has	  thus	  drawn	  his	  support	  from	  the	  Iraqi	  Kurdistan	  region	  (BBC	  News,	  Jalal).	  	  	  	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  if	  there	  is	  one	  ray	  of	  light	  for	  drawing	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  Iraqi	  Sunni	  and	  the	  theoretical	  elements	  discussed,	  it	  is	  the	  Sunni	  community	  embodied	  in	  the	  Sunni	  Awakening	  movement.	  	  The	  Awakening	  began	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  enormous	  amounts	  of	  violence	  that	  existed	  in	  Iraq	  in	  2006	  in	  the	  Anbar	  Province.	  	  Pressuring	  was	  mounting	  from	  all	  sides-­‐	  from	  Americans,	  from	  the	  Iraqi	  Army,	  and	  from	  Shias	  (NYTimes,	  Awakening	  Movement	  in	  Iraq).	  	  The	  Sunni	  tribal	  leaders	  reached	  a	  decision	  out	  of	  self-­‐preservation,	  to	  cease	  fighting	  with	  American	  troops	  and	  instead	  work	  with	  them	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  to	  both	  end	  sectarian	  violence	  and	  take	  on	  al-­‐Qaeda	  in	  Iraq	  (ibid).	  	  Sunnis	  were	  paid	  by	  the	  American	  military	  to	  not	  fight	  Americans	  and	  to	  guard	  infrastructure,	  government	  buildings,	  and	  checkpoints	  (ibid).	  	  The	  Awakening	  became	  regarded	  as	  not	  simply	  important	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  country,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  means	  for	  Sunnis	  to	  gain	  some	  agency	  in	  the	  country’s	  politics.	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   The	  promise	  of	  the	  Awakening	  died	  in	  part	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  elections	  in	  2010.	  	  “The	  Awakening	  presented	  no	  organized	  front	  in	  the	  election,	  and	  with	  much	  division	  and	  squabbling	  the	  dream	  of	  national	  political	  power	  died”	  (ibid).	  	  	  	   The	  cynic	  would	  argue	  that	  any	  group	  of	  people,	  regardless	  of	  historic	  background,	  would	  come	  together	  if	  the	  alternative	  meant	  annihilation,	  and	  this	  example	  is	  not	  inherently	  democratic.	  	  There	  are	  no	  liberal	  democratic	  values	  present,	  no	  voting	  taking	  place,	  no	  discussion	  on	  human	  rights	  or	  ethics.	  	  It	  is,	  however,	  an	  example	  of	  the	  consensus	  building	  that	  Sunnis	  value,	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Sunni	  community,	  however	  shattered,	  to	  come	  together	  to	  serve	  the	  common	  good.	  	  It	  is	  not	  a	  stretch	  to	  draw	  parallels	  between	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Awakening	  and	  democracy,	  although	  no	  actual	  democracy	  took	  place.	  	  It	  was	  however,	  much	  like	  in	  a	  democracy,	  a	  community	  working	  together	  for	  self-­‐preservation	  and	  for	  mutual	  benefit.	  	  	  Without	  taking	  a	  political	  stance	  whatsoever,	  the	  Sunni	  case	  in	  Iraq	  should	  provide	  an	  example	  and	  a	  warning	  of	  how	  easily	  the	  bonds	  created	  by	  religion	  can	  be	  shattered	  by	  oppression	  and	  violence.	  	  The	  previous	  chapter	  outlined	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  community	  for	  Sunnis,	  their	  emphasis	  on	  consensus,	  and	  other	  theological	  tenets	  that	  were	  positive	  in	  their	  outlook	  towards	  democratization.	  	  All	  this	  does	  not	  matter	  if	  there	  is	  not	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  in	  which	  to	  reside.	  In	  her	  book	  Eclipse	  of	  the	  Sunnis,	  Amos	  outlines	  the	  crippled	  Sunni	  diaspora.	  	  Her	  outlook	  is	  bleak,	  and	  highlights	  a	  Catch-­‐22;	  without	  the	  return	  of	  Sunnis	  to	  Iraq,	  there	  cannot	  be	  peace	  and	  true	  democracy,	  but	  without	  peace,	  Sunnis	  will	  not	  return	  to	  Iraq.	  	  	  The	  question	  that	  was	  first	  posed	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in	  this	  chapter	  was	  one	  of	  constructivism	  versus	  realism.	  	  The	  answer,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Iraq,	  is	  that	  constructivist	  differences	  between	  Sunnis	  and	  Shia,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  historical	  reasons	  they	  are	  different,	  matter,	  but	  only	  when	  they	  have	  been	  put	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  basic	  human	  nature.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  differences	  exist	  because	  of	  history	  and	  theology,	  but	  it	  thanks	  to	  human	  nature	  that	  the	  result	  of	  these	  differences	  is	  highly	  negative	  for	  democracy	  in	  Iraq.	  	  There	  is	  no	  single	  theological	  difference	  that	  exists	  that	  makes	  one	  sect	  more	  democratic	  than	  the	  other;	  instead,	  it	  is	  that	  the	  differences	  exist	  at	  all.	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Chapter	  6:	  Conclusion	  This	  goal	  of	  this	  thesis	  was	  not	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  Islam	  and	  democracy	  could	  and	  should	  only	  be	  analyzed	  on	  a	  specific	  sect-­‐based	  examination,	  but	  rather	  that	  it	  was	  a	  gaping	  hole	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  no	  one	  had	  bothered	  to	  look	  into.	  	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  has	  been	  shown,	  and	  that	  it	  has	  also	  been	  established	  that	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  understand	  the	  divide	  that	  separates	  the	  two	  as	  it	  does	  govern	  some	  very	  real-­‐world	  consequences.	  	  This	  thesis	  outlined	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Sunni-­‐Shia	  spit	  after	  the	  death	  of	  Muhammad,	  the	  battle	  for	  succession	  that	  followed	  through	  the	  four	  caliphs,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Shia	  value	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  legitimate	  rule	  and	  the	  Sunni	  emphasis	  on	  community	  and	  basic	  order.	  	  It	  then	  traced	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  actual	  function	  of	  the	  successor	  to	  Muhammad	  for	  the	  two	  sects,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  difference	  to	  democracy.	  	  It	  then	  followed	  the	  development	  of	  
ijma	  through	  the	  ages	  and	  its	  importance	  to	  Sunni	  Islam	  before	  falling	  into	  disuse,	  and	  its	  potential	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  democracy.	  	  	  We	  then	  examined	  the	  Shari’ah	  and	  the	  different	  approaches	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  took	  to	  the	  corpus	  of	  Islam	  and	  Islamic	  jurisprudence.	  	  Shias	  place	  emphasis	  on	  ijtihad	  and	  the	  continuous	  reinterpretation	  of	  the	  Qur’an,	  a	  potentially	  positive	  sign	  for	  democratization	  efforts,	  while	  still	  continuing	  their	  use	  of	  authoritative	  leaders,	  known	  as	  mujtahids,	  among	  other	  titles.	  	  Sunni	  Islamic	  law,	  meanwhile,	  has	  been	  relatively	  stagnant	  and	  resistant	  to	  change,	  and	  its	  Ash’arite	  approach	  stresses	  tradition	  and	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  individual,	  placing	  in	  its	  stead	  the	  supremacy	  of	  God.	  	  It	  was	  also	  noted	  that,	  unlike	  in	  Shia	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Islam,	  there	  is	  little	  hierarchy	  inherent	  to	  Sunni	  Islam,	  and	  that	  Sunni	  Muslims	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  interpret	  God’s	  word	  for	  themselves	  and	  the	  potential	  to	  change	  schools	  of	  thought	  if	  need	  be,	  all	  with	  positive	  implications	  for	  democratization.	  	  There	  is	  plenty,	  then,	  that	  separates	  Sunnis	  from	  Shias.	  	  	  	  	  It	  is	  apparent	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  cases	  this	  thesis	  has	  explored,	  the	  theological	  literature	  discussed	  before	  is	  largely	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  democratic	  propensity	  of	  contemporary	  Shia	  and	  Sunni	  parties	  and	  leaders.	  	  References	  to	  Islam	  were	  plentiful	  by	  the	  numerous	  leaders	  previously	  cited,	  but	  we	  encountered	  none	  of	  the	  sect-­‐specific	  theological	  principles	  identified	  beforehand,	  such	  as	  ijtihad	  or	  ijma.	  	  It	  is	  also	  entirely	  possible	  that	  the	  wrong	  differing	  components	  of	  the	  two	  sects	  were	  identified	  as	  potentially	  influential	  in	  the	  process	  of	  democratization,	  and	  that	  thus	  the	  analysis	  of	  this	  thesis	  simply	  missed	  the	  theological	  mark.	  	  Regardless,	  I	  have	  found	  nothing	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  case,	  and	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  should	  be	  construed	  as	  evidence	  of	  absence,	  rather	  than	  an	  argument	  from	  ignorance.	  	  It	  is,	  meanwhile,	  certainly	  discouraging	  that	  some	  very	  obvious	  theological	  sources	  to	  support	  democratization	  have	  fell	  to	  the	  wayside.	  	  	   This	  should	  be	  contrasted,	  however,	  with	  some	  very	  demonstrable	  impacts	  of	  the	  differences	  of	  power	  dynamics	  and	  governance	  structures	  with	  historical	  roots.	  	  The	  previous	  chapter	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  Shia	  relationship	  with	  its	  clergy	  left	  it	  up	  to	  the	  leaders	  as	  to	  the	  attitude	  towards	  democracy	  and	  democratic	  principles	  Shias	  develop.	  The	  cases	  of	  al-­‐Sadr,	  Hezbollah,	  and	  Sadr	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have	  demonstrated	  this	  as	  likely.	  	  It	  is	  evidence	  of	  history,	  with	  the	  glorification	  of	  the	  Twelve	  Imams,	  leaving	  an	  indelible	  mark	  on	  the	  Shia	  psyche.	  	  	  	  	   There	  are	  not	  significantly	  more	  democratic	  Sunni	  parties	  than	  Shia	  parties,	  or	  vice	  versa,	  in	  the	  world	  today.	  	  There	  are	  some	  Shia	  leaders	  who	  are	  more	  earnestly	  democratic	  than	  Sunni	  parties,	  just	  as	  there	  are	  some	  Sunni	  leaders	  who	  are	  more	  bent	  on	  democratization	  than	  their	  Shia	  counterparts.	  	  The	  takeaway	  from	  this	  is	  that	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  will	  all	  act	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  best	  suits	  them,	  and	  work	  within	  the	  electoral	  and	  governmental	  structures	  they	  are	  faced	  with	  in	  the	  most	  efficient	  manner	  possible.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  the	  two	  sects	  are	  faced	  with	  a	  democracy,	  they	  will	  most	  likely	  work	  within	  the	  democratic	  mechanisms	  to	  bring	  change	  if	  they	  are	  able	  to	  have	  a	  sense	  that	  fair	  play	  and	  equal	  participation	  will	  enable	  them	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  self-­‐interests.	  	  Likewise,	  in	  a	  dictatorship,	  a	  sectarian	  push	  for	  democracy	  is	  dependant	  on	  whether	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  feel	  as	  if	  their	  ideological	  interests	  are	  already	  being	  respected.	  	  In	  Iraq,	  the	  evidence	  shows	  that	  democracy	  has	  failed	  largely	  because	  it	  is	  not	  a	  democracy	  with	  a	  level	  playing	  field;	  the	  mechanisms	  in	  which	  an	  equitable	  system	  of	  representation	  should	  be	  based	  on	  have	  not	  worked.	  	  Instead,	  Sunnis	  feel	  discriminated	  against	  and	  incapable	  of	  retaining	  a	  sense	  of	  agency	  in	  the	  Iraqi	  government.	  	  One	  need	  only	  witness	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  March	  2010	  parliamentary	  elections	  to	  see	  this	  causal	  relationship.	  	  Because	  the	  Awakening	  suffered	  the	  defeat	  that	  it	  did,	  Sunnis	  once	  again	  were	  denied	  political	  re-­‐empowerment,	  and	  turned	  back	  to	  assassinations,	  bombings,	  and	  general	  murder	  (NYTimes,	  Awakening	  Movement	  in	  Iraq).	  	  The	  violence,	  fueled	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by	  Sunni	  dissatisfaction,	  continues	  to	  this	  day,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  death	  of	  40	  people	  in	  February	  23	  of	  this	  year.	  	  The	  simultaneously	  marvelous	  and	  terrifying	  facet	  of	  religion	  is	  that	  it	  allows	  a	  person	  to	  have	  an	  incredible	  amount	  of	  moral	  and	  political	  flexibility	  depending	  on	  the	  lens	  they	  view	  it	  through	  or	  the	  opinions	  they	  hold.	  	  Religion	  “permits”	  Christians	  to	  speak	  out	  against	  war	  and	  commit	  horrendous	  atrocities.	  	  Similarly,	  religion	  allows	  Hindus	  to	  advocate	  for	  nonviolence	  and	  also	  to	  perpetrate	  murder.	  	  Theology	  is	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  flux,	  of	  evolution	  and	  devolution,	  and	  it	  is	  battered	  and	  molded	  and	  transformed	  contingent	  upon	  the	  opinions	  and	  desires	  and	  motivations	  of	  whoever	  is	  in	  power.	  	  It	  can	  be	  used	  for	  democratic	  purposes,	  and	  just	  as	  easily	  for	  authoritarian	  purposes.	  	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  Islam	  are	  no	  different.	  	  	  Perhaps	  the	  only	  conclusion	  that	  the	  reader	  should,	  and	  indeed	  can,	  draw	  is	  this:	  that	  in	  the	  grand,	  overarching	  scheme	  of	  split	  between	  Sunni	  and	  Shia	  Islam,	  the	  differences	  are	  small,	  and	  although	  they	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  large	  and	  also	  positive	  for	  the	  prospects	  of	  democracy	  in	  Islam,	  what	  has	  always	  mattered	  the	  most,	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  matter	  the	  most,	  is	  general	  constituent	  attitude	  (within	  the	  Shia	  hierarchical	  structure,	  for	  example,	  a	  more	  democratically-­‐inclined	  constituency	  may	  support	  a	  more	  democratically-­‐inclined	  leader),and	  the	  attitude	  political	  leaders	  and	  governance	  systems	  containing	  Islamists	  take	  towards	  democratic	  principles.	  	  It	  is	  frustrating	  that	  the	  two	  sects	  do	  not	  use	  the	  means	  cited	  in	  this	  paper	  as	  a	  way	  to	  push	  for	  democracy.	  	  The	  ability	  is	  there,	  and	  much	  of	  what	  is	  lacking	  is	  the	  desire.	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   It	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  fairly	  conclusive,	  then,	  that	  as	  far	  as	  Sunnis	  and	  Shia	  are	  concerned,	  differences	  in	  theology	  are	  not	  the	  most	  important	  characteristic	  in	  the	  acceptance	  of	  democracy	  and	  democratic	  values.	  	  An	  entire	  thesis	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  could	  be	  dedicated	  to	  the	  socioeconomic,	  regional	  and	  political	  contexts	  in	  which	  this	  desire	  for	  democracy	  is	  lacking.	  	  These	  facets	  were	  briefly	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  for	  this	  thesis.	  	  For	  Islam	  specifically,	  scholars	  cite	  the	  growing	  antagonism	  between	  the	  West	  and	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  quicker	  modernization	  of	  the	  West	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  Muslim	  world	  (Hoveyda,	  230).	  	  	  There	  is	  a	  historical	  hostility	  between	  the	  two	  cultural	  and	  political	  regions	  that	  stretches	  back	  for	  much	  of	  history,	  past	  even	  the	  First	  Crusade	  to	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Jerusalem	  in	  the	  11th	  century,	  but	  we	  can	  easily	  identify	  the	  European	  colonization	  of	  the	  Muslim	  world	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  as	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  contemporary	  divide	  between	  the	  two	  worlds.	  	  Wars	  and	  peaceful	  movements	  for	  independence	  followed,	  from	  Tunisia	  to	  Algeria	  to	  Mesopotamia.	  	   Perhaps,	  or	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  the	  desire	  for	  democratization	  is	  lacking	  because	  of	  the	  unique	  Muslim	  experience	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  colonial	  powers	  who,	  while	  democratic	  at	  home,	  did	  nothing	  to	  achieve	  their	  stated	  interested	  in	  the	  modernization	  of	  their	  colonies.	  	  	  Rather	  than	  finding	  appealing	  these	  nations	  that	  were	  ostensibly	  the	  model	  for	  democratic	  governance,	  Muslims	  began	  an	  organized	  retreat	  from	  modernization	  efforts	  and	  Western	  values	  (Hoveyda,	  231).	  	  The	  divide,	  such	  as	  it	  is,	  can	  be	  potentially	  defined	  not	  by	  democratic	  values	  but	  by	  a	  Western	  versus	  Muslim	  ideology.	  	  The	  incompatibility	  is	  not	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between	  Islam	  and	  democracy,	  but	  by	  the	  West	  playing	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  more	  radical	  Islamic	  groups	  that	  offer	  solace	  and	  answers	  to	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  world	  and	  Western	  countries	  that	  conveniently	  and	  constantly	  fit	  the	  mold	  of	  aggressors.	  	  In	  a	  terrible	  case	  of	  irony,	  the	  West	  has	  poisoned	  the	  well	  of	  democracy	  from	  which	  Muslims	  must	  first	  drink,	  so	  to	  speak.	  	  	  	   The	  recent	  events	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  meanwhile,	  illustrate	  the	  ability	  of	  Muslims	  to	  fight	  against	  dictatorships	  in	  non-­‐Islamist	  terms.	  	  In	  Tunisia,	  for	  example,	  enormous	  pressure	  drove	  President	  Ben	  Ali’s	  dictatorship	  out	  of	  power.	  	  The	  case	  of	  Tunisia,	  a	  relatively	  secular	  country,	  is	  interesting	  because	  of	  Tunisians	  were	  protesting	  a	  government	  that,	  while	  a	  dictatorship,	  had	  largely	  eliminated	  Islamist	  movements	  in	  the	  country	  (Angrist).	  	  Islamic	  groups	  in	  Tunisia	  now	  have	  an	  increased	  ability	  to	  participate	  in	  its	  governmental	  processes.	  	  Indeed,	  its	  leaders	  “have	  taken	  pains	  to	  praise	  tolerance	  and	  moderation,	  comparing	  themselves	  to	  the	  Islamic	  parties	  that	  govern	  Turkey	  and	  Malaysia”,	  although	  Islamic	  groups	  have	  certainly	  also	  caused	  friction	  in	  Tunisia	  over	  the	  past	  year	  (Fuller,	  Next	  Question	  for	  Tunisia).	  	  	   How	  Muslims	  view	  the	  West	  is	  thus	  crucial	  to	  making	  democracy	  more	  attractive	  to	  Sunnis	  and	  Shias	  alike.	  	  It	  is	  an	  extraordinarily	  complex	  subject,	  and	  in	  America	  alone	  there	  has	  been	  extensive	  research	  performed	  on	  what	  specifically	  should	  be	  done	  governmentally.	  	  It	  should	  be	  uncontroversial	  to	  state	  that	  the	  West	  should	  no	  longer	  financially	  support	  dictatorial	  regimes,	  as	  it	  simply	  associates	  Western	  ideals	  with	  autocracies.	  	  Further,	  democracy	  that	  comes	  naturally,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  from	  within,	  rather	  than	  at	  the	  front	  of	  an	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Abraham’s	  tank	  has	  proven	  to	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  more	  resilient.	  	  Western	  democracy	  is	  unlikely	  to	  meld	  perfectly	  with	  Muslim	  cultures	  and	  ideologies;	  if	  Muslims	  instead	  use	  concepts	  cited	  in	  this	  thesis,	  then	  all	  the	  better,	  for	  they	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  link	  Islam	  and	  democracy	  in	  an	  authentic	  manner	  and	  to	  thus	  better	  make	  democracy	  a	  more	  appealing	  concept	  as	  an	  Islamic-­‐based	  form	  of	  governance.	  	  The	  international	  community	  should	  support	  not	  only	  secular	  parties,	  but	  Shias	  and	  Sunnis	  that	  support	  democratic	  values;	  the	  perceptions	  of	  a	  certain	  representative	  of	  Florida’s	  22nd	  district	  not	  withstanding,	  such	  Islamic	  leaders	  do	  exist,	  as	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  and	  these	  types	  of	  people	  are	  certain	  to	  make	  democratization	  more	  palatable	  to	  the	  Muslim	  world.	  	  	  	   Socioeconomics	  matter	  as	  well;	  the	  higher	  the	  income	  level	  a	  person	  has,	  the	  younger	  and	  better	  educated	  a	  person	  is,	  the	  more	  likely	  he	  or	  is	  to	  be	  favorable	  towards	  democracy	  (Alkalay,	  126).	  	  It	  could	  very	  well	  be	  that	  these	  individual	  characteristics	  have	  more	  control	  over	  the	  potential	  democratization	  of	  the	  Muslim	  world	  than	  the	  theological	  aspects	  of	  even	  Islam	  as	  a	  whole	  have.	  	  	  	   The	  information	  in	  this	  thesis	  thus	  does	  offer	  a	  few	  useful	  prescriptions,	  some	  less	  obvious	  than	  others.	  	  The	  theological	  differences	  between	  Sunnis	  and	  Shia	  can	  matter	  for	  more	  than	  reasons	  and	  excuses	  for	  sectarian	  violence.	  	  They	  can	  be	  used	  positively	  for	  democratic	  movements,	  and	  government’s	  intent	  on	  democratizing	  the	  Middle	  East	  should	  point	  to	  theological	  concepts	  such	  as	  
ijtihad	  and	  ijma	  as	  means	  to	  achieve	  democratic	  governance.	  	  The	  literature	  review	  of	  this	  thesis	  noted	  that	  in	  order	  for	  democracy	  to	  become	  acceptable	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  “democratic	  ideas	  will	  first	  need	  to	  receive	  legitimation	  on	  the	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basis	  of	  Koranic	  texts	  and	  Islamic	  traditions”	  (Alkalay,	  132).	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  thus	  found	  some	  very	  specific	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  can	  be	  achieved	  for	  both	  branches	  of	  Islam.	  	  It	  is	  not	  hard	  to	  envision	  a	  government	  in	  a	  predominantly	  Sunni	  nation	  using	  ijma	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  democracy;	  democracy	  is,	  after	  all,	  a	  form	  of	  consensus.	  	  Likewise,	  ijtihad	  could	  be	  invoked	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  creating	  amendments	  or	  for	  any	  law	  requiring	  modernization	  or	  updating.	  The	  worrisome	  fact	  is	  that	  all	  democracies	  require	  checks	  and	  balances	  within	  their	  framework,	  something	  that	  no	  amount	  of	  finagling	  of	  Islamic	  theology	  will	  provide	  for.	  	  For	  example,	  while	  in	  “classical	  Islamic	  statecraft,	  the	  ulama	  provided	  the	  sole	  checks	  and	  balances	  on	  the	  ruler”,	  scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  Muslim	  dilemma	  of	  today	  is	  that	  there	  lacks	  a	  system	  of	  accountability	  within	  Islamic	  principles	  (Mehmet,	  73).	  	  Islamic	  principles	  need	  to	  be	  “replaced	  by	  a	  new	  system	  of	  checks	  and	  balances	  limiting	  political	  authority:	  people’s	  power’,	  or	  the	  accountability	  of	  the	  ruler	  directly	  to	  the	  subjects”	  (Mehemt,	  73).	  	  There	  must	  therefore	  be	  a	  desire,	  external	  from	  Islamic	  precepts	  of	  jurisprudence,	  for	  equality	  and	  mutual	  respect	  among	  all	  people	  in	  order	  for	  democracy	  to	  work.	  	  	  	   Although	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  all	  of	  these	  theological	  tenets	  specific	  to	  Shiism	  and	  Sunnism	  have	  been	  used	  in	  contemporary	  democratization	  efforts	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  scholars	  seem	  to	  attribute	  specific	  beliefs	  to	  Islam	  in	  a	  whole	  in	  their	  discussions	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  democracy	  and	  Islam.	  	  	  	  	  Goddard,	  for	  example,	  used	  the	  concept	  of	  ijma	  in	  order	  to	  argue	  that	  Islam	  and	  democracy	  are	  compatible,	  but	  failed	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  vastly	  different	  approaches	  the	  two	  sects	  take	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towards	  ijma.	  	  The	  issue	  is	  not	  that	  these	  scholars	  do	  not	  know	  that	  these	  differences	  exist,	  but	  that	  they	  choose	  to	  present	  specific	  tenets	  as	  inherent	  to	  Islam	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  At	  best,	  it	  is	  misleading	  while	  at	  worst	  it	  is	  dishonest.	  	  	   	  	  	  It	  was	  noted	  “the	  differences	  between	  Shias	  and	  Sunnis	  are…	  not	  only	  political	  but	  also	  theological	  and	  even	  anthropological”,	  and	  indeed	  the	  very	  fabrics	  of	  the	  two	  branches	  are	  different	  (Nasr,	  361).	  Shias,	  after	  all,	  are	  the	  party	  of	  dissent	  and	  the	  followers	  of	  Ali,	  and	  Sunnis	  are	  the	  people	  of	  tradition	  and	  consensus.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  should	  have	  been	  impossible	  to	  fairly	  pass	  judgment	  on	  Muslims	  and	  democracy	  without	  the	  comprehension	  that	  these	  differences	  might	  have	  had	  some	  effect	  on	  analyses.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  astonishing	  that	  such	  differences	  were	  glossed	  over	  or	  mutually	  attributed	  in	  scholarly	  works.	  The	  studying	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  democracy	  and	  Islam	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  an	  important	  field,	  but	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  understand	  that	  beneath	  such	  a	  general	  approach	  remain	  hidden	  some	  very	  meaningful	  differences	  that	  have	  powerful	  implications	  for	  the	  future	  of	  Islam	  and	  democracy.	  	  It	  is	  an	  extremely	  complex	  world	  that	  we	  live	  in	  today,	  and	  efforts	  to	  oversimplify	  it	  can	  only	  lead	  to	  more	  misunderstandings,	  a	  dangerous	  outcome	  for	  us	  all.	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